Edwina, List: We always need to pay attention to *when* Peirce wrote something. CP 1.409 is from 1887 or 1888, and Lowell 3 is from 1903; Gary F.'s point is that Peirce's terminology *evolved *between these two writings. As for "composed," he stated the following.
CSP: I have taken no pains to make this promiscuous list of properties of fact complete, having only cared that it should be sufficient to enable us to compare the characters of fact with those of duality and thus ultimately to attain an understanding of why all phenomena should be *composed *of quality, fact, and law. (CP 1.440; c. 1896, bold added) CSP: All the elements of experience belong to three classes, which, since they are best defined in terms of numbers, may be termed *Kainopythagorean categories*. Namely, experience is *composed *of 1st, *monadic experiences*, or *simples*, being elements each of such a nature that it might without inconsistency be what it is though there were nothing else in all experience; 2nd, *dyadic experiences*, or *recurrences*, each a direct experience of an opposing pair of objects; 3rd, *triadic experiences*, or *comprehensions*, each a direct experience which connects other possible experiences. (CP 7.528; undated, bold added) The Categories are, as Peirce himself said in multiple places, the only three types of "*indecomposable *elements" that we find in every phenomenon. This is "reductionistic" only if saying that all matter is composed of 118 elements is "reductionistic." In fact, according to Peirce, "*composition *is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321; 1909). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 12:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > With regard to your comment: > > "not about classification of phenomena but analysis into the elements of > which they are composed, namely Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness." > > I don't see that 'elements' or 'categories' means 'of which they are > composed, which is reductionistic. After all, a basic understanding of the > term 'element', is as 'a component or constituent of a whole'. But I don't > see that the categories are an analysis of the elements of which phenomena > are composed'. > > I understand Peirce's use of 'element' to refer to the nature of, > or basic mode of organization of that 'whole'. > > After all, Peirce's “three elements are active in the world, first, > chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking” (CP 1.409) As active, they > cannot refer to 'bits' or 'components of a whole'. Chance is a state of a > phenomena - and thus, not a component or 'bit'. Law is a rule of that > phenomena and again, not a component. Habit-taking is a process...not a > component or bit of a whole. > > Edwina Taborsky >
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