Instead of doing a point by point explanation of what I mean, because they diverge or at least rose up with no specific sense of Peirce, I will try to say why I would write to this forum and not one on either Nietzsche of Wittgenstein whom I regard as influences as well. Explicitly let me say what I think at the word Peircean I think of a man who filched food from the Century Club -- a few blocks from where I write -- and made his way down Fifth Avenue passing a block from where I live. I think of what I have learned from accounts of his life, knowing these to be more or less the case depending on the perception of the authors. My picture is of a man unjustly but perhaps providentially given no quarter by Harvard and generally unable to have a career save in the two areas where it was possible. His measuring work. His writing. I think of someone whose philosophy in its most available sense appeared in a popular magazine. I suppose I feel some kinship because my mother's famlily settled in Watertown at the time the Peirce family did. There is still a Mason walking path from Cambridge to Watertown. I hold it in some importance that Peirce was an American. I am not a hyper-patriot but I sort of see Dostoevsky and Peirce as comparable figures who were tied to their countries in interesting and important ways. None of this has much to do with what you may mean by Peircean but they are the first things that come to mind. As to what he thought I do not claim to know it. I have read a lot as I have read a lot in mathematics but I am not able to claim that I understand any of it. What Peirce did for me thoughtwise was open me not merely past dualism but to the development of a method of thinking based on my sense not of what he had in mind but what confirmed with what I think he might have eventually had in mind. In the same way, I believe both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein came close to the same place. All three of them in my sense of them were post-Christians beyond the Bonhoeffer (accepting of violence and in some ways rigidly orthodox) stage. Nietzsche may have completed his promised revaluation with The Antichrist. That is a scholarly conundrum. But one can infer from some things in the Antichrist that Nietzsche was definitely not anti-Jesus and perhaps that he was confounded between his own thought and what he saw in Jesus Wittgenstein was rather like Peirce in his tendency to fly off the handle. He definitely knew himself to be fallible. He also was a Tolstoyan Christian. I could go farther but I think there can be no disputing that. And Peirce was definitely an American version of Christian combining clear mystical encounters with an undeveloped and clearly ambivalent criticism of the USA as a culture of greed. To me, Peirce may be the most important of the three but not because he will emerge as an academic replacement for whoever is being lionized this year or next. It would be because it makes a huge difference whether the world thinks in triadic terms or in binary terms. It is that difference which I think can be adduced, inferred and perhaps deduced from some of what Peirce has to say. It certainly was enough to furnish me with a basis for what I have come to think on top of my own life which I find similar to that Peirce in a few key respects, including the loss of a career and an iconoclasm regarding much of the current moral code. This will be more than you want to read but It is at least a chance to explain myself a bit. If Peirce becomes the new Aristotle it will be because he had a similar influence, not because of his involved modes of getting his thoughts out, but because some form of triadic thinking will take root and steer us away from whatever we fancy the abyss to be..
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 4:39 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Stephen, list > > You've made your views clear on these matters any number of times on this > list, Stephen, and to my mind they aren't especially--or really at > all--Peircean, at least as I see it and, I believe, you've stated. Of > course you are entitled to your views, but it would be helpful if you were > to place your thoughts within the context of a given ongoing Peirce-related > discussion, say, offering an argument--rather than a mere opinion, whatever > its worth--as to why you consider your quite different views of reality and > existence to be superior to Peirce's. > > You wrote: > > For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by any > name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a reference to > beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious. > > > > The distinction which you make is certainly* not* "obvious" to me. And > even before considering your distinction between reality and existence, I > question your view of existence as being limited to "beings with > consciousness." This is not existence as a pragmaticist sees it. For rocks > exist, hydrogen molecules exist, stars exist, all sorts of beings exist > which are not conscious (unless you have some special meaning in mind for > "conscious"). So some argumentation from you here would be helpful as well. > > And your description of Reality is so very general as to say, at least to > me, really nothing at all. It's like remarking that "Everything is > Everything." That doesn't take the consideration of (inquiry into) the > question of reality very far at all. > > You also wrote: > > And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can speak > of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is all it is > everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or don't yet call > them because they aren't yet known. > > > If by firsts, seconds, and thirds you're referring to Peirce categories, > my jaw would drop too if even for a moment I thought of them as "parts of > reality." From the phenomenological, semiotic, and metaphysical > standpoints, you can't truly separate the three except for the limited > purposes of analysis. They always appear together, even if, say in the > analysis of time, one necessarily has to look at them > altogether-one-after-the-other (M. Alexander). > > Finally, you wrote: > > > The main value I see in triadic is its enablement of logical thinking > tending toward the good, true-beautiful. > > > Peirce employs his three categories in *many* sciences including > mathematics, phenomenology, logic as semiotic, metaphysics, review science > (for example, his classification of signs, classification of the sciences), > etc. I'm all for logical thinking, especially of the kind that Peirce so > painstakingly developed (and which some are further developing--Fernando > Zalamea's work in continuity comes to mind). But, as for the "good, > true-beautiful," Peirce's three normative sciences--theoretical esthetics > and ethics, and logic as semeiotic--explore the analogous concepts in > science and philosophy in very great detail, hardly stopping at vague > notions, mere words like "the beautiful" which the individual may interpret > as he pleases. > > Now the results of inquiry in discovery science (pure theory), then > organized in review science (philosophy of science, science digests, etc.), > can be applied to the practical sciences, which Peirce also calls 'arts' > (to be distinguished, however, from the fine arts), and in the development > of technologies. > > It seems to me that the work of creation in the fine arts is a very > different matter and has its own, to my mind, inestimable value. So now, to > prove that point to myself--as if it needed proving-- I'll go listen to a > recording of a Mozart piano concerto for the pure aesthetic enjoyment of it. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by any >> name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a reference to >> beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious. >> >> And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can speak >> of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is all it is >> everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or don't yet call >> them because they aren't yet known. The main value I see in triadic is its >> enablement of logical thinking tending toward the good, true-beautiful. >> >> >> >> amazon.com/author/stephenrose >> >> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon S, Edwina, list, >>> >>> This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the >>> quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes >>> between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between >>> realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did >>> not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. >>> >>> In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent >>> on thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to >>> suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." >>> >>> ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and >>> so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the >>> environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two >>> meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. >>> Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding >>> that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, >>> who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such >>> person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals >>> *exist*? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of >>> the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and >>> cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a >>> head that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP >>> 5.503). >>> >>> >>> Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's >>> probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and that >>> it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting material >>> from Lowell 2. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the >>>> time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now. >>>> >>>> That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish >>>> reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to >>>> the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist >>>> while having no generality whatsoever. >>>> >>>> And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to >>>> designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate >>>> Interpretant. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your >>>>> saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, >>>>> tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to >>>>> revisit it with you. >>>>> >>>>> I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies >>>>> that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within >>>>> only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but >>>>> reality >>>>> requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not >>>>> exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or >>>>> generality and is not a thing. >>>>> >>>>> And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of >>>>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term >>>>> 'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to >>>>> its >>>>> end. >>>>> >>>>> There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's >>>>> been done to exhaustion before. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>> sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not >>>>> interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some >>>>> following along now who were not on the List back then. >>>>> >>>>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality >>>>> from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything >>>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>>>> never be) actualized. >>>>> >>>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see >>>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>>> >>>>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>>> sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that >>>>>> every >>>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Gary, list: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted >>>>>>> frequently, >>>>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within >>>>>>> 'material' >>>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in >>>>>>> space >>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as >>>>>>> your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>>>> logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into >>>>>>> Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about >>>>>>> “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to >>>>>>> clarify >>>>>>> those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless >>>>>>> others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ >>>>>>> Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his >>>>>>> last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their >>>>>>> relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and >>>>>>> its >>>>>>> place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the >>>>>>> development >>>>>>> of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, >>>>>>> namely >>>>>>> Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of >>>>>>> resolving >>>>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to >>>>>>> this as >>>>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gary f. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jeff, list >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in >>>>>>> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>>> world"....not only is thought in the organic world but it develops >>>>>>> there. >>>>>>> But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so >>>>>>> there >>>>>>> cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not >>>>>>> saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am >>>>>>> saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within >>>>>>> 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which >>>>>>> is a >>>>>>> General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see >>>>>>> his >>>>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' >>>>>>> unit, >>>>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a >>>>>>> word >>>>>>> rather than a bacterium. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, >>>>>>> can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>>>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>>>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of >>>>>>> these >>>>>>> three forms of argument.. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>>>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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