Mike, List,
Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation of that
post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.
I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint of what
I've termed the* vector of involution*, commencing at 3ns, which involves
2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of considerable importance
and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet of a piece of logic which
would equivocate existence and reality in a logico-grammatical sleight of
hand ("quantified variables") which makes *everything* "exist" by the
conceptual trick of having "is" stand for not only existence, but also
reality. While the problem is difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not
think that Quine's (and Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.
You quoted me, then asked:
GR: As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that ". . . it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
into metaphysical inquiries.
MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).
I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly important to
point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be." But I believe that the
first question we ought try to answer is why Peirce says that "it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
upon."
My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some" of
those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses which
might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing, show
themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce writes:
Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to
consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and
therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical
antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate
nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing
whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently
of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in
any other symbol of any man or men. *But that amounts to saying that
possibility is sometimes of a real kind.* (Issues of Pragmatism, EP2:354,
emphasis added).
This, I believe, is how inquiry progresses, how we approach "the truth of
certain matters," that 'truth," or, better, knowledge, sometimes bringing
about, for example, technologies which are of benefit to us. Perhaps it is
yet possible to imagine that we might evolve our humane consciousness, the
final frontier of evolution as Peirce saw it. But this has little--if
any--hope of happening if we cannot conceive powerful abductions,
hypotheses, *possibilities*. . . This, I would maintain, *is* the work of
individuals.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 9:33 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
> Hi Gary, List,
>
> Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
> Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
> possibilities may be (with citations).
>
> Thanks, Mike
>
> On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> As for the reality of *possibles*, Peirce holds that ". . . it is the
> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist
> upon." Here one can begin to see how the last branch of logic rather melds
> into metaphysical inquiries.
>
>
> --
> __________________________________________
>
> Michael K. Bergman
> Cognonto Corporation319.621.5225
> <(319)%20621-5225>skype:michaelkbergmanhttp://cognonto.comhttp://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
> __________________________________________
>
>
>
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