Edwina, List: ET: With regard to your reminding us that 'we always need to pay attention to when Peirce wrote something - that is how you read Peirce. I don't do this and read him as a whole not in a linear fashion.
Paying careful attention to chronology and the associated evolution of ideas and terminology does not entail reading "in a linear fashion." ET: Your bold font of Peirce's use of 'composed' is dissimilar to Gary F's comment and use of the term. How so? I read Gary F. as using "composed" in *exactly *the same sense as Peirce in those two passages. All three instances are within the context of discussing the analysis of phenomena/experience, which leads to recognition of the three Categories. ET: I don't see the categories as 'elements' but as, 'organization of experience/phaneron'. As Gary F. noted, "elements" or "kinds of elements" or "forms of elements" are basically interchangeable with "Categories" in Lowell 3 and some of Peirce's other late writings. Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list > > With regard to your reminding us that 'we always need to pay attention to > when Peirce wrote something - that is how you read Peirce. I don't do > this and read him as a whole not in a linear fashion. > > Your bold font of Peirce's use of 'composed' is dissimilar to Gary F's > comment and use of the term. > > My comment - and I think I was specific in this - was not about what > Peirce wrote but about what Gary F. wrote. > > "not about classification of phenomena but analysis into the elements of > which they are composed, namely Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness" > > I don't see the categories as 'elements' but as, 'organization of > experience/phaneron'. > > Edwina > > On Tue 05/12/17 2:56 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > We always need to pay attention to when Peirce wrote something. CP 1.409 > is from 1887 or 1888, and Lowell 3 is from 1903; Gary F.'s point is that > Peirce's terminology evolved between these two writings. As for > "composed," he stated the following. > > CSP: I have taken no pains to make this promiscuous list of properties of > fact complete, having only cared that it should be sufficient to enable us > to compare the characters of fact with those of duality and thus ultimately > to attain an understanding of why all phenomena should be composed of > quality, fact, and law. (CP 1.440; c. 1896, bold added) > > CSP: All the elements of experience belong to three classes, which, since > they are best defined in terms of numbers, may be termed Kainopythagorean > categories. Namely, experience is composed of 1st, monadic experiences, > or simples, being elements each of such a nature that it might without > inconsistency be what it is though there were nothing else in all > experience; 2nd, dyadic experiences, or recurrences, each a direct > experience of an opposing pair of objects; 3rd, triadic experiences, or > comprehensions, each a direct experience which connects other possible > experiences. (CP 7.528; undated, bold added) > > > The Categories are, as Peirce himself said in multiple places, the only > three types of "indecomposable elements" that we find in every > phenomenon. This is "reductionistic" only if saying that all matter is > composed of 118 elements is "reductionistic." In fact, according to > Peirce, " composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two > (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321; 1909). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 12:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> With regard to your comment: >> >> "not about classification of phenomena but analysis into the elements >> of which they are composed, namely Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness." >> >> I don't see that 'elements' or 'categories' means 'of which they are >> composed, which is reductionistic. After all, a basic understanding of the >> term 'element', is as 'a component or constituent of a whole'. But I don't >> see that the categories are an analysis of the elements of which phenomena >> are composed'. >> >> I understand Peirce's use of 'element' to refer to the nature of, >> or basic mode of organization of that 'whole'. >> >> After all, Peirce's “three elements are active in the world, first, >> chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking” (CP 1.409) As active, they >> cannot refer to 'bits' or 'components of a whole'. Chance is a state of a >> phenomena - and thus, not a component or 'bit'. Law is a rule of that >> phenomena and again, not a component. Habit-taking is a process...not a >> component or bit of a whole. >> >> Edwina Taborsky >> >
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