BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Jon Awbrey- I'd certainly agree with your statement below:
"I declared myself long ago as one who sees more continuity
of development than radical shift in Peirce's thought over
his lifetime."
That is one reason why I'm not interested that much in the dates of
the writings; my focus is on the content, and I view that content as
a coherent long term exploration - without radical shifts.
Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.
http://www.primus.ca
On Sat 25/03/17 10:54 AM , Jon Awbrey [email protected] sent:
Clark, List,
With respect to the issues surrounding “modal realism” —
what position Peirce took up and when up did he take it —
let me refer to a figure I constantly have in mind, one
I drew to map the first few principalities in Peirce's
classification of sciences:
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
[1]
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/31/definition-and-determination-4/
[2]
The picture reminds us of both the analogy and the disparity
between phenomenology, our observation of actual appearances,
and mathematics, our observation of possible existence, with
“possible” in this case meaning no more than not inconsistent.
The disparity is something we come to know as the fallibility,
partiality, or subjectivity of all our models, representations,
and theories of reality.
The most astute physicists appreciate the significance of this
disparity or gap, and there is a famous quip by Einstein that
testifies to it, but more often than not I think they tend to
get by like the rest of us, with a variety of naive realism.
On the other foot, doing mathematics requires one to remain more
steadily recognizant of the di-stance between these two footings,
the terra firma of actuality and Plato's heaven of possibilities.
This makes the position described as “modal realism” the modus
operandi or standard operating philosophy in mathematics, so
taken for granted that its marching orders need no banners
or fanfare in the ordinary course of work.
I declared myself long ago as one who sees more continuity
of development than radical shift in Peirce's thought over
his lifetime. What I do see changing through the years is
the greater diversity of his audiences as the river of his
work flows from its constant sources to the alluvial delta
he left for us to sift. The greatest share of variance in
what he writes is explained more by variations in the whom
he is addressing than the what he is trying to communicate.
Drawing the conclusion in the present case, my initial guess
would be that any apparent conversion to modal realism is more
likely explained by an increasing need to underscore attitudes
of mind that are simply tacit in the scientific application of
formal logic, mathematics, probability, and statistics.
Regards,
Jon
On 3/17/2017 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Re:
> CG:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00012.html
[3]
> CG:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-03/msg00111.html
[4]
>
> Clark,
>
> I've been trying to get back to the questions you raised
> on your initial “Truth as Regulative or Real” thread and
> again on this one, but there are a number of underlying
> issues that require a measure of preparation on my part.
> I've made scattered remarks on these issues many times
> over the last couple of decades, without quite sensing
> much success in making them clear, so I'm going to do
> my best to put together a more coherent account this
> time around.
>
> Until then ...
>
> Jon
>
> On 3/13/2017 6:51 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:
>>
>>> On Mar 13, 2017, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>>
>>> I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused
by ignoring [Peirce]”
>>> and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a
“Procrustian bed
>>> for CSP's concepts” are very apt in this context, and I will
have more to say
>>> in that regard if I can get to it.
>>
>> I think so too, but I think we should make explicit what other
doctrines Peirce held that was different from the
>> mainstream of philosophy lead to these differences. Off the top
of my head I think you have to mention the following:
>>
>> scholastic realism vs. nominalism
>> modal realism vs. actualism (primarily for the late Peirce
although with the
>> pragmatic maxim he moved to counterfactuals reasonably
early)
>> externalism vs. internalism
>> signs vs. thoughts in a mind (i.e. the interpretant need not be
a human mind)
>> verification as meaning vs. verification as truth
>>
>> There’s probably some others but those five see the key
differences that make terms like correspondence or coherence
>> misleading at best.
>>
>
--
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ [5]
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey [6]
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey [7]
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA [8]
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache [9]
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com%2F2014%2F08%2Fpeirce-syllabus.jpg
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.com%2F2012%2F05%2F31%2Fdefinition-and-determination-4%2F
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Flist.iupui.edu%2Fsympa%2Farc%2Fpeirce-l%2F2017-03%2Fmsg00012.html
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Flist.iupui.edu%2Fsympa%2Farc%2Fpeirce-l%2F2017-03%2Fmsg00111.html
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Finquiryintoinquiry.com%2F
[6]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Findependent.academia.edu%2FJonAwbrey
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.oeis.org%2Fwiki%2FUser%3AJon_Awbrey
[8]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fintersci.ss.uci.edu%2Fwiki%2Findex.php%2FJLA
[9]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FJonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
