Gary F., List: I just stumbled across an interesting passage within "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:285-300, c. 1903?) that might shed some further light on this terminological issue. Here are a few key excerpts.
CSP: Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The quality or form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies the suchness. It is something positive in itself ... Matter, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of [the real world] that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an existent. Matter is precisely that which exists ... This Entelechy, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. (NEM 4:293-296) Peirce refers here to Form, Matter, and Entelechy as *elements*; and they clearly correspond directly to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively. But as I quoted below ... CSP: We are to consider what *forms *are possible, rather than what *kinds *are possible, because it is universally admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most important divisions are divisions according to *form*, and not according to qualities of *matter*, in case division according to form is possible at all. Indeed, this necessarily results from the very idea of the distinction between *form *and *matter*. (EP 2:362, 1905) So a division of the *indecomposable elements* of the Phaneron according to *form *is according to 1ns. And as I also quoted below ... CSP: In the ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, the three elements, or *Universal Categories*, appear under their forms of Firstness ... Phenomenology studies the Categories in their forms of Firstness. (EP 2:272, 1903) This suggests to me that the *Categories *are, properly speaking, divisions according to the *forms* of elements as studied in *phenomenology*. By contrast, different *kinds *of elements would be divisions "according to qualities of matter," and matter is "that something which is the subject of a fact"; so I wonder if these correspond to what Peirce later called *Universes*. In the text that I omitted from that last quote, he said ... CSP: They appear under their forms of Secondness in the ideas of Facts of Firstness, or *Qualia*, Facts of Secondness, or Relations, and Facts of Thirdness, or Signs; and under their forms of Thirdness in the ideas of Signs of Firstness, or Feeling, i.e., things of beauty; Signs of Secondness, or Action, i.e., modes of conduct; and Signs of Thirdness, or Thought, i.e., forms of thought. (EP 2:272, 1903) Qualia, relations, and signs do not quite match up with the constituents of the three Universes of Experience as Ideas, Brute Actuality, and Signs (CP 6.455, 1908), but they come pretty close. Would the *Universes *then be divisions according to the *kinds *of elements as studied in *metaphysics*? Furthermore, "things of beauty," "modes of conduct," and "forms of thought" seem like exactly the subject matter of the normative sciences--esthetics, ethics/practics, and logic/semeiotic, respectively. However, that would imply aligning metaphysics with 2ns and the normative sciences with 3ns, rather than the other way around as Peirce consistently arranged them in his architectonic. With that in mind, perhaps a more viable interpretation is to place *all *of this under phenomenology, because Peirce was discussing how the three elements *appear *under their *forms *(1ns) of 2ns and 3ns. Incidentally, that last quote suggests that as a Sign, every Interpretant must be a Sign of 1ns (Feeling), 2ns (Action), or 3ns (Thought). This is consistent with my now-longstanding working hypothesis that the (internal) Immediate Interpretant is the range of *possible* feelings/actions/thoughts that the Sign *may *produce, the (external) Dynamic Interpretant is any *actual *feeling/action/thought that the Sign *does* produce, and the Final Interpretant is the *habit *of feeling/action/thought that the Sign *would *produce with sufficient repetition. Regards, Jon S. *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 26-Nov-17 17:06 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14) > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > As you may recall, I offered the hypothesis over a year ago that late in > his life, Peirce shifted his terminology from "categories" to "universes," > or perhaps confined "categories" to phenomenology/phaneroscopy and employed > "universes" for metaphysics, or at least suggested that > predicates/relations are assigned to "categories" while subjects belong to > "universes." Back then, Gary R. cited a passage from one of the drafts of > "Pragmatism" that finally convinced me to abandon this conjecture, and it > would seem to stand equally against the suggestion that Peirce definitively > shifted from "categories" to "elements." > > CSP: To assert a predicate of certain subjects (taking these all in the > sense of forms of words) means,—intends,—only to create a belief that the > real things denoted by those subjects possess the real character or > relation signified by that predicate. The word "real," *pace *the > metaphysicians, whose phrases are sometimes empty, means, and can mean, > nothing more nor less. Consequently, to the three forms of predicates there > must correspond three conceptions of different *categories *of > characters: namely, of a character which attaches to its subject regardless > of anything else such as that of being hard, massive, or persistent; of a > character which belongs to a thing relatively to a second regardless of any > third, such as an act of making an effort against a resistance; and of a > character which belongs to a thing as determining a relation between two > others, such as that of being transparent or opaque or of coloring what is > seen through it. Moreover, turning from the three kinds of predicates to > their subjects, since by the "mode of being" of anything can be meant only > the kinds of characters which it has, or is susceptible of taking, > corresponding to the three kinds of characters, there must be three > *categories > *of things: first, those which are such as they are regardless of > anything else, like the living consciousness of a given kind of feeling, > say of red; secondly, those which are such as they are by virtue of their > relation to other things, regardless of any third things, which is the case > with the existence of all bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on > each other, in pairs; thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue > of bringing two others into relation, as signs of all sorts are such only > so far as they bring their significations to bear upon the objects to which > they are applied. (EP 2:427-428, 1907; bold mine) > > That "categories" and "elements" were effectively *interchangeable *for > Peirce, precisely at the time of the Lowell Lectures, is evident from the > Syllabus that he prepared to supplement them. > > CSP: *Phenomenology *is that branch of science ... in which the author > seeks to make out what are the *elements*, or, if you please, the *kinds > of elements*, that are invariably present in whatever is, in any sense, > in mind. According to the present writer, these *universal categories* are > three. Since all three are invariably present, a pure idea of any one, > absolutely distinct from the others, is impossible; indeed, anything like a > satisfactorily clear discrimination of them is a work of long and active > meditation. They may be termed *Firstness*, *Secondness*, and *Thirdness *... > In the ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, the three *elements*, > or *Universal Categories*, appear under their forms of Firstness ... > Phenomenology studies the *Categories *in their forms of Firstness. (EP > 2:267, 272, 1903; bold mine) > > The only potential distinction that I can discern here is that "elements" > might be used to refer to the *constituents *of the "categories," if the > latter are defined as "kinds of elements." On the other hand, in between > these two writings, a version of "The Basis of Pragmaticism"--the one to > whose title the EP2 editors appended "in Phaneroscopy"--eschewed any > mention of "categories" in favor of "indecomposable elements." > > CSP: I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron > (which will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to > discover what different forms of indecomposable *elements *it contains > ... The expression "indecomposable *element*" sounds pleonastic; but it > is not so, since I mean by it something which not only is elementary, since > it seems so, and seeming is the only being a constituent of the Phaneron > has, as such, but is moreover incapable of being separated by logical > analysis into parts, whether they be substantial, essential, relative, or > any other kind of parts ... We are to consider what *forms *are possible, > rather than what *kinds *are possible, because it is universally > admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most important divisions are > divisions according to *form*, and not according to qualities of *matter*, > in case division according to form is possible at all. Indeed, this > necessarily results from the very idea of the distinction between *form *and > *matter*. If we content ourselves with the usual statement of this idea, > the consequence is quite obvious. A doubt may, however, arise whether any > distinction of form is possible among indecomposable *elements*. But > since a possibility is proved as soon as a single actual instance is found, > it will suffice to remark that although the chemical atoms were until quite > recently conceived to be, each of them, quite indecomposable and > homogeneous, yet they have for half a century been known to differ from one > another, not indeed in *internal *form, but in *external *form ... We > conclude, then, that there is a fair antecedent reason to suspect that the > Phaneron's indecomposable *elements *may likewise have analogous > differences of external form. Should we find this possibility to be > actualized, it will, beyond all dispute, furnish us with by far the most > important of all divisions of such *elements*. (EP 2:362-363, 1905; bold > mine) > > However, it seems to me that here Peirce is once again using "elements" > for the *constituents *of the categories, but substituting "forms" for > the latter. He now prefers not to refer to the categories as "*kinds *of > elements," because that would make them divisions "according to qualities > of *matter*," rather than according to form. > > > > To muddy the waters further, none of these excerpts were published during > Peirce's lifetime. Even the Syllabus passage was, according to the EP2 > headnote, "not printed in the pamphlet for the audience." It is not a > stretch to think that Peirce was simply experimenting with these different > terminologies, and it may be impossible to establish once and for all > whether they genuinely reflect a significant conceptual shift. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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