List,
I agree with Jerry.
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:
List, Gary:
Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.
It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
(“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
communicate with others.
This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of
logical
stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
practitioners.
Beyond that, the following quote:
I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation
of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed
clear
and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that
it
would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute
examination
of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses
might
be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how
the
argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
interpreted.
simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
possible sin-signs could be given form?
"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?
The phrase:
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the
conclusion
and the premisses might be emended…"
remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because
the
symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be
put
into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
numbers.
Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and
let
each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.
IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?
I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will
be
offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in
various
disciplines.
Cheers
Jerry
On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly
malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any
refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect
it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its
believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence
for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!).
Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a
“thorough and formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious
argument which would exemplify this “false notion of
reasoning.”
He proposes instead “simply to describe the phenomena presented
in
reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under
examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the
phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of
_phenomenology_, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify
the irreducible elements found in _any and every possible
phenomenon_ — including those “presented in reasoning.” In
this way we can show how the phenomena necessarily involved in
reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this process
combining observation and generalization, we can establish some
“facts_”_ about reasoning. Then we can see “how the
[fallacious] argument under examination must falsify these
facts.”
Peirce is proposing to refute a “confused” theory of logic by
confronting it with facts gleaned from phenomenology. This
procedure
is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic as dependent on
phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which
accompanied these Lowell Lectures.
That’s how I see it, anyway.
Gary f.
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway
FROM: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
SENT: 23-Sep-17 09:06
Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s
Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments
and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the
source information given in EP2:242:
_[Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8.
176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered
on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce
gave
at the Lowell Institute in Boston under the general title “Some
Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now Vexed.”] _
A malady, ladies and gentlemen, has broken out in science. Science
is today in splendid vigor, having thrown off its earlier infirmity
of dogmatism, and being in most respects in superlative trim. Its
new disease is in its very first stage and is confined as yet
almost
exclusively to certain members that always have been weakly. The
symptoms are local. The disorder, however, is, in its nature, not
local, but constitutional; and there is a distinct danger of its
appearing in parts that are now untouched. There is a certain
_craze_ in the universities; by which I mean that certain ideas
have
become rife in the universities by the force of _vogue_, and not by
the force of reasoning, whether good or bad. Such a phenomenon may
be likened to fever. Science has, at different times, passed
through
several such ailments,— some of them pretty serious. They ran
their course and health came back. The present visitation is more
serious, for the reason that it is no mere feverish attack, not a
_mere_ fashion, but is in great measure the outcome of a principle.
Now every principle, once entertained, possesses vitality, until it
is notoriously refuted; and even after they have received their
death-blows, we have all had occasion to remark how long life may
linger in principles whose formulation has been sonorous.
The principle in this case is a false notion about reasoning
arising
from a confusion of thought; and unfortunately science, at this
moment, is ill-fortified against such an invasion, since scientific
men of today are, on the average, less armed than their forerunners
were with that logical acumen which is necessary to detect a
somewhat subtle sophistry. I have kept watch upon the progress of
the symptoms for years; and my observations go to show that they
are
becoming aggravated. I am unable to resist the belief that the
canker is bound to spread and to eat deeper. What renders it
particularly malignant is a peculiarity of this particular false
notion of reasoning which will prevent any refutation of it from
receiving any attention. Let this conception of ratiocination once
get control, and science must perforce become exceedingly
enfeebled;
and the only apparent road to recovery will be through its
gradually
outgrowing the vicious diathesis. Now this gradual resolution,
after
the vitality of science has been depressed by its morbid condition,
must drag through centuries. A very young and ingenuous person
might
expect that, in a matter of supreme importance, men would give ear
to the refutation that only waits to be heard against the false
notion of reasoning that is the living bacillus in the infection of
science, that they would pay this refutation sufficient attention
to
see the point of it, which is plain enough. If men only would do
that, the situation would be saved. But one must indeed be both
sanguine and inexperienced to harbor any such hope.
This false notion of reasoning may be weaved into several varieties
of fallacies. In outward guise, they differ considerably; nor are
they quite identical in texture. I shall only have time to consider
one. One tangle of ideas is common to all. I select for examination
an argument as little illogical as any of those weaved from this
same tangle; and of those as nearly logical I take the simplest. I
had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed
clear and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I
felt
that it would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute
examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the
premisses might be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape
from the refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe
the phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you
how the argument under examination must falsify these facts however
it be interpreted. This ought to satisfy you as far as this
argument
is concerned, and when you meet with other forms of the same tangle
you will see for yourselves that they falsify the facts of
reasoning
in the same way.
To be continued Sept. 25
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