Dear Kirsti, list:
Thank you for your comment. With regard to seminary philosophy, Peirce cites a familiar passage: “*Ye may know them by their fruits*”, and alternatively, "By their fruits ye shall know them.” Which is reminiscent of Matthew 7:15-17 “Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. *Ye shall know them by their fruits*… Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.” What do you suppose is the complete meaning of this line and why does he choose it when referring to pragmaticism, in particular? Best, Jerry R On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 7:53 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > Jerry, > > If you take "to people who want to find out" to mean: "people who want to > find out by themselves" thus not only to be told so, it makes perfect > sense. - In order to find grounds for this interpretation, you will have to > look elsewhere in the works of CSP. - It is not uncommon that in order to > find the right interpretation for a piece of writing of any philosopher (or > other writer( you'll have to look outsiden the quote or piece in question. > - It is more like a rule. You usually have to. > > As to the other quote, the main message I see, is that actually doing > philosophy. philosphizing, is nos just a matter of words. - Even though > propositional logic, even as now, takes it to be. > > It is for seminary philosophers to do so. CSP never took such endeavours > seriously. To him they were simply second-class philosophers. > > He did not deal with quotes. He dealt with ideas, thoughts, arguments. > > Also, the second quote shows his contempt of taking language as consisting > of WORDS, even chains of words. > > Catching a sense of irony always needs the contexts. Without a sense fot > that anyone gets lost in the web of quotes. > > Best, > > Kirsti Määttänen > > > > > > > > Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 13.11.2016 02:47: > >> Dear list, >> >> How are we to interpret Peirce based strictly on the printed word if >> the philosopher says such things as: >> >> “My book is meant for people who _want to find out; _and people who >> want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.” >> >> I mean, it’s not as though Peirce didn’t understand nuances of >> recovering an author’s intention. For example: >> >> “Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument, >> thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argument >> conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only with >> the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of >> interpretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as GUESSED >> at from other indications, the only fallacies should be such as are >> simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions are >> absolutely inconsistent with their premisses, or because they CONNECT >> PROPOSITIONS BY A SPECIES OF ILLATIVE CONJUNCTION, by which they >> cannot under any circumstances be validly connected. “ >> >> ~_Some Consequences of Four Incapacities_ >> >> ____________ >> >> If to understand irony is to understand that the philosopher may not >> to speak at all (which would then make it _up to us_ to do so), >> >> then what does _this_ perfect philosopher mean? >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo [1] >> >> For example, consider contradictions in the following: >> >> one; _Some Consequences_, 1883 >> >> If _A,_ then _B;_ >> But _A:_ >> [Ergo,] _B._ >> >> two; CP 2.718 (per JAS) 1886 >> >> _Rule. _If _A _is true, _C _is true, >> >> _Case. _In a certain case _A _is true; >> >> _Result. _.·. In that case _C _is true. >> >> three, CP 5.189, 1903 >> >> The surprising fact, C, is observed; >> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, >> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. >> >> _Ergo_ and _Hence_ are illative conjunctions. >> >> But there is also contradiction. >> >> For example, what of the following sequence? >> >> For “This much Peirce had learnt from the medieval doctors, who >> “always called the minor premise the antecedent and the conclusion >> the consequent” (NEM 4, p. 178, 1898). ~ Bellucci and Pietarinen >> >> That is, if “A presents B with a gift C, is a triple relation”, or >> alternatively, “Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings >> something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into >> the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that >> in which itself stands to C”, >> >> then which is the consequent and where the predicate? >> >> In consequence of the identification in question, in S ^ P, I speak of >> S indifferently as _subject_, _antecedent_, or _premise_, and of P as >> _predicate_, _consequent_, or _conclusion_. (Peirce 1880; W4, p. 170, >> >> 170n5) >> >> In other words, when you examine one and two, the consequent is B and >> C. >> >> So, which is the consequent when taken whole? >> >> For what reasons B or C, when even conclusion of a suspicious A? >> >> That is, “Given the separate probabilities of the two consequences, >> >> “If A, then B,” and “If both A and B, then C (1878),” >> >> then perhaps multiple consequences sharing labels for different >> reasons? >> >> “But, first, if ‘being’ has many senses (for it means sometimes >> substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that >> it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other >> categories),” >> >> then what of the next situation in which there are many labels? >> >> In which direction is movement; one two or three? >> >> _________ >> >> To determine consensus opinion on what Peirce said reflects the >> problem of speaking as a single, unified voice on something as >> difficult as man’s glassy essence. But what is our social principle >> for determination here? If we’re not allowed to apply the method of >> that philosopher who gave us his method for scientific guessing to his >> own philosophical writings, then where else should we test abduction? >> >> >> That is, why is it we are doing what we’re doing? What is the good >> in it? >> >> With best wishes, >> Jerry Rhee >> >> PS. If we were to bring into this conversation an old one, then >> >> CP 5.189 over CP 5.402 because illation and _consequentia, _ >> >> which is surprising, for _“_a _consequentia_ is an argument (A, >> therefore B), not a conditional proposition (if A, then B).” >> ~Francesco Bellucci__ >> >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo >> > >
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