Jon S, John S, list, Jon S wrote in reflecting on John S conclusion in a discussion of the language and logic used to discuss "existence" and "reality":
Jon: By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual things that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495). Exactly so. Existence is reactive (act/react), dual, 2ns, hic et nunc, once for all, singular, determinate, etc. One sees this in such late definitions as this which contrast existence and reality: 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613 …whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially the same thing… and 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 Existence […] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. And so, as you remarked: Jon: This is precisely why he famously argued for the *Reality *of God, rather than the *existence *of God. Some of the difficulty here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then be used to talk about both *actual *things and *real *relations. The latter indeed include generals and possibilities--even those that are *real *despite never becoming *actual *(i.e., instantiated), and therefore do not *exist.* Besides the difficulty you commented on, viz., "that there is no verb form of 'reality'," another problem is that according to Peirce existence is not "properly" a term of logic, but of metaphysics. 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7 …the term *existence* is properly a term, not of logic, but of metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object *exists*, if and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, *exist* is used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a logical universe, or universe of discourse. This seems to me somewhat different from John S's logical analysis since, in the quotation above, Peirce says that *exist* "used in its logical sense. . . means merely to be a singular of a. . . universe of discourse." This makes good sense to me. As metaphysics has been introduced in the quotation directly above, I'd also like to say a few words about it in considering, or better, emphasizing *reality* (all the following quotations are from EP2, so represent Peirce's late thinking on this topic). "Metaphysics is the science of Reality. Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness. Reasonable reasonableness is Thirdness as Thirdness." But "active laws" are, Peirce argues, symbols, which he goes on to say are "the only things in the universe that have importance." (One recalls that for Peirce *man* is a symbol, the *universe* itself is a symbol, the Greek language is a symbol, the works of Shakespeare are a symbol, etc.) The knowledge of such laws allow us to make predictions of what may happen* in futuro*. " Nobody can doubt that we know laws upon which we can base predictions to which actual events still in the womb of the future will conform to a marked extent, if not perfectly. To deny reality to such laws is to quibble about words. Many philosophers say they are "mere symbols." Take away the word mere, and this is true. They are symbols; and symbols being the only things in the universe that have any importance, the word "mere" is a great impertinence." But while metaphysics may be a matter of 3ns, *reality*, in Peirce's view, involves all three categories, and notably in the quotation below, 2ns, compulsion, a matter of most assuredly of *hic et nunc*. But compulsion, 2ns, while existentially experienced, is not sufficient for a full description of reality which requires regularity (habit). "[R]eality is compulsive. But the compulsiveness is absolutely hic et nunc. It is for an instant and it is gone. Let it be no more and it is absolutely nothing. The [existential aspect of] reality only exists as an element of the regularity. And the regularity is the symbol. Rea[lity, therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols." Or stated somewhat differently: " Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing." As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that ". . . it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries. As Peirce delves further into the character of metaphysics, as important as he sees it to be as the last of the philosophic (cenoscopic) sciences, it is, in his view, in horrible shape. "Metaphysics is the proper designation for the third and completing department of cenoscopy, . . Its business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects. But in its present condition it is, even more than the other branches of cenoscopy, a puny, rickety, and scrofulous science. It is only too plain that those who pretend to cultivate it carry not the hearts of true men of science within their breast." Peirce suggests that these metaphysicians, rather than being scientists, have been for the most part "theologians." So, while in the Lowell threads Gary F is posting we are principally concerned with logic. one ought not forget that the third and final branch of logic, namely, methodeutic (or theoretic rhetoric, which involves a theory of inquiry which includes pragmatism as a method) is immediately followed in Peirce's Classification of the Sciences by metaphysics, the science concerned with Reality, and methodeutic's findings are meant to facilitate inquiry into this final philosophical science, "the third and completing department of cenoscopy [which] business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects." Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > John S., List: > > JFS: For actual things that interact with the environment, Peirce used > first-intentional logic. For relations that represent generals and > possibilities, he used second intentional logic, which may refer to > anything that has a "cognitionary character" in thought. By Quine's > dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to talk about either domain. > > > By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed > late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to talk about actual > things that "react with the other like things in the environment" (CP > 6.495). This is precisely why he famously argued for the *Reality *of > God, rather than the *existence *of God. Some of the difficulty here is > likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could > then be used to talk about both *actual *things and *real *relations. > The latter indeed include generals and possibilities--even those that are > *real > *despite never becoming *actual *(i.e., instantiated), and therefore do > not *exist*. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Kirsti and Gary R, >> >> If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since >> Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either >> (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely. >> >> Kirsti, >> >>> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they >>> become actual. >>> >> >> In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues: 'real', >> 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's >> dictum: "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." >> >> (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'. I wrote 'Kirsti' >> in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.) >> >> But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold. >>> >> >> In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation >> for predicate calculus. For "first intentions", he used quantified >> variables to range over individuals. For "second intentions", he >> used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals. >> >> Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language >> can be represented by a relation in logic. >> >> For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the >> domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and >> geometrical shapes. >> >> For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent >> generals of any kind. Those generals include possibilities, among >> which are sign types. >> >> If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles >> aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions. >> >> For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan. As a general, >> it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities. >> But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill) >> which does exist in the physical world. >> >> However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the >> relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan. >> We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations >> in the domain of second intentions. >> >> Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503) >> >>> [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists >>> are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that >>> all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic >>> realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." >>> [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that >>> time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine. >>> >> >> In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about >> what "many a logician" would consider: >> >>> reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so >>> is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the >>> environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two >>> meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same. >>> >> >> Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use >> logic to represent both reality and existence. But the domains would >> be different. Logic about physical existence is first intentional; >> it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about >> reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character" >> that does not react with the environment. But both first intentional >> logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables. >> >> Summary: For actual things that interact with the environment, >> Peirce used first-intentional logic. For relations that represent >> generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic, >> which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character" >> in thought. By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to >> talk about either domain. >> >> John > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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