On 11/2/2017 4:08 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Among the implications: The sharp distinction between "formal logic",
> which is part of mathematics, from logic as a normative science and the
> many studies of reasoning in linguistics, psychology, and education.
>
John, List,
Peirce used the word “formal” in a sense that gave it a normative connotation.
That is the sense in which he defined “logic” as “formal semiotic”.
I think that raises some problems with the proposal of
a “sharp distinction between ‘formal logic’, which is
part of mathematics, from logic as a normative science”.
I don't think this means that “formal logic” is “formal formal semiotic”,
and as such a part of mathematics. I think it simply means that logic
is inherently formal (= normative) and adding the adjective “formal”
is redundant.
Regards,
Jon
Links to a few relevant texts:
C.S. Peirce • On the Definition of Logic
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%e2%80%a2-on-the-definition-of-logic/
Posted on June 1, 2012 by Jon Awbrey
Selections from C.S. Peirce, “Carnegie Application” (1902)
No. 12. On the Definition of Logic
Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human
thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the
same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this
definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a
historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no
novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally
recognized. (NEM 4, 20–21).
C.S. Peirce • Logic as Semiotic
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-logic-as-semiotic/
Posted on June 4, 2012 by Jon Awbrey
Selection from C.S. Peirce, “Ground, Object, and Interpretant” (c. 1897)
Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for semiotic (σημειωτική), the
quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary”, or formal, I mean that
we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object
to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary,
as to what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence
capable of learning by experience. As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation.
See Also:
The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 14
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/06/24/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-14/
Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey
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