Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list, Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this snippet from his message: * "Is this opening flourish a case of CSP style? or hubris? or bragging? or sophistry?"*
But Jerry has here offered 4 *possibilities of interpreting* the opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I would suggest that Peirce was the *most *thorough of thinkers, in particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he *may* have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as Jerry put it), that it was indeed his *style* to make such extremely thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem an impossible task). I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that there are other members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan Schmidt, who have contributed to SPIN. I'm looking forward to a lively discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures on peirce-l. I'll try to respond to Gary F's comments in the next few days, but have just returned from what was to have been a vacation trip on Martha's Vineyard but which soon became something of a battle with Tropical Storm Jose. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 3:55 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > List, > > I agree with Jerry. > > Kirsti > > > Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41: > >> List, Gary: >> >> Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream. >> >> It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance >> (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( >> linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to >> communicate with others. >> >> This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of >> mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical >> stances are common and part of the everyday communications among >> practitioners. >> >> Beyond that, the following quote: >> >> I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of >> the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear >> and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it >> would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination >> of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might >> be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the >> refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the >> phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the >> argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be >> interpreted. >> >> simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible >> emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all >> possible sin-signs could be given form? >> >> "But after I had written it out,…" >> Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript? >> >> The phrase: >> "the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion >> and the premisses might be emended…" >> >> remains a logically impossible task today. >> I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the >> symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put >> into premises. >> Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and >> chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am >> aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic >> numbers. >> >> Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let >> each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves. >> >> IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR >> BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY? >> >> I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be >> offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various >> disciplines. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >>> >>> Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an >>> intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of >>> science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a >>> false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science >>> are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical >>> acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly >>> malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any >>> refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect >>> it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its >>> believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence >>> for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!). >>> >>> Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a >>> “thorough and formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious >>> argument which would exemplify this “false notion of reasoning.” >>> He proposes instead “simply to describe the phenomena presented in >>> reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under >>> examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the >>> phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of >>> _phenomenology_, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify >>> the irreducible elements found in _any and every possible >>> phenomenon_ — including those “presented in reasoning.” In >>> this way we can show how the phenomena necessarily involved in >>> reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this process >>> combining observation and generalization, we can establish some >>> “facts_”_ about reasoning. Then we can see “how the >>> [fallacious] argument under examination must falsify these facts.” >>> Peirce is proposing to refute a “confused” theory of logic by >>> confronting it with facts gleaned from phenomenology. This procedure >>> is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic as dependent on >>> phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which >>> accompanied these Lowell Lectures. >>> >>> That’s how I see it, anyway. >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway >>> >>> FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] >>> SENT: 23-Sep-17 09:06 >>> >>> Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s >>> Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments >>> and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the >>> source information given in EP2:242: >>> _[Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8. >>> 176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered >>> on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave >>> at the Lowell Institute in Boston under the general title “Some >>> Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now Vexed.”] _ >>> >>> A malady, ladies and gentlemen, has broken out in science. Science >>> is today in splendid vigor, having thrown off its earlier infirmity >>> of dogmatism, and being in most respects in superlative trim. Its >>> new disease is in its very first stage and is confined as yet almost >>> exclusively to certain members that always have been weakly. The >>> symptoms are local. The disorder, however, is, in its nature, not >>> local, but constitutional; and there is a distinct danger of its >>> appearing in parts that are now untouched. There is a certain >>> _craze_ in the universities; by which I mean that certain ideas have >>> become rife in the universities by the force of _vogue_, and not by >>> the force of reasoning, whether good or bad. Such a phenomenon may >>> be likened to fever. Science has, at different times, passed through >>> several such ailments,— some of them pretty serious. They ran >>> their course and health came back. The present visitation is more >>> serious, for the reason that it is no mere feverish attack, not a >>> _mere_ fashion, but is in great measure the outcome of a principle. >>> >>> Now every principle, once entertained, possesses vitality, until it >>> is notoriously refuted; and even after they have received their >>> death-blows, we have all had occasion to remark how long life may >>> linger in principles whose formulation has been sonorous. >>> >>> The principle in this case is a false notion about reasoning arising >>> from a confusion of thought; and unfortunately science, at this >>> moment, is ill-fortified against such an invasion, since scientific >>> men of today are, on the average, less armed than their forerunners >>> were with that logical acumen which is necessary to detect a >>> somewhat subtle sophistry. I have kept watch upon the progress of >>> the symptoms for years; and my observations go to show that they are >>> becoming aggravated. I am unable to resist the belief that the >>> canker is bound to spread and to eat deeper. What renders it >>> particularly malignant is a peculiarity of this particular false >>> notion of reasoning which will prevent any refutation of it from >>> receiving any attention. Let this conception of ratiocination once >>> get control, and science must perforce become exceedingly enfeebled; >>> and the only apparent road to recovery will be through its gradually >>> outgrowing the vicious diathesis. Now this gradual resolution, after >>> the vitality of science has been depressed by its morbid condition, >>> must drag through centuries. A very young and ingenuous person might >>> expect that, in a matter of supreme importance, men would give ear >>> to the refutation that only waits to be heard against the false >>> notion of reasoning that is the living bacillus in the infection of >>> science, that they would pay this refutation sufficient attention to >>> see the point of it, which is plain enough. If men only would do >>> that, the situation would be saved. But one must indeed be both >>> sanguine and inexperienced to harbor any such hope. >>> >>> This false notion of reasoning may be weaved into several varieties >>> of fallacies. In outward guise, they differ considerably; nor are >>> they quite identical in texture. I shall only have time to consider >>> one. One tangle of ideas is common to all. I select for examination >>> an argument as little illogical as any of those weaved from this >>> same tangle; and of those as nearly logical I take the simplest. I >>> had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of >>> the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed >>> clear and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt >>> that it would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute >>> examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the >>> premisses might be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape >>> from the refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe >>> the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you >>> how the argument under examination must falsify these facts however >>> it be interpreted. This ought to satisfy you as far as this argument >>> is concerned, and when you meet with other forms of the same tangle >>> you will see for yourselves that they falsify the facts of reasoning >>> in the same way. >>> >>> To be continued Sept. 25 >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] . >>> >> >> >> >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ >> [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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