That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack of imagination.
John John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John - thanks for the quotation. I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a sign, even all by itself. That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the FUNCTION of the triad. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> sent: I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM To: John Collier Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John C., List: [John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing. Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them. Would you at least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? [John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago. Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS [R] 914:5-6 The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs… John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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