Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

Fri, 08 Dec 2017 10:08:26 -0800

List,
when i read about the question, whether possibility is a matter of seeming or speculating, then another definition of it comes into my mind: possible is everything that is not impossible, and what is impossible is all that is ruled out by deduction. So possibility is everything minus deduced impossibility. So, is possibility a matter of deduction too? No, because we donot know all that "everything" includes, and "everything" is not a deduced premiss. (or is it premise? I dont know the difference, except that we are not talking about a building). I think, "everything" is an indefitite set, and "impossibility" known by humans is a definite set. An indefinite set minus a definite set is still an indefinite set. So possibility does not have a value, like to say, something is more possible or less. That would be probability. So I think, "seeming" is a matter of probability (induction). Possibility is a matter of abduction, and I think, "speculation" suits it, as speculation is potentially indefinite too. "Seeming" is a matter of ruling out, or limitation, something inductive and probability-related. Metaphysics, too, I guess, have rather to do with probability than with possibility: The probabilty that phenomena of similar kind, frequently occuring, may be generalized for assuming universal laws. But that is probability, induction, I would say, not possibility. Possibility is the "Tohu Va Bohu" minus the quite few things that are known for being impossible. So it is still impossible (for humans) to deal with the possible. Only the one and only, if you believe in this entity, who has tamed the Tohu Va Bohu, has been able to do so. But why not believe? From what else should probability have derived from possibility, if there has not been something/ somebody being able to deal with indefinite sets? But the problem here is, that belief leads to nowhere, and is not scientific. It merely fills the hole, that the unknown is. Solution: Believe in this hole, a hole nobody ever can close, neither today, nor in the future. The God of science is the bait getting bigger and more complex the further you chase it, like the carrot getting redder and bigger the further the donkey chases it.
The donkey, though, could just stop and eat some grass. I want to do something similar: Not care too much about theology, but rather occupy myself with the things on the roadside, like different species of grass, I can deal with.
Best,
Helmut
 
 08. Dezember 2017 um 16:53 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
 

Jon, list - I think that if YOU wish to use the term 'possibility' as confined to metaphysics, then, that is your prerogative. But I don't think that it's beneficial to suggest that WE [all] should use the term in that way.

I see your usage as referring primarily to formal possibility [3.527] but there are other kinds - those which are IN the triadic Sign process/thing [6.371]. That is, possibility is aligned, in my view, with existential Relations of actuality and habit. It is obviously not Secondness nor Thirdness but as a freedom [i.e., Firstness] it brings that force existentially into the semiosic formation of things which are already forming within Secondness and Thirdness.

Edwina



 

On Fri 08/12/17 10:22 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent:

Jeff, List:
 
Once more, I am not making an interpretative claim, but a terminological proposal.  Indeed, there are other senses of "possibility" besides the one that I have articulated, but I am suggesting that--at least in some circumstances--it would be better for the sake of clarity if we only use the word "possibility" when referring to the metaphysical mode of Being that is distinct from actuality and regularity.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> wrote:

Jon S, Gary, R, List,

Jon S:  Possibility is not a matter of "seeming," but of speculating (in the sense of theorizing) on the mode of Being of what it was that seemed or might have seemed, based on collateral experience rather than only that which is immediately present to the mind.

Are there other senses of "possibility" in addition to the one you have articulated? 

For aspects of our experience involving vagueness, are there a range of possibilities lurking in the bushes? How about the experience of what has potentiality--such as is involved in the experience of the growth of our understanding? How about the experience of something that is continuous, such as the experience of things being at a place in space and at a time? 

In each of these sorts of cases, I take Peirce to be claiming that our experience involves a range of possibilities. I would think that each of these sorts of cases involves an experience of possibilities that is different, in important respects, from the sense that you've articulated. 

Am I missing something about what it is that you are trying to suggest in making your interpretative claim?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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