I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came
to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially
input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this
account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly
organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that
there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar
irreducibility.
I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but
there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly
Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
John
On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct.
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from
their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in
other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options
(analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide
ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly
as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were
that of a man.
And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how
to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and
nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
forces are the */product/* of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the
motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>.
While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in
semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El
Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a
group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor
(condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for
the miners to achieve:
I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound
I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
*From:*Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
*To:* [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>;
[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>; Mike Bergman
*Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers
to its functioning as a triadic process:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any one
of the three modal categories.
Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit'
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness] and also,
Mind or Thirdness.
But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or,
are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this
expansion. The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would
say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic -
with each node [O-R-I] in a mode of Secondness. But organization of
the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.
Edwina
*On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> sent:*
Hi Gary f, List,
I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and
the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question
well. Are there passages from Peirce where he specifically
connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than the passing
reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely
believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it
anywhere stated something like that?
I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or
semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though
suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little
more to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes
up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty
thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.
Thanks!
Mike
On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, [email protected]
<javascript:top.opencompose('[email protected]','','','')> wrote:
Mike,
There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually
identify semiosis with Representation and thus with Thirdness,
and the laws of nature being /general/ laws, Thirdness is
predominant in them. For instance there is CP 5.105, EP 2:184):
[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for
Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term
because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as those
of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a
general principle that is operative in the real world is of
the essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol
because its /modus operandi/ is the same as that by which
/words/ produce physical effects. ]]
Gary f.
*From:*Mike Bergman [mailto:[email protected]
<javascript:top.opencompose('[email protected]','','','')>]
*Sent:* 9-Dec-17 17:25
*To:* [email protected]
<javascript:top.opencompose('[email protected]','','','')>
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology,
and Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across
this quote:
"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis
(semeiosis), is human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever
there is life and there is some reason to believe that even
the *laws of nature* are semiotic products." (emphasis added)
I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551),
but do not recall seeing Peirce references to signs in
inanimate nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list
know of others?
Thanks!
Mike
[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The
Routledge Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New
York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.
--
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
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