Something has to embrace everything. The word is less important than the thought. I see Reality as that which leads evolution through its stages until there is some unification -- say more than now. In that sense reality is now and whatever it becomes. Enough said. Cheers, S
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Stephen - I confine my understanding of 'reality' to it as referring to > Generalities, to Thirdness. And I see 'existence' as a reference to > individual finite entities - which can be a molecule, a cell, a word, > a flower, a human being - i.e., no consciousness is required. > > Edwina > > > > On Mon 16/10/17 3:04 PM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent: > > For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by any > name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a reference to > beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious. > > And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can speak > of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is all it is > everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or don't yet call > them because they aren't yet known. The main value I see in triadic is its > enablement of logical thinking tending toward the good, true-beautiful. > > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon S, Edwina, list, >> >> This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the >> quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes >> between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between >> realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did >> not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. >> >> In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on >> thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to >> suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." >> >> ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and >> so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the >> environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two >> meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. >> Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding >> that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, >> who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such >> person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals >> exist? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of >> the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and >> cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a >> head that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP >> 5.503). >> >> >> Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's >> probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and that >> it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting material >> from Lowell 2. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> >> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the >>> time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now. >>> >>> That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish >>> reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to >>> the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist >>> while having no generality whatsoever. >>> >>> And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to >>> designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate >>> Interpretant. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your >>>> saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, >>>> tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to >>>> revisit it with you. >>>> >>>> I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies that >>>> both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within only >>>> the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but reality >>>> requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not >>>> exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or >>>> generality and is not a thing. >>>> >>>> And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of >>>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term >>>> 'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its >>>> end. >>>> >>>> There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's >>>> been done to exhaustion before. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not >>>> interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some >>>> following along now who were not on the List back then. >>>> >>>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality >>>> from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything >>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>>> never be) actualized. >>>> >>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see >>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>>> >>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>> sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>>> >>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that >>>>> every >>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Gary, list: >>>>>> >>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, >>>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within >>>>>> 'material' >>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in >>>>>> space >>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>>> logical >>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>>> Lowell >>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>>> reasoning” >>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>>> ready >>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely >>>>>> Lowell >>>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of >>>>>> resolving >>>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone >>>>>> with >>>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this >>>>>> as >>>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Gary f. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, list >>>>>> >>>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>> world"....not >>>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not >>>>>> saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am >>>>>> saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within >>>>>> 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which >>>>>> is a >>>>>> General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a >>>>>> word >>>>>> rather than a bacterium. >>>>>> >>>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can >>>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>>>>> true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be >>>>>> on >>>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>>>>> three forms of argument.. >>>>>> >>>>>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > >
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