Clark, John, list,
I am not nearly as skilled in this subject, and about Peirce-texts as you are, but I am happy to learn, that Peirce was opposed to positivism and behaviourism. Because I always was having the impression, that Peirce was a bit on the positivist side: There is always the emphasis on "habit", when it is about thirdness. In Tychism even the natural laws are due to habit. Habit for me does not seem to be a metaphysical concept. I think for example, that emergence is something completely different from habit, though thirdness. Ok, the term "emergence" did not exist at the time of Peirce, it has to do with chaos theory. But there was transcendental philosophy, and Peirce sort of started with Kant. But if you compare Kants and Peirces concepts of "A-Priori", then there is a difference: For Kant it means something like conditions for knowledge out of pure reason. For Peirce, in his four methods of inquiry, it is rather something having to do with feeling or instinct. Which are positive things, but not transcendent, grounded in metaphysics, things. So I am a bit confused now. Ok, you might say, that semiotics is a sort of metaphysics, and a behaviour has a better chance to become a habit if it goes along with existing transcendental laws such as pure reason or natural laws. The latter though are habits themselves, so: Circle. Remains pure reason. Did Peirce believe in that, or is it also a matter of habit for him? Confused, but wishing you the
Best,
Helmut
On Dec 5, 2016, at 7:05 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent
of what any particular person thinks about it is key.
That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the
laws of nature are "really real".
It’s a major point but not an universal one. Especially among physicists Feynman’s loose adoption of a kind of instrumentalism was influential. So it wasn’t just Mach or certain aspects of the positivists. Of course most physicists who haven’t studied any philosophy end up with an incoherent mess of views on the nature of physical laws. Sometimes a realist, sometimes an idealist, sometimes a Feynman like denial that anything matters but calculating. At least in my experience with physicists. (Chemists are somewhat different due to a more practical field)
However I think what Peirce did differently was in thinking of the laws of physics in terms of thirdness. I don’t think most others - even those who were realists about law - put them in quite that formulation. (If only because few thought of things in those terms)
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