List, John In response to your narrative, I think that formal mathematic logic is stronger than mere analogy. Cheers Jerry
Sent from my iPhone > On Oct 25, 2017, at 5:04 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree. By the way, using > the term 'universe' is fine with me. > > Kirsti > > John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03: >> Kirsti and Gary R, >>> Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter. >> My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized >> in just one line. If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll >> restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited: >> 1901 | Individual | CP 3.613 >>> ...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality) >>> and individuality are essentially the same thing... >> 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 >>> Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other >>> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. >> 1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7 >>> ...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of >>> metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if >>> and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same >>> universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is >>> used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of >>> a logical universe, or universe of discourse. >> The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in >> a metaphysical sense. The last three lines state the equivalent >> of Quine's dictum: >> In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper >> name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier. >> In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to >> the referent of a line of identity. >> The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of >> a logical universe, or universe of discourse". If you object to >> the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'. >> Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is >> to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable." >> I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler. >> But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition. >>> Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. >> I agree. Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the >> logical sense. That enabled him to talk about a domain of >> possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable. >> As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds >> to Peirce's metaphysical existence. Therefore Quine equated existence >> in the physical universe with reality. Quine never used modal logic, >> metalanguage, or higher-order logic. And he was strongly opposed to >> any talk about real possibilities. >> Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this >> discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's >> realism and Quine's nominalism. >> In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but >> Quine allowed only one universe (or domain). >> John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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