Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term
'sign' to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can
become a sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes
- in that case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of
Peirce - that is exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an
Object. That is how things develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean
framework.
That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic
Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially
separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of
DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that
is the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness.
Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is
observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it
is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would
be semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand.
Edwina
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On Thu 30/03/17 4:10 PM , John Collier [email protected] sent:
That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are
certainly many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for
representamen. One of the problems I have with sign used this way in
all cases is that the interpretant can be a sign with the original
sign its object. The only way I have been able to diagram this is
with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack of
imagination.
John
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant".
Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must
have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign
FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a
sign, even all by itself.
That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] -
because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only
within the FUNCTION of the triad.
Edwina
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On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier [email protected] [3]
sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is
just talk.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected] [4]]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: [email protected] [5]
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John C., List:
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing.
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that
consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant. If there
are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I
can take a look at them. Would you at least agree that Peirce
predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating?
[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is
hard to understand if the sign meant here is the representamen
alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and
interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature
to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the
iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time
ago.
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness
[R] | MS [R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it
is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign
has an object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately
represented in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It
is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to the object
of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it
is in its pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own
firstness. Upon these considerations are founded six trichotomic
divisions of signs…
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [6]
Links:
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[2] http://www.primus.ca
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5]
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[6] http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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