Thanks, Jon, I had not seen that observation from Jappy before.
The operative phrase in what I wrote is “as a substitute for”.
We always have the task of classifying signs and classifying
objects but the problems arise when your favorite ism thinks
that half the work will do double duty. It hardly ever does.
Dyadic forms of correspondence between syntactic structures
and objective functions are always nice when you can get them
and it's always worth taking advantage of them when they occur.
It would make things a whole lot simpler if the forms of signs
always mirrored the forms of their objects. That is one of the
attractions of Fregean compositionality and Russell's isomorphism
theory and it's one of the reasons programming language designers
keep to the realm of context-free languages for as long as they can.
Taking the Chomsky–Schützenberger Hierarchy as our first rough guide
to the complexity of formal languages and the competencies demanded of
their processors, we run into a critical point at the threshold between
context-free and context-sensitive languages where the mirror of language
breaks and the triadic nature of genuine symbols can no longer be avoided.
Regards,
Jon
On 6/13/2017 12:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jon A., List:
JA: As I am realizing more and more in recent years, analyzing and
classifying signs as a substitute for analyzing and classifying objects
is the first slip of a slide into nominalism, namely, the idea that the
essence or reality of objects is contained in the signs we use to describe
them.
Not sure if this is related, but Tony Jappy seems to think that Peirce
changed the basis of his efforts at Sign classification from how a Sign
represents its Object (1903) to what sort of Object a Sign represents
(1908). The latter involves the two different Objects and three different
Interpretants that are associated with each Sign, and situates all six
correlates in Universes (Possible/Existent/Necessitant) rather than
Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), although there is an apparent alignment between
the two types of trichotomy. Could this perceived shift from phenomenology
to ontology perhaps reflect a desire to emphasize realism over against
nominalism?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 9:15 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Post : The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 9
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/
Peircers,
I took some pains to trace the threads on rhemes, rhemata, etc. back before
the U.S. holiday disruptions and the home improvement havoc that wrecked my
own concentration. Here is the blog rehash of that record leading up to my
opening post on the subject this month.
Re: Peirce List Discussion
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00034.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00043.html )
• GF ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/ )
• GR ( http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/05/rhematics/#comment-1194 )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00044.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00045.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00046.html )
• GF ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00047.html )
• JA ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00048.html )
• GR ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00051.html )
• JFS ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00052.html )
The just-so-story that relative terms got their meanings by blanking out
pieces of meaningful clauses or phrases, along with the analogies to
polyunsaturated chemical valences, make for engaging ways of introducing
the logic of relative terms and the mathematics of relations but they both
run into cul-de-sacs when taken too literally, and for the same reason.
They tempt one to confuse the syntactic accidents used to suggest formal
objects with the essential forms of the objects themselves. That is the
sort of confusion that leads to syntacticism and on to its kindred
nominalism.
Here's a note I appended to the InterSciWiki article on Relative Terms the
last time questions about rhemes or rhemata came up.
Relative Term
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relative_term
Discussion
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Talk:Relative_term
I wanted to check out some impressions I formed many years ago —
this would have been the late 1960s and probably mainly from CP 3 & 4 —
about Peirce's use of the words rhema, rheme, rhemata, etc.
Rhema, Rheme
* CP 2.95, 250-265, 272, 317, 322, 379, 409n
* CP 3.420-422, 465, 636
* CP 4.327, 354, 395n, 403, 404, 411, 438, 439, 441, 446, 453, 461, 465,
470, 474, 504, 538n, 560, 621
Reviewing the variations and vacillations in Peirce's usage over the
years, I've decided to avoid those terms for now. As I am realizing more
and more in recent years, analyzing and classifying signs as a substitute
for analyzing and classifying objects is the first slip of a slide into
nominalism, namely, the idea that the essence or reality of objects is
contained in the signs we use to describe them.
Add a comment to this post:
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/13/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-9/#respond
Regards,
Jon
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