Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

Hi Gary F., List, I separately responded to Jon on his quotes, so will not discuss further here. On 10/20/2017 10:45 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Mike,   I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real possibility.” But I’d like to add a point about the “universal categories”: they are not watertight compartments, or separate bins into which phenomena can be sorted. Any given phenomenon, such as an argument or a blueprint, can have its Firstness, its Secondness and its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t involve Firstness. I would say, in contrast, that it is EXACTLY the process of sorting things into the bins of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness that Peirce was, throughout many all of his writings, trying to instruct us. I very often hear common themes of categorization and natural classes in Peirce's writings, don't you? Sure, there are always edge cases, and the inspections of those are partly what helps bring clarity and understanding to our thinking, so should be highly valued. And, of course, we may not always categorize them correctly (but should try to).     A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, i.e. it is the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated blueprint, like a “replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second in the universe of representations, a token of a type. And it is a Third in its function as an iconic sign interpretable by the builders. With all due respect, I could not disagree more, and I think this shows the muddied thinking around the universal categories. A blueprint and a physical building are both Secondness, period. There is certainly Firstness associated with a building, such as design and form and possible materials, but not a blueprint. A blueprint is its own Secondness. To my understanding, nothing material or in existence can ever be in Firstness; they are characters or attributes, not instances. We also have a Thirdness about a building, but that relates to methods for constructing buildings, limits and laws that govern how and within what constraints it can be built, or inclusion of buildings as a type of architectural artifact. Thanks, Mike   We certainly can’t define these categories as arguments. An argument is a phenomenon, and so is a process such as an inquiry; both are phenomena in which Thirdness is predominant. But the categories are elements of any and all phenomena that can be “before the mind” (any kind of “mind”) in any way. That includes mathematical and other imaginary objects, which may be intelligible without being perceptible by the senses. Indeed it is only in the mathematical realm that necessary reasoning can be done, because the objects of pure mathematics have no being except what they are defined to have.   Gary f.   From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] Sent: 20-Oct-17 10:20 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)   Hi John, List,   On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote: Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument). And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness. John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement: Mike Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with citations) Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer program, the variables represent "real possibilities". But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley". Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops. I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are in any way Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if they deal with an unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness. My original question to Gary (and, now, you) about "some [Firstness] possibilities" which we should be "most concerned to insist upon" remains. The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying, that the universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments is, I agree, a more clarifying definition. However, that being said, I also think that framing the process question into "starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my process points; I made no such suggestion. The proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle. But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being Thirdness. I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness -- Peirce makes this point often in discussing his categories applied to logic -- but the components of what might go into those arguments are drawn from all three categories, which I think is what Gary was attempting to point out. Mike -- __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman Cognonto Corporation 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman http://cognonto.com http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________

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