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And here we still have a sticking point. Jon wrote:
"So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is primordial overall,
but I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three
Categories were present from the very beginning of our existing
universe."
Yes, in my view, all three categories were present from the very
beginning of our existing universe. BUT, I define them all therefore,
as primordial, because I cannot see that any category/thing..was prior
to the existential emergence of the Universe. That includes Mind; I
consider Mind to be made up of all three categories.
So- that remains a key difference. Nothing wrong with that - just -
it's 'there'.
Edwina
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On Sat 08/04/17 12:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary R., Edwina, Clark, List:
Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that
"Ideas, or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns,
"whatever has its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect
actualization on account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP
2:478-479; 1908). I found this distinction very helpful in sorting
out Peirce's cosmology when we were discussing it on the List last
fall.
As I said back then, I believe that we should interpret Peirce's
earlier writings on the subject, including "A Guess at the Riddle"
(1887-8) and the Monist metaphysical series (1891-3), in light of his
later writings, including the RLT lectures (1898) and "A Neglected
Argument" (1908). So I agree with Gary that 3ns as continuity is
primordial overall, but I think that both of us agree with Edwina
that all three Categories were present from the very beginning of our
existing universe. On that basis, the three of us also seem to agree
that while chance as 1ns can break up habits, it does not create new
ones, since that is a matter of 3ns.
Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two]
categories of chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is
continuous. This ends up being important in various ways." However,
I do not recall seeing that statement in any of Clark's messages, and
it also does not show up in the List archive. More importantly, where
does this notion arise in Peirce's writings?
Clark's earlier observation that "chance is the outward aspect of
that which within itself is feeling" (CP 6.265; 1892) points the way
to one possible translation of the three modes of Interpretants in
human semeiosis (feeling/action/thought) to the physico-chemical and
biological realms.
*1ns could be chance, spontaneity, freedom, indeterminism,
"sporting"; the question then becomes how this can be a
possible/actual/habitual effect produced by a Sign, since we usually
associate such concepts with the absence of a (sufficient) cause.
*2ns was always the clearest, as there are obviously
physical/existential actions and reactions in nature, and we can also
recognize Peirce's use of "law" as brute determinism here.
*3ns could be habit-taking or what Clark called "the statistical
tendency," although my working hypothesis is that all (and only)
Final Interpretants are habits. I guess that we would then have the
Immediate Interpretant as a range of possible habit-takings, the
Dynamic Interpretant as any actual habit-taking, and the Final
Interpretant as a habit of habit-taking; but is this sufficiently
analogous to possible/actual/habitual thoughts in human semeiosis?
I see that Clark also commented yesterday, "If law were primordial it
wouldn’t need to be explained whereas Peirce is explicit that it
must be explained." This suggests that if continuity is indeed
primordial, then it does not need to be explained--and it seems to me
that this is basically what Peirce was arguing in CP 6.490 (1908),
although there he referred instead to "super-order" and "super-habit"
as "any general state of things whatsoever." I understand his claim
to be that the Reality of God--or Mind, as Edwina prefers to say--as
Ens necessarium is the only postulate or premise that can account for
the reality of the three Universes of Experience, without already
assuming it. On the other hand, if we take all three Categories to
be primordial overall, then none of them needs to be explained--and I
suspect that Peirce would reject this as blocking the way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:40 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, List,
What you just wrote ("that the "womb of indeterminacy" is "the
original continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and habit as
"a generalizing tendency" emerges from that primordial continuity")
reminded me that Aristotle's notion of potentiality is more like
Peirce's idea of "would-be's" (3ns) than it is like the notion of
simple possibility, or, "may-be's" (1ns).
Both these thinkers argued that the distinction between simple
possibilities versus potentialities hinges on the idea that the later
(unlike simple possiblities) can come into being of their own accord,
so to speak, only when the conditions are ripe for this (emergence,
evolution) to happen and nothing interferes with it happening.
So, in several papers and on this list I have sometimes extended
Peirce's term "would-be's" in just this direction by writing that we
should think of potentialites as "would-be's were the conditions in
place for their coming into being."
One of the fundamental conditions for this emergence is "that
primordial continuity" which you noted. Something likes this seems to
me essential in consideration of all emergence, evolution,
autopoiesis, etc.
Best,
Gary R.
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745718
482-5690 [2]
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 6:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
I have been tied up all day, and may have more to say later. For
now, I just want to point out what Peirce wrote about continuity,
potentiality, and habit in the last RLT lecture.
CSP: This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a
generalization, and as such a general, and as such a continuum or
continuity. It must have its origin in the original continuity which
is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent
in potentiality, which is essentially general. (CP 6.204; 1898)
My understanding of Peirce is thus that the "womb of indeterminacy"
is "the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality," and
habit as "a generalizing tendency" emerges from that primordial
continuity.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 5:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Edwina, Clark, John S, List,
Clark wrote:
I think Peirce has [two] categories of chance. One is discontinuous
whereas the other is continuous. This ends up being important in
various ways.
I see a change, shall we say an evolution, in Peirce's thinking
towards a much greater emphasis on continuity as his studies of the
mathematical concept deepens. His later cosmological writings, esp.
RLT but also the N.A, as well as the many papers and MSS where he
discusses continuity, strongly suggest to me that Peirce comes to
emphasize 3ns as continuity (and generality) while earlier he had
associated it principally with habit (and lawfulness). So in the
latter part of his career one reads such passages as this:
1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things:
Detached Ideas continued and the Dispute between Nominalists and
Realists | RLT 160
… the continuum is all that is possible, in whatever dimension
it be continuous (in Commens dictionary)And as Eliseo Fernandez
remarks. Peirce generalizes the idea of generalization such that
continuity is seen by him to the highest form of generality.
http://www.lindaha
[7]ll.org/media/papers/fernandez/habit_and_generalization.pdf
"Peirce’s logical and mathematical investigations, especially his
unfinished theory on the mathematical continuum, and his existential
graphs, led him to his doctrine of synechism, and to consider
mathematical continuity as the highest form of generality"
And see this Abstract from a "Panel Proposal for SAAP 2010."
http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/CLT/PD04.htm [8]
[T]here is an unfortunate tendency to reduce Thirdness to habit,
ignoring the various other examples of Thirdness Peirce gives, such
as continuity, generality, and law. . . Habit, after all, is [but]
one sort of Thirdness. . .
[One panelist's paper] aims to explore Peirce’s conception of a
habit in light of his cenopythagorean categories and also post-1900
attempts to classify the various kinds of signs. . . . Here the
inquiry will follow three paths: the relationship between the
different examples of Thirdness (continuity, generality, law, etc.),
the relationship between the three categories (that a proper
Thirdness includes Secondness and Firstness ) [I would correct this
to "involves" rather than "includes" GR], and finally an especial
focus on the notion of degenerate forms of a category to see what
kind of Thirdness habits are. In other words, instead of the usual
procedure of appealing to habits to illustrate Thirdness, this
section [of the paper] attempts to use an account of Thirdness to
clarify Peirce’s understanding of what constitutes a habit
(emphasis added).
Edwina wrote:
Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I
don't see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of
different habits. But habit-taking is primordial.
Ah, I thought for a moment that we were going to be in complete
agreement here, Edwina (but I'm glad to see that we too seem to be
coming to agreement in at least certain matters); however, you
continued:
ET: My only difference is that I think that the tendency to behave
within Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - each of which are
different behaviours - all three are primordial. I don't see that
Thirdness is privileged in this set; i.e., First-in-line.
As I've previously argued, I don't see "habit-taking" but, rather,
continuity as primordial, again this following from Peirce's
argumentation in the 1898 RLT.
And in terms of the categories I tend to agree with the seminar
paper author in the passage highlighted "that a proper Thirdness
includes Secondness and Firstness," this in the sense of involution
as Peirce argues for it as propelling the generation of the
categories in "The Logic of Mathematics" paper; namely, that--and as
opposed to "Hegelian evolution" (i.e., loosely, dialectic) where the
path is 1ns -> 2ns -> 3ns--that in the generation of the categories
that the path is just the oppose: 3ns involves 2ns and 1ns and 2ns
involves 1ns.
So, it's not so much a matter of 3ns being "first-in-line" but
rather it's involving (in the mathematical sense just mentioned) the
other categories.
And, again, I am here most interested in what I see to be the
primordial nature of that most general form of 3ns, continuity which
"is all that is possible, in whatever dimension it be continuous."
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New YorkC 745718
482-5690 [9]
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R - I agree with your comment re 'chance creates habit'. I
don't see how this could happen. Chance enables the development of
different habits.
But habit-taking is primordial. My only difference is that I think
that the tendency to behave within Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness - each of which are different behaviours - all three are
primordial. I don't see that Thirdness is privileged in this set;
i.e., First-in-line.
Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 1:58 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
[12] sent:
Clark, Jon S, Gary F, Edwina, John S, list,
This is a most interesting discussion, but for now I'd like only to
repeat a point which, as I recall, Jon S recently made in response to
you. You wrote:
It’s also the case that chance creates habit.
But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up
old habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to
occur--but I don't see that "chance creates habit" either in Peirce's
early cosmological musings, nor once *this* universe--our universe--is
underway. The habit-taking tendency (3ns) is there from the get-go,
either as primordial (in the sense that all three categories are) or,
to put it somewhat differently and with a different emphasis, in the
sense that one can derive monadic and dyadic relations from triadic
ones, but that stringing together monads and dyads (although properly
speaking monads can't even be strung together) could never produce
triads (nor a fortiori produce all higher -adities according to
Peirce's 'reduction thesis').
While some would disagree, Jon S and I have argued here near the
close of last year that the 'black board' metaphor in the final
lecture of RLT strongly suggests that if one associates continuity
with 3ns (which Peirce in places explicitly does), then continuity
(so 3ns) is primal and the two other categories are either derived
from--or inscribed upon--that ur-continuity or, in some obscure way
contained within it (potentially) from the outset--although this last
matter remains quite unclear to me at present (alathough I think Jon S
might say 'inscribed upon it').
But, again, my present question is, why do you continue to say that
"chance creats habit"?
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New YorkC 745718
482-5690 [13]
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:00 PM, Clark Goble wrote: On Apr 5, 2017,
at 10:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: I would suggest that 1ns is
better characterized as spontaneity, life, and freedom than as pure
chance in the sense of randomness, especially as it relates to mind
as 3ns.I’ve been trying to think the best way to get into this
subject. I recognize it’ll diverge from Edwina’s discussion so
I’m changing the subject. It’ll definitely get into ontology and
a careful analysis of terminology which I know Edwina doesn’t enjoy
so that’ll help keep the discussions separate.
The question ends up being even if we can make a distinction between
the terms what the cash value is. That is if meaning is given by a
careful application of the pragmatic maxim, what does it mean here?
First off I’m not sure there’s as big a divide as you think in
those quoted texts. Particulary this one.
Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to
express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity.
(CP 6.201; 1898)
I think that while Peirce may not have been familiar with Gibb’s
development over Boltzmann of statistical mechanics and
thermodynamics, he did have pretty clear and particular views on what
the mathematics of chance was. That is he was a frequentist and
thought the outward aspect mathematically was this frequentist
conception. The inner aspect is feeling.
Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there in the same proportion
feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward aspect of that
which within itself is feeling.[—]…diversification is the vestige
of chance-spontaneity; and wherever diversity is increasing, there
chance must be operative. On the other hand, wherever uniformity is
increasing, habit must be operative. (“Man’s Glassy Essence”,
CP 6.265-6, 1892)
Chance […] as an objective phenomenon, is a property of a
distribution. That is to say, there is a large collection consisting,
say, of colored things and of white things. Chance is a particular
manner of distribution of color among all the things. But in order
that this phrase should have any meaning, it must refer to some
definite arrangement of all the things. (“Reasoning and the Logic
of Things”, CP 6.74, 1898)
Given this, while I understand the desire to distinguish spontaneity
from chance as Peirce uses it they are synonymous. That means that the
distinction you find in say the free will literature between chance
and libertarian free will (either at an event level or agent level)
It’s also the case that chance creates habit. So habit is a kind of
relationship between determinism and indeterminism (chance).
In terms of meaning, I just don’t see any basis for a distinction
in content between chance, spontaneity or so forth. The only
difference is that Peirce’s ontology sees “feeling” or absolute
firstness as the inner quality of this.
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