Franklin, Gary f, list:
"How do you know that *A* is *A*?" "Because that is involved in what I mean by 'is'." "How do you know it is involved?" "Because, torture my imagination as I will, I cannot think of anything that I could call *A* and not judge that *A* is *A*." "Perhaps that is because you have not hit on the right kind of a subject to substitute for A." "Possibly. But as long as I cannot help thinking that that is what I mean by 'is', it is nonsense to question it." Best, Jerry R PS. Franklin, very cool gmail handle... On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Franklin Ransom < pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary F, > > Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular > consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? > That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given > what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture. > > -- Franklin > > On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee" <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary f: >> >> "pet theories"? :) >> >> Best, >> J >> >> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Jerry R, list, >>> >>> >>> >>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls >>> it, as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented >>> in the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first >>> *why* Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in >>> the presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a >>> section from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more >>> detail what the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” >>> is so important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells. >>> >>> >>> >>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and >>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the >>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1 >>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That >>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to >>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought. >>> >>> >>> >>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de >>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):* >>> >>> >>> >>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy >>> between two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of >>> conditional propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is >>> lightening it will thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will >>> thunder and was only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. >>> Diodorus objected to this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself >>> failed to make out precisely what was in his mind, and though there have >>> been many virtual Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state >>> their position clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong >>> logicians have been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been >>> Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice >>> has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran >>> vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that the >>> proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely >>> by its not lightening. >>> >>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw >>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary >>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex >>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of >>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et >>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that >>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but >>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood >>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. >>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that >>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of >>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow. >>> >>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit >>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for >>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand >>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the >>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional >>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go >>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not >>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is >>> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible >>> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel >>> that I was violating the usages of speech. >>> >>> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of >>> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still, >>> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the >>> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a >>> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language >>> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms* >>> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed >>> by inflexible rules; and if the forms of speech are borrowed to be used as >>> *canonical >>> forms of logic* it is merely for the mnemonic aid they afford, and they >>> are always to be understood in logic in strict technical senses. These >>> forms of expression are to be defined, just as zoologists and botanists >>> define the terms which they invent, that is to say, without the slightest >>> regard for usage but so as to correspond to natural classifications. That >>> is why I entitled one of the first papers I published, “On the Natural >>> Classification of Arguments.” And by a *natural* classification, we >>> mean the most pregnant classification, pregnant that is to say with >>> implications concerning what is important from a strictly logical point of >>> view. >>> >>> Now I have worked out in MS. the whole of syllogistic in a perfectly >>> thoroughgoing manner both from the Philonian and from the Diodoran point of >>> view. But although my exposition is far more favorable to the Diodoran >>> system even than that of DeMorgan in his *Syllabus of Logic*, which is >>> much the best presentation of the Diodoran case ever made by an adherent of >>> it, yet I find that the Philonian system is far the simpler,— almost >>> incomparably so. You would not wish me to take you through all those >>> details. This general statement is all that is appropriate for this brief >>> course of lectures. >>> >>> Be it understood, then, that in logic we are to understand the form “If >>> A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or in every possible case in >>> which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other words it means “In each >>> possible case, either A is false or B is true.” >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] >>> *Sent:* 23-Oct-17 18:51 >>> >>> Gary f, list: >>> >>> Thank you for that posting. >>> >>> I must assert though, >>> >>> I am surprised that if A is true, B is true, for I thought: if A were >>> true, C would be a matter of course. >>> >>> Does B and not C surprise you? >>> >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 9:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>> >>> Continuing from Lowell 2.3, >>> >>> https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts >>> /ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13602: >>> >>> The most immediately useful information is that which is conveyed in >>> conditional propositions, “*If* you find that this is true, *then* you >>> may know that that is true.” Now in ordinary language the conditional form >>> is employed to express a variety of relations between one possibility and >>> another. Very frequently when we say “If A is true, then B is true,” we >>> have in mind a whole range of possibilities, and we assert that among all >>> possible cases, every one of those in which A is true will turn out to be a >>> case in which B is true also. But in order to obtain a way of expressing >>> that sort of conditional proposition, we must begin by getting a way of >>> expressing a simpler kind, which does not often occur in ordinary speech >>> but which has great importance in logic. The sort of conditional >>> proposition I mean is one in which no range of possibilities is >>> contemplated, which speaks only of the actual state of things. “If A is >>> true then B is true,” in this sense is called a conditional proposition *de >>> inesse*. In case A is not true, it makes no assertion at all and >>> therefore involves no falsity. And since every proposition is either true >>> or false, if the antecedent, A, is not true, the conditional *de inesse* >>> is true, no matter how it may be with B. In case the consequent, B, is >>> true, all that the conditional *de inesse* asserts is true, and >>> therefore it is true, no matter how it may be with A. If however the >>> antecedent, A, is true, while the consequent, B, is false, then, and then >>> only is the conditional proposition *de inesse* false. This sort of >>> conditional says nothing at all about any real connection between >>> antecedent and consequent; but limits itself to saying “If you should find >>> that A is true, then you may know that B is true,” never mind the why or >>> wherefore. >>> >>> *http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm <http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm>* >>> }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 >>> >>> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms- >>> 455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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