Edwina, List: ET: I find that a lot of attention on this list seems to focus on specific and particular definitions of terms - and I have to say, I'm not terribly interested in that area.
In my view, this is not surprising at all, since you routinely redefine terms to suit your own theories--thus violating Peirce's ethics of terminology. ET: I'm interested in the process of transforming one morphological form of matter/concept into another morphological form - which is done by semiosis. In my view, this is not an accurate description of what semeiosis actually does. ET: Those are the areas where I feel Peircean semiosis has a LOT to say. In my view, those are the areas where *Taborskyan *semiosis apparently has a lot to say, but *Peircean *semeiotic has little or nothing to say. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > I agree - there isn't a Mind. And yes, 'semiosis itself is determinative > of mind' - though I would also say that mind, understood not as A Mind, but > as the process of Being Mind determines > semiosis-which-determines-Mind-which...and > so on. > > My focus in Peircean semiosis is the process. I find that a lot of > attention on this list seems to focus on specific and particular > definitions of terms - and I have to say, I'm not terribly interested in > that area. It seems to me at least, mechanical and static. I'm interested > in the process of transforming one morphological form of matter/concept > into another morphological form - which is done by semiosis. So, the > process of transforming one cell to another cell; the process of > transforming information of a Dynamic Object to a Dynamic Interpretant - > which Interpretant can also function as a Dynamic Object for another > Dynamic Interpretant and as well, transform into the habits-of-form that > are vested within the Representamen. Those are the areas where I feel > Peircean semiosis has a LOT to say. > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Tue 28/03/17 6:36 PM , Clark Goble [email protected] sent: > > On Mar 28, 2017, at 4:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > Clark, list - I think that the point of a primordial symbol is that it > MUST be interpreted to exist even as a symbolic reality. > > An other way to put my question is to ask what this “be interpreted” > means. We have to unpack it. > > The traditional way in philosophy this is taken is in the Cartesian or > Kantian sense where there is a mind that makes a judgment. I think that > Peirce ultimately rejected this. There isn’t a mind. Rather semiosis > itself is determinative of mind. So the flow from object through sign to > interpretant is what makes a mind. And it’s precisely that this movement > happens throughout the universe that the universe is mind-like. > > So to say an icon is only an icon when interpreted as such read literally > puts a mind like substance doing an interpretation. Instead we might say an > icon is constituent of a part of mind. > > There’s some very real ontological issues here. > > Again my usual caveat that one need not buy Peirce’s ontology or cosmology > to use his semiotics. They’re controversial for good reason. It works fine > if one prefers to simply think of interpretation in the more traditional > way. However Peirce means something much more radical in terms of the > ontology of objects as well as the ontology of the relation between signs > and objects. > >
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