Clark, Jon S, Gary F, Edwina, John S, list, This is a most interesting discussion, but for now I'd like only to repeat a point which, as I recall, Jon S recently made in response to you. You wrote:
It’s also the case that chance creates habit. But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may *break up* old habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur--but I don't see that "chance creates habit" either in Peirce's early cosmological musings, nor once *this* universe--our universe--is underway. The habit-taking tendency (3ns) is there from the get-go, either as primordial (in the sense that all three categories are) or, to put it somewhat differently and with a different emphasis, in the sense that one can derive monadic and dyadic relations from triadic ones, but that stringing together monads and dyads (although properly speaking monads can't even be strung together) could* never* produce triads (nor a fortiori produce all higher -adities according to Peirce's 'reduction thesis'). While some would disagree, Jon S and I have argued here near the close of last year that the 'black board' metaphor in the final lecture of RLT strongly suggests that if one associates continuity with 3ns (which Peirce in places explicitly does), then continuity (so 3ns) is primal and the two other categories are either derived from--or inscribed upon--that ur-continuity or, in some obscure way contained within it (potentially) from the outset--although this last matter remains quite unclear to me at present (alathough I think Jon S might say 'inscribed upon it'). But, again, my present question is, why do you continue to say that "chance creats habit"? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Apr 5, 2017, at 10:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > I would suggest that 1ns is better characterized as spontaneity, life, and > freedom than as pure chance in the sense of randomness, especially as it > relates to mind as 3ns. > > > I’ve been trying to think the best way to get into this subject. I > recognize it’ll diverge from Edwina’s discussion so I’m changing the > subject. It’ll definitely get into ontology and a careful analysis of > terminology which I know Edwina doesn’t enjoy so that’ll help keep the > discussions separate. > > The question ends up being even if we can make a distinction between the > terms what the cash value is. That is if meaning is given by a careful > application of the pragmatic maxim, what does it mean here? > > First off I’m not sure there’s as big a divide as you think in those > quoted texts. Particulary this one. > > Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term *to > express with accuracy* the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity. (CP > 6.201; 1898) > > > I think that while Peirce may not have been familiar with Gibb’s > development over Boltzmann of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, he > did have pretty clear and particular views on what the mathematics of > chance was. That is he was a frequentist and thought the outward aspect > *mathematically* was this frequentist conception. The inner aspect is > feeling. > > Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion feeling > exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that which within > itself is feeling. > [—] > …diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity; and wherever > diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative. On the other hand, > wherever uniformity is increasing, habit must be operative. (“Man’s Glassy > Essence”, CP 6.265-6, 1892) > > > Chance […] as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a distribution. > That is to say, there is a large collection consisting, say, of colored > things and of white things. Chance is a particular manner of distribution > of color among all the things. But in order that this phrase should have > any meaning, it must refer to some definite arrangement of all the things. > (“Reasoning and the Logic of Things”, CP 6.74, 1898) > > Given this, while I understand the desire to distinguish spontaneity from > chance as Peirce uses it they are synonymous. That means that the > distinction you find in say the free will literature between chance and > libertarian free will (either at an event level or agent level) It’s also > the case that chance creates habit. So habit is a kind of relationship > between determinism and indeterminism (chance). > > In terms of meaning, I just don’t see any basis for a distinction in > content between chance, spontaneity or so forth. The only difference is > that Peirce’s ontology sees “feeling” or absolute firstness as the inner > quality of this. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
