Gary R,
After I mentioned Peirce’s “narrow sense” of the term “logic,” you asked, “What narrow sense?” What I had in mind was mainly CP 1.444: [[ The term “logic” is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs being signs (which Duns Scotus called grammatica speculativa, also of the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another, ought, for the sake of taking advantage of an old association of terms, be called rhetorica speculativa, but which I content myself with inaccurately calling objective logic, because that conveys the correct idea that it is like Hegel's logic. The present inquiry is a logical one in the broad sense.]] The “present inquiry” was, of course, his “Logic of Mathematics” c.1896. In his Outline Classification of the Sciences (EP2:260), Peirce uses “logic” in both senses, first the narrow and then the broad: [[ Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and upon mathematics. All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; 2, Critic, which classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; 3, Methodeutic, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it. ]] You can read this as classifying logic in the broad sense under the Normative head, and I think Jeff and John have already explained why these divisions are not mutually exclusive in the practice of these sciences, so I won’t object to that reading. Earlier you quoted Peirce in 2.111: [[ … now we have to examine whether there be a doctrine of signs corresponding to Hegel's objective logic; that is to say, whether there be a life in Signs, so that--the requisite vehicle being present--they will go through a certain order of development, and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that the same round of changes of form is described over and over again whatever be the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to such a repetitive order, there be also a greater life-history that every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes through, and what is the nature of it (emphasis added to show that this "greater life-history" of a symbol requires "a vehicle of life." ]] Apparently you missed my response to this, so I should make it more explicit. You interpret it as referring to “a life form as a vehicle,” meaning by “life form” a category that excludes AI learning systems on the ground that they are “machines” and not “natural.” But Peirce does not say that. What he says is that the “life in Signs” can evolve only if the signs are instantiated in some form whose actual uses can vary. Thus a symbol can evolve and “grow” only if it is actually replicated many times, vocally or in print or on a computer monitor or in someone’s pattern of brain activity. For Peirce, it is the sign that is alive, because its vehicle is variable; but he does not say that the vehicle must be a “life form” in your narrow sense of that term. The sign/vehicle distinction here is analogous to the type/token distinction, or in biology, the species/population distinction. Just as a species cannot evolve without being instantiated in many individuals, a sign cannot evolve without being repeatedly instantiated in sinsigns, i.e. without being actually used. This is what Peirce calls the “doctrine of signs corresponding to Hegel's objective logic.” I tried to say this earlier by saying that “I don’t agree that my laptop is a sign-user. I think it’s a vehicle and I’m the user (of the signs instantiated by the computer hardware).” But apparently that was too elliptical, so I’m spelling it out further here. Your interpretation is based on your conviction that Peirce’s references to “life in signs” are metaphorical, which I don’t accept. But I won’t try to change your mind about that, or about the potential of learning systems to evolve even though they don’t fit into your concept of a “life form.” I’m just taking note of the difference between your reading of Peirce and mine (as mine is represented in Turning Signs). Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 17-Jun-17 17:59 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason Gary F, Jeff, John S, list, A half hour or so I wrote to Jeff off-list to say regarding his most recent post: The crucial distinction you've made here between the theoretic and the idioscopic sciences is, I believe, at the heart of the matter, whatever the 'normative' concerns may be. So I'm clearly confused as to what you mean by writing this, Gary: GF: But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part of “logic” in Peirce’s broad sense) as “normative” simply because you’ve subsumed all of semiotics under “logic” in Peirce’s narrow sense, which is indeed normative. What narrow sense? As Jeff noted, theoretical esthetics, ethics, and the three branches of logic as semiotic (speculative, or theoretical grammar, critical logic and speculative, or theoretical rhetoric) are given as normative by Peirce in his late Classification of Sciences. So why are you suggesting that speculative grammar is not normative? Or rather, what is this distinction between "narrow" and "broad" that you're making? Peirce, it seems to me, sometimes calls the 2nd branch of logic, Critical Logic, "logic as logic." That would seem to be the narrower sense of logic. But all three branches are designated "normative" by Peirce. GF: Concerning your later post, about Peirce’s classificatory schemes of triadic relations, I think it runs into problems with equivocation on some of the terms used as class names, such as “organic” and “growth,” which prevent its being of much use for sorting out the relations among mind, life and semiosis. I don’t think that can be done without delving into biology and physics as well as semiotics (as Terrence Deacon and others have done, and as I have tried to do in my book). I would be interested as to where in Peirce's classification of the sciences list members (perhaps for the moment especially Jeff, Gary, and John) think the "classificatory schemes of triadic relations" (and the entire argumentation of "The Mathematics of Logic") ought be placed. Also, in consideration of Gary F's comments relating to biology and physics, apparently contra Jeff's schemata, I think the distinction Jeff made earlier between coenoscopic and idioscopic science is critical here. Confusion is sure to follow from conflating the two (as it seems to me Jeff commented on soundly in the exchange today on the subtle differences of meaning of "normative" in relation to them). After quoting the first sentnece of CP 2.227 concluding that Logic as Semeiotic concerns itself with "what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience," Gary F wrote (in part): GF: Now, an artificial intelligence is called that largely because it is capable of learning (modifying its own algorithms) from its interaction with other entities, rather than passively having its “knowledge” programmed into it. This seems to me to (1) beg the question in its first part and (2) represent at most a very mechanical kind of learning which leaves out real experience in interaction with an environment. GF: By insisting that an “AI” can only be a “machine” (and thus devoid of real intelligence), Gary R. is essentially claiming that an utterly mindless and lifeless entity is nevertheless capable of learning. You'll have to explain to me what you mean by "real intelligence" in this sentence. GF: This is what I find implausible, considering the entanglement of intelligence and learning with mind, semiosis, and intentionality, as well as experience in the Peircean sense above. It goes without saying that all knowledge is in signs; surely then all learning is by means of signs, as Peirce strongly implies above. There is, I suppose, most certainly a kind of machine learning involved here--but, as I wrote earlier, when you, as you have, suggest that "insight" and "abduction" (and even "life") can be the result of that sort of learning (which I discussed in an earlier post as, as I see it, the result of the rich complexity of, for example, the Gobot's vast memory in relation to rule driven programming), then I think you go too far. GF: So the question of whether an absolutely mindless and lifeless entity is capable of learning cuts to the heart of semiotics, in my opinion. Not to mention our concept of intelligence. In my view, much more needs to be discussed here in consideration of what machine learning implies as regards "mind" and "life"--that intelligent bot is yet, in my opinion, if not absolutely mindless in Peirce's sense in which mind would appear to occur most everywhere, nonetheless it is "lifeless" even given the somewhat metaphorical notion of "the life of the symbol" (which, again, requires--as the Peirce quotation I gave a while back and which Gary F hasn't yet addressed-- a life form as a vehicle. Best, Gary R
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