This was sent to me and not to the list but I think either Deely or Deacon would have understood me without any explanation. Therefore I am issuing a simple challenge. If the post you find baffling is that baffling and John Sowa's post which follows it is completely comprehensible, I am entirely in agreement with it. Does that help?
I have said in successive posts that Peirce is a moral philosopher. That is obvious. I have worked for a few years now on the premise that philosophy as an academic exercise is largely irrelevant. Susan, quoted by John, says this quite damningly. I am in the same camp. I assume you are there also. As I have stated more than once, writing to this forum has been frustrating. I divide Peirce into a large area I do not comprehend (the mathematical and categorical) and a smaller one that I feel inspires a post-Aristotelian world. I will continue on this path. But if my posts simply baffle I will save you time and me frustration by merely reading and not confusing you and others. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 10:16 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Hola Stephen, > > > > I think this is your most baffling post yet. I read it over three times > and still fail to see *any* connection between any part of what you’ve > said and what Peirce says in 1.6. I know you don’t like explaining what you > say, but if you don’t try in this case, I’m afraid I can make no sense of > it at all! > > > > gary > > > > *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 4-Oct-17 09:49 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.6 > > > > Again we have Peirce in a teleological mode but not telling us he is > conflating now with some time in the future. Maybe he does. His emphasis on > fact is to denouement -- ultimate outcomes. It would be like saying people > are not populating their homes with as many guns as once was the case, but > that gun purchases rise among the gun-inclined. This is true. But > ultimately it might be more logical not to allow hurt and harm to be > possible. Continuity is the route. Fallibility is the condition. Logic is > the end. > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > > On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 7:37 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > Continuing from Lowell Lecture 1.5 (CP 1.608, EP2:251): > > > > 609. There is also such a thing as a general logical *intention.* But it > is not emphasized for the reason that the will does not enter so violently > into reasoning as it does into moral conduct. I have already mentioned the > logical norms, which correspond to moral laws. In taking up any difficult > problem of reasoning we formulate to ourselves a logical resolution; but > here again, because the will is not at such high tension in reasoning as it > often is in self-controlled conduct, these resolutions are not very > prominent phenomena. Owing to this circumstance, the efficient > determination of our nature, which causes us to reason in each case as we > do, has less relation to resolutions than to logical norms. The act itself > is, at the instant, irresistible in both cases. But immediately after, it > is subjected to self-criticism by comparison with a previous standard which > is always the norm, or *rule,* in the case of reasoning, although in the > case of outward conduct we are too often content to compare the act with > the resolution. In the case of general conduct, the lesson of satisfaction > or dissatisfaction is frequently not much taken to heart and little > influences future conduct. But in the case of reasoning an inference which > self-criticism disapproves is always instantly annulled, because there is > no difficulty in doing this. Finally, all the different feelings which, as > we noticed, accompanied the different operations of self-controlled conduct > equally accompany those of reasoning, although they are not quite so vivid. > > > > 610. The parallelism is thus perfect. Nor, I repeat, could it fail to be > so, if our description of the phenomena of controlled conduct was true, > since reasoning is only a special kind of controlled conduct. > > > > *The next section, omitted in CP 1, is from EP2:251-2. * > > > > Let us now consider the defendant argument. It rests on two premisses, to > wit: *first*, that it is unthinkable that a conclusion should be drawn > for any other reason than that it will be accompanied by a feeling of > logicality; *second*, that if all reasoning is determined by our feeling > of logicality, there can be no distinction of good and bad reasoning. > > > > But both these premisses are false. Even if our reasonings were all > determined by a feeling of logicality, still so long as we were able to > compare them with *norms* based on the consideration of the relation of > our thoughts to facts, in case the norms were not satisfied, our feeling of > logicality would instantly be reversed. In no way could the distinction of > good and bad reasoning be destroyed short of destroying the power of > comparing it, after it was made, with such norms. The truth is that the > defendants confound the judgment of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the > norms which is made subsequent to the act of inference with a feeling > accompanying that act. > > > > The first premiss is still more manifestly false. Nothing can be more > monstrous than to say that it is unthinkable that a reasoning should be > based on anything but a feeling of logicality which is a part of it. How > can an act be caused by a feeling which does not exist until the act > exists? Or who ever reasons, “This seems to me true and therefore it must > be true”? Yet even this is not adopting the reasoning because that very > reasoning seems sound. That is a thing too absurd to be formulated in > words. The only thing without which it is unthinkable that reasoning should > take place is a determination of one’s nature causing it. But the > defendants confound this with that feeling in the act which they also > confound with the judgment of satisfaction of the norm. > > > > Besides this principal fault of the defendant argument, there is another > that I cannot pass over. When it is said that all inference “assumes that > what seems to be good reasoning is so,” there is an inaccuracy of > expression. For an inference assumes nothing but its premisses. But if we > understand this to mean that no reasoning would be sound unless what seemed > to be good reasoning were good reasoning, I reply that according to my > description of the phenomena of reasoning, the only fact which the > soundness of all reasoning and the truth of all human thought really > depends [on] is that a man’s conjectures are somewhat better than purely > random propositions. The idea that the criticism of the criticism of > reasoning involves some new reasoning overlooks the fact that the criticism > is sustained by the original inference. “Reasoning,” says Hobbes, “is > computation,” and although this is extravagant, yet it is quite true that > the criticism of the criticism of reasoning simply repeats the process, > like adding up a column of figures a second time. It is conceivable that a > blunder should be repeated, but after the column has been added, say ten > times, and always with the same result, the arithmetician has no longer any > discernible doubt to be quieted; and to add the column an eleventh time > would be quite purposeless. In a strict theoretical sense, it is not > *certain* that twice two are four, since it is conceivable that a blunder > that might occur once has occurred every time the addition has been > performed. > > > > Now, ladies and gentlemen, I think you will agree that the defendant > argument is a thoroughly bad one, and in particular that the question of > what is good reasoning and what bad is not a question of whether the mind > approves it or not, but is a question of *fact*. A method that tends to > carry us toward the truth more speedily than we could otherwise progress is > good; a method that has a tendency to carry us away from the truth is > utterly bad, whether we naturally approve of it or not. This great fallacy > once overthrown which governs more or less the German logics, > > > > *CP 1.611 begins here (EP2:252). * > > > > 611. what does right reasoning consist in? It consists in such reasoning > as shall be conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our ultimate aim? > Perhaps it is not necessary that the logician should answer this question. > Perhaps it might be possible to deduce the correct rules of reasoning from > the mere assumption that we have some ultimate aim. But I cannot see how > this could be done. If we had, for example, no other aim than the pleasure > of the moment, we should fall back into the same absence of any logic that > the fallacious argument would lead to. We should have no ideal of > reasoning, and consequently no norm. It seems to me that the logician ought > to recognize what our ultimate aim is. It would seem to be the business of > the moralist to find this out, and that the logician has to accept the > teaching of ethics in this regard. But the moralist, as far as I can make > it out, merely tells us that we have a power of self-control, that no > narrow or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory, that the only > satisfactory aim is the broadest, highest, and most general possible aim; > and for any more definite information, as I conceive the matter, he has to > refer us to the esthetician, whose business it is to say what is the state > of things which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior > reason. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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