Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self
with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact
that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of
electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that
differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. 

         in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional
facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if
they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of
dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even
look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog.  
But -  in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are
similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of
stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each individual
token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more
adaptive diversity - and less stability. 

        I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms -
the biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token,
removing the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes
from the Type could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli. 

        Edwina
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 On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
  Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a
molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains
electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and
other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in
physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability
of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear
borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs
of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears
in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause?
(...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there
obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would
mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). Best, Helmut    
08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"   

        Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point. 

        I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law. 

        Edwina
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 On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:   
John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there
are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have
been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut     08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.
 I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
 Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
 An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
 babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
 John
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