Dear Kirsti, list:
You said: *You picked up a metaphor, used by CSP. In order to understand the meaning of any metaphor (in pragmaticist sense), one needs relational thinking connecting an idea with a more developed (a better) idea VIA the metaphorical expession.* It is my experience that some users on this list run first to Peirce quotes to do this, then state their interpretation and hold fast to that meaning, in spite of Reaction put forth by other interlocutors. So there is slow drift of metaphoric meaning, if any at all. As to what Peirce said and the context, he said this about the statement: It has been said to be a sceptical and materialistic principle. But it is only an application of the sole principle of logic which was recommended by Jesus; “*Ye may know them by their fruits*,” and it is very intimately allied with the ideas of the gospel… Their fruit is, therefore, collective; it is the achievement of the whole people. What is it, then, that the whole people is about, what is this civilization that is the outcome of history, but is never completed? We cannot expect to attain a complete conception of it; but we can see that it is a gradual process, that it involves a realization of ideas in man’s consciousness and in his works, and that it takes place by virtue of man’s capacity for learning, and by experience continually pouring upon him ideas he has not yet acquired. That is, the web of relations point at a particular meaning here, (application of the sole principle of logic recommended by Jesus, relates to the ideas of the gospel, a collective achievement, involves a realization of man’s ideas, never completed but *gradual process*, dependent on man’s capacity for learning). In a different place, he again refers to *fruits…* as a “logical rule”, a term that he would not use haphazardly since he puts himself forth *as* a logician: All pragmatists will further agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings of words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by which all the successful sciences…have reached the degrees of certainty that we severally proper to them today;- this experimental method being itself nothing but a particular application of an older *logical rule*, “*By their fruits ye shall know them*.” Given the two situations in which the *fruits…* are used to indicate pragmatism, we could ask of ourselves, *what does pragmaticism mean?* and query whether this symbol is growing or whether complete. Do you believe your conception of pragmaticism to be different in ten years? I admit that I think of myself as having a strong grasp of what pragmaticism means and I don’t genuinely think the meaning will be different in ten years. It does not grow. It is complete. Adding new information does not change its essence. That is, I know of this principle of logic recommended by Jesus that is synonymous with an experimental method by which all the sciences have been successful that I can state clearly. But perhaps my belief is merely hubris, which is to say that I prefer to think of my belief as fallibilist but that is not only for me to judge. We could look at the clear statement together and determine if there is a stronger argument. Upon consideration of that strongest statement and not finding any better, the meaning for me is nearly indubitable and does not grow. In a different place, he doesn’t mention pragmatism specifically, but to an idea involved in pragmatism, which does not disrupt my fallibilist understanding: I can hardly be supposed to have selected the unusual word “uberty” instead of “fruitfulness” merely because it is spelled with half as many letters. Observations may be *fruitful as you will, but they cannot be said to be gravid with young truth* in the sense in which reasoning may be, not because of the nature of the subject it considers, but because of the manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative instinct. I believe there is room for growth in the meaning of this statement but again, it does not alter my view of pragmaticism but only reaffirms it. You said: You seem to assume that it is possible to offer, to explicate a complete meaning of an expression. - But it is just as impossible as it is to express the ultimate truth, once and for all times. This is one way to understand the meaning of “completeness”, but it neglects the finiteness of human life. That is, I assume a different type of complete meaning because while meanings may change, they don’t change so fast that meanings can’t be argued about. Change can be both gradual and abrupt, but they must be fixed enough so that interlocutors can state a position and adhere to it. So words and meanings have lifetimes and symbols don’t grow any faster/slower than users use them. But the completeness concept is more complicated than at first glance. For instance, I asked Gary previously what he meant by completeness and he responded with abduction, deduction, induction, by which I think he meant specifically for *complete inquiry*. Moreover, despite the claim that “We cannot expect to attain a complete conception of it”, Peirce had talked of a “complete meaning”, by which I mean “Complete Sign”: By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a *Complete Sign*. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/complete-sign Thus, a Sign can be complete and imperfect as yet (immature), and completeness is dependent on the Object and on mediation by a collective Mind (commens). I think the important question we ought to ask when attempting to ascertain the complete meaning of a concept is: *Among all complete concepts, is there a complete concept?* In this sense, at least, I think we can talk about a complete meaning of the symbol, “*ye shall know them by their fruits*”. You said: - A lot of math is needed to understand this. - To just take one example: What were the key points in Peirce's critique of Cantor and his theory. I acknowledge that a lot of math is needed to understand this but I haven’t read Peirce’s critique of Cantor and his theory. What in there relates to our problem? What is a mathematical explanation of *ye shall know them by their fruits* that is relevant here, or is that not the point? For we could also talk about a molecular theory of protoplasm for apples, since that is also part of the matter at hand. Best, Jerry Rhee On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 1:09 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > Jerry, > > Instead of jumping into conclusions (iterpretations) on what CSP meant, > let's (as a first step) take closer look on what you did in the act of > writing your response. > > You picked up a metaphor, used by CSP. In order to understand the meaning > of any metaphor (in pragmaticist sense), one needs relational thinking > connecting an idea with a more developed (a better) idea VIA the > metaphorical expession. > > You seem to assume that it is possible to offer, to explicate a complete > meaning of an expression. - But it is just as impossible as it is to > express the ultimate truth, once and for all times. > > Symbols grow, meanings change. Both are contextual, thus also have a > history and a future. > > It is easy to see why (in a teleological sense) CSP re-used a quote from > the Testaments. He was addressing the audience of his times. It was > sensible to assume his readers were quite well familiar with the Testaments > and the Bible. > > In our globalized world, this may not be the case. Some familiarity with > fruits, sheep and wolves may be assumed more common. Although city-people > may know sheep and wolves mostly via television & childhood fairy-tales. > > Just as I earlier tried to point out, the question of a "complete meaning" > of any single verbal expression, or a collection of expressions singled > out. - A lot of math is needed to understand this. - To just take one > example: What were the key points in Peirce's critique of Cantor and his > theory. > > Best, > > Kirsti Määttänen > > > > > > > > In this particular case > > Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 14.11.2016 23:32: > >> Dear Kirsti, list: >> >> Thank you for your comment. >> >> With regard to seminary philosophy, Peirce cites a familiar passage: >> >> “YE MAY KNOW THEM BY THEIR FRUITS”, and alternatively, >> >> "By their fruits ye shall know them.” >> >> Which is reminiscent of Matthew 7:15-17 >> >> “Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing, >> but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. YE SHALL KNOW THEM BY THEIR >> FRUITS… >> >> >> Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad >> fruit.” >> >> What do you suppose is the complete meaning of this line and why does >> he choose it when referring to pragmaticism, in particular? >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 7:53 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: >> >> Jerry, >>> >>> If you take "to people who want to find out" to mean: "people who >>> want to find out by themselves" thus not only to be told so, it >>> makes perfect sense. - In order to find grounds for this >>> interpretation, you will have to look elsewhere in the works of CSP. >>> - It is not uncommon that in order to find the right interpretation >>> for a piece of writing of any philosopher (or other writer( you'll >>> have to look outsiden the quote or piece in question. - It is more >>> like a rule. You usually have to. >>> >>> As to the other quote, the main message I see, is that actually >>> doing philosophy. philosphizing, is nos just a matter of words. - >>> Even though propositional logic, even as now, takes it to be. >>> >>> It is for seminary philosophers to do so. CSP never took such >>> endeavours seriously. To him they were simply second-class >>> philosophers. >>> >>> He did not deal with quotes. He dealt with ideas, thoughts, >>> arguments. >>> >>> Also, the second quote shows his contempt of taking language as >>> consisting of WORDS, even chains of words. >>> >>> Catching a sense of irony always needs the contexts. Without a >>> sense fot that anyone gets lost in the web of quotes. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Kirsti Määttänen >>> >>> Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 13.11.2016 02:47: >>> >>> Dear list, >>>> >>>> How are we to interpret Peirce based strictly on the printed word >>>> if >>>> the philosopher says such things as: >>>> >>>> “My book is meant for people who _want to find out; _and people >>>> who >>>> want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.” >>>> >>>> I mean, it’s not as though Peirce didn’t understand nuances >>>> of >>>> recovering an author’s intention. For example: >>>> >>>> “Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an >>>> argument, >>>> thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the >>>> argument >>>> conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only >>>> with >>>> the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of >>>> interpretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as >>>> GUESSED >>>> at from other indications, the only fallacies should be such as >>>> are >>>> simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions >>>> are >>>> absolutely inconsistent with their premisses, or because they >>>> CONNECT >>>> PROPOSITIONS BY A SPECIES OF ILLATIVE CONJUNCTION, by which they >>>> cannot under any circumstances be validly connected. “ >>>> >>>> ~_Some Consequences of Four Incapacities_ >>>> >>>> ____________ >>>> >>>> If to understand irony is to understand that the philosopher may >>>> not >>>> to speak at all (which would then make it _up to us_ to do so), >>>> >>>> then what does _this_ perfect philosopher mean? >>>> >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo [1] [1] >>>> >>>> >>>> For example, consider contradictions in the following: >>>> >>>> one; _Some Consequences_, 1883 >>>> >>>> If _A,_ then _B;_ >>>> But _A:_ >>>> [Ergo,] _B._ >>>> >>>> two; CP 2.718 (per JAS) 1886 >>>> >>>> _Rule. _If _A _is true, _C _is true, >>>> >>>> _Case. _In a certain case _A _is true; >>>> >>>> _Result. _.·. In that case _C _is true. >>>> >>>> three, CP 5.189, 1903 >>>> >>>> The surprising fact, C, is observed; >>>> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, >>>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. >>>> >>>> _Ergo_ and _Hence_ are illative conjunctions. >>>> >>>> But there is also contradiction. >>>> >>>> For example, what of the following sequence? >>>> >>>> For “This much Peirce had learnt from the medieval doctors, who >>>> “always called the minor premise the antecedent and the >>>> conclusion >>>> the consequent” (NEM 4, p. 178, 1898). ~ Bellucci and >>>> Pietarinen >>>> >>>> That is, if “A presents B with a gift C, is a triple >>>> relation”, or >>>> alternatively, “Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings >>>> something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, >>>> into >>>> the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as >>>> that >>>> in which itself stands to C”, >>>> >>>> then which is the consequent and where the predicate? >>>> >>>> In consequence of the identification in question, in S ^ P, I >>>> speak of >>>> S indifferently as _subject_, _antecedent_, or _premise_, and of >>>> P as >>>> _predicate_, _consequent_, or _conclusion_. (Peirce 1880; W4, p. >>>> 170, >>>> >>>> 170n5) >>>> >>>> In other words, when you examine one and two, the consequent is B >>>> and >>>> C. >>>> >>>> So, which is the consequent when taken whole? >>>> >>>> For what reasons B or C, when even conclusion of a suspicious A? >>>> >>>> That is, “Given the separate probabilities of the two >>>> consequences, >>>> >>>> “If A, then B,” and “If both A and B, then C (1878),” >>>> >>>> then perhaps multiple consequences sharing labels for different >>>> reasons? >>>> >>>> “But, first, if ‘being’ has many senses (for it means >>>> sometimes >>>> substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes >>>> that >>>> it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other >>>> categories),” >>>> >>>> then what of the next situation in which there are many labels? >>>> >>>> In which direction is movement; one two or three? >>>> >>>> _________ >>>> >>>> To determine consensus opinion on what Peirce said reflects the >>>> problem of speaking as a single, unified voice on something as >>>> difficult as man’s glassy essence. But what is our social >>>> principle >>>> for determination here? If we’re not allowed to apply the >>>> method of >>>> that philosopher who gave us his method for scientific guessing >>>> to his >>>> own philosophical writings, then where else should we test >>>> abduction? >>>> >>>> That is, why is it we are doing what we’re doing? What is the >>>> good >>>> in it? >>>> >>>> With best wishes, >>>> Jerry Rhee >>>> >>>> PS. If we were to bring into this conversation an old one, then >>>> >>>> CP 5.189 over CP 5.402 because illation and _consequentia, _ >>>> >>>> which is surprising, for _“_a _consequentia_ is an argument (A, >>>> therefore B), not a conditional proposition (if A, then B).” >>>> ~Francesco Bellucci__ >>>> >>>> Links: >>>> ------ >>>> [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo [1] >>>> >>> >> >> >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo >> > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
