BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
consider the action of 'possibility' as akin to anticipation - as
the mode of Thirdness expressed within the current relational
experience of something experienced as either Firstness or
Secondness.
Edwina
On Thu 07/12/17 11:49 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Jon S, Gary f, list,
Jon wrote: "Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of
speculating (in the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what
it was that seemed or might have seemed, based on collateral
experience rather than only that which is immediately present to the
mind."
I can't agree with your claim here that possibility cannot be
experienced phenomenologically (although your point regarding
"collateral experience" may yet be well taken).
It seems to me that 1. your notion of 'seeming' is much too limited,
that that which is immediately present to the mind doesn't, for
example, occur in an 'instant' (Peirce holds that there is no such
thing except as a mathematical abstraction). So the notion of an
instantaneous 'seeming' is a mere abstraction, while the very
smallest 'seemings' according to Peirce's view of experiential time
will be triadic 'moments' which parts, naturally, meld into each
other, and which moments meld into other moments such that Peirce can
give examples of qualitative experience which might include, say, the
total experience of the movement of a piano concerto. In this way
Time and Semiosis and the Phaneron are intimately involved in each
other such that discussion of any of these requires a rather
considerable amount of abstraction from the 'pure' experience.
2. Regarding both this broader conception of the "quality of a total
feeling" as well as 'possibility' in this connection, Peirce writes:
A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It
is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its
quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor
sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal
Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it,
except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while
universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new
word was required for it. Otherwise, "possibility" would have answered
the purpose (CP 1.531).
So, perhaps we do need another word than 'possibility' for this
notion of phenomenological "possibility" which might 'fit' this more
expanded sense of "universal Firstness." There is a clearly a tension
here in Peirce's thinking. However, I do not see any reason to reject
phenomenological 'possibility' nor to see it as exclusively a
metaphysical notion. This is principally because I have experienced
phenomenological possibility.
3. I don't know who on the list considers him/herself a
phenomenologist (well, actually, I do know a couple), but I would say
that while I am most certainly not a "professional phenomenologist"
(are there any?), I can truly say that I at times practice
phenomenology, and have experienced 'possibility' as phenomenon (even
if this necessarily required) some "after the fact" reflection. This
is because one simply can't discuss immediate phaneroscopic
experience.
For example, I once offered Ben Udell an example of this sense of
phenomenological possibility when, at a Summer outing on one of the
highest foothills of the Catskill Mountains in New York State, one
overlooking the Tappan Zee expansion of the Hudson River, lying on my
back in the grass observing rather rapidly moving clouds making
forests of green tree leaves suddenly turn to colors I hadn't
anticipated or even known to exist: strange grays, deep purples,
browns sometimes approaching amber, and near blacks, etc. Those
colors were clearly 'possible', but I didn't know them until they
came to exist in my phaneron. This is where a kind of collateral
experience comes into play, I suppose.
So since, as in the quotation above, Peirce notes that "possibility
implies a relation to what exists," I have been arguing for the
necessity of at least one, but perhaps two other branches of
phenomenology beyond phaneroscopy for the development of a Peircean
phenomenological science. Otherwise, there would be nothing to 'speak
of' phenomenologically because the pure experience of phenomenological
quality (say, redness or hardness) or of phenomenological possibility
(say, the example just given) is quite truly and, really, necessarily
ineffable in itself. This holds a fortiori for such abstractions as
1ns (firstness), 2ns, 3ns, or Something, Other, Medium, etc.
It seems to me that de Tienne argues that there is a potentially
valuable science of Phenomenology, valuable at least as a
propaedeutic for logic as semeiotic. And he strongly suggests (in a
paper earlier cited) the development of this science requires an
additional branch of phenomenology beyond phaneroscopy, viz.,
Iconoscopy (or Imagoscopic as I'm beginning to think of it), this
being necessary for it to have a 'material' (and in order to develop
methods) for analytical discussion. So, in a word, for de Tienne,
Phaneroscopy is itself necessary but not sufficient to the
development of a science of Phenomenology. (As I earlier commented, I
believe that a 3rd branch, Category Theory, is also necessary for a
full development of this science.)
In truth, I have considered most discussions of Peircean
phenomenology far too narrow to be very helpful in bringing about an
authentic Peircean science of Phenomenology.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 6:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
Thanks for the link to the paper by de Tienne; I downloaded and
(presumably) read it more than a year ago, but it does not ring a
bell, and in any case makes more sense now. The following quote from
page 7 gets at why I believe that any discussion of "an unrealized
possibility" cannot properly fall within phaneroscopy.
ADT: Since observation must be single-minded and pure, description
will be devoid of speculations of any sort, and will only be an
honest account of whatever was observed. The ethical demand made on
phaneroscopists is twofold: they should not lie when reporting their
observation, and they should make sure that their report states only
what actually “seemed,” without speculating on what it was that
seemed or might have seemed.
Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in the
sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed
or might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only
that which is immediately present to the mind.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 4:15 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, Gary f, list,
I will have to mull over your comments, Jon, and have nothing to add
to my previous remarks at the moment.
Yesterday I came upon this paper by André De Tienne which I had
read some time ago and, as I recall, Joe Ransdell commented on at
some length on the list in dialogue with André. In may be helpful in
the current discussion of at least the phaneroscopic part of what
we've been and, hopefully, will be discussing. But the last sentence
of the Abstract.
"Is Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible?"
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/m
[3]enu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf
ABSTRACT Peirce thought that, after mathematics, the most
fundamental of all sciences was phenomenology, or phaneroscopy as he
dubbed it to escape from Hegel. But phaneroscopy as a research
activity isn’t practiced anywhere and hasn’t attracted any wide
following; its results are neither taught nor disseminated; and no
scientist has begged for its conclusions with any urgency. Peirce
scholars are divided about what that science is supposed to be and to
do, and about how exactly it relates to semiotics. Some have even
questioned its scientificity. The fact that it hasn’t become a
major field of research raises the question of whether there is any
actual need for it, whatever it is, and of whether it has any future,
assuming it ever had a past. This paper attempts to address some of
these questions candidly. It tries to determine what it is that
Peirce held phaneroscopy to be, what type of discourse it is bound to
produce, and whether its activity can be said to be scientific by
Peirce’s own standards. It examines its place between mathematics
and the normative sciences, especially semiotics, and takes stock of
both the type and the method of analysis Peirce associated with it.
Also studied are the peculiar qualities required from anyone who
wants to become a phaneroscopist, and the reason why Peirce thought
that everyone was capable of doing original work in it. The
connection between phaneroscopy and the existential graphs is also
addressed.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4]
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 2:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Garys, List:
"Division" is Peirce's own term (along with "classification") for
sorting the indecomposable elements of the Phaneron into their
different kinds (CP 1.288, c. 1908, on Gary F.'s website), so I am
inclined to stick with it. I can understand why one might prefer
"aspect" in phaneroscopy, but it strikes me as a poor fit in
normative science and metaphysics.
I am also not convinced (so far) that possibility is something that
"appears" in the Phaneron, except as a mode of Being within
metaphysics. Notice that in Lowell 3.2, Peirce refers to the quality
of hardness as "an unrealized possibility," which is clearly (to me) a
metaphysical statement, not properly a phaneroscopic one. From that
standpoint, as I have suggested previously, all three branches of
philosophy could be called phenomenology--quality/reactio n/mediation
are phenomena in their 1ns, feeling/volition/thought are phenomena in
their 2ns, and possibility/actuality/regularity are phenomena in
their 3ns.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary f., Jon, list,
I am still troubled by a few things in Jon's proposal while still
thinking that it might prove highly useful. I'll employ Gary f's most
recent comments to make a couple of points concerning what yet
troubles me.
Gf: I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as
you said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of
overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics
— especially when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and
logic takes principles (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as
is the case in Peirce’s classification of sciences.
In my view, not only does "there tend to be a lot of overlap between
the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics," but that in
the matter of categorial 'aspects' (I think Gary f's terminology is
sound) that they are all (or almost all) 'given' in phenomenology,
Then, as Gary notes, metaphysics takes categorial principles from
logic which has taken categorial principles from phenomenology, and
in return in Peirce's Classification of Sciences, logic and
phenomenology may take examples from metaphysics; while
phenomenology can also receive examples ---and undoubtedly other
help--from logic. But the categorial elements (including
'possibility---and in the section of Lowell 3 I referred to in my
earlier post, Peirce is discussing not metaphysics, but pointedly,
phenomenology), these categorial aspects first appear in some
phaneron. Gf continues:
Gf: However in phaneroscopy, rather than “divisions of
phenomena,” I would say aspects of phenomena, or even better,
aspects of the phaneron. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but abstracts from them the Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness which is present in anything “before the
mind” in any way.
I agree that at least in phaneroscopy that one might better say
'aspects' rather than 'divisions' of phenomena. Andre De Tinne,
Director and General Editor of PEP, in a paper, 'Iconoscopy: Between
Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic', has argued that once one has
'experienced' such aspects in the phaneron that one can then single
individual aspects out and give them names (and, perhaps, do further
analysis: e.g. to retrospectively see that in the simplest
theoretical mathematics that they appear as monod/dyad/triad and,
further, that Peirce's Reduction Thesis makes this division
necessary and sufficient for further -adities; and, moreover, in my
view it is this retrospective mathematical analysis which gives
warrant to our referring to them as 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in
phenomenology when the categorial aspects first appear).
(Btw, in his paper De Tienne suggests, and I think he's correct,
that 'Iconoscopy' is not quite the proper term in this context and
suggests that it ought better be something closer to 'Imagoscopy'
which, however, is probably too weird and ugly a term; still,
Iconoscopy, in referencing a term in semeiotic, is at least
misleading).
I have also suggested that there may be a 3rd branch of
phenomenology. Joe Ransdell suggested that i call that branch
'Category Theory' and I immediately took his advice. In this branch
of phenomenology one goes beyond Iconoscopy/Imagoscopy and arranges
trichotomies of aspects identified in that branch. The paper and ppt
presentation I linked to in my last post from the Arisbe site offers
suggestions as to the kinds of content that this 3rd branch of
phenomenology might concern itself with. Gf concludes:
Gf: In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a
phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness
(which may be more or less degenerate). I think that Gf is
essentially correct in this if one remembers that it is phaneroscopy
proper which treats phenomenon in their 1ns. Further analysis,
especially that using the tools of logic as semeiotic (and even a
logica utens), can analyze phenomena in consideration of the other
categories as well allowing for the two other possible branches just
mentioned.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690 [7]
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:05 AM, wrote:
Jon,
I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you
said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap
between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics —
especially when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic
takes principles (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the
case in Peirce’s classification of sciences.
However in phaneroscopy, rather than “divisions of phenomena,” I
would say aspects of phenomena, or even better, aspects of the
phaneron. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds
and Thirds, but abstracts from them the Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness which is present in anything “before the mind” in any
way. In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a
phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness
(which may be more or less degenerate).
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto: [email protected] [9]]
Sent: 5-Dec-17 22:16
To: [email protected] [10]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell
Lecture 2.14)
List: For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a
proposal for parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology.
*In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns
as divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience:
quality/reaction/mediation.
*In the normative sciences, we discover the three Ideals of
esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to
the contents of consciousness: feeling/volition/thought.
*In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of
Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of
Being: possibility/actuality/regularity.
Criticize away! Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [11] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [12]
Links:
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[3]
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[5]
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