BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen, list
1] I'm not sure what you mean by 'universal agreement on choice,
freedom, options and so forth'. 'Universal agreement' by whom??
2] I don't think that options are 'more real' the more consciously
decisions are made. I think that there are MORE options for a species
with consciousness than for a species without consciousness. But
that's hardly an earth-shattering observation.
3] I disagree with your comment that: 'Peirce by making the triadic
a sort of default effects a massive block to notions of behaviour as
instinctive'.
First - the triad IS basic, and not a 'sort of default'. But it
certainly doesn't function as a 'massive block to instinctive
behaviour'! With the requirement for mediation rather than direct
interaction [as referred to by John Collier], then, this mediative
process can include the knowledge base known as Thirdness. As Peirce
observed, "the objective final opinion is independent of the thoughts
of any particular men, but is not independent of thought in general'
[7.336].
It seems to me, and I may be misunderstanding you, but your analysis
seems to exclude 'thought in general' - which is the basis of
instinct.
Edwina
On Sun 10/12/17 11:50 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" [email protected]
sent:
Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so
forth. Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more
real the more consciously decisions are made and the more choices one
allows oneself. Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects
a massive block to notions of behavior as instinctive.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is
not reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].
Edwina
On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier [email protected] [3] sent:
I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he
came to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient
(especially input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are
open-ended on this account and not reducible to input-output
relations (they are complexly organized, as Cliff Hooker and I
call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that there are instincts that
are thirds, then they would have a similar irreducibility.
I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right
now, but there are a couple of articles on this on my web page
that are certainly Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
John
On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis,
it would be helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with
the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL organism's are
decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems.
What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of
options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to
"know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would
behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if
her body were that of a man.
And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a
preprogrammed blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend
the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. That is, the
mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not
what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in
accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics,
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics
of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are the product
of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind
my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics [4].
While we are discussing the role of mind-body
predispositions in semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded
of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its original
form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor
mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of
freedom for the miners to achieve:
I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound
I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; Mike
Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical
realm refers to its functioning as a triadic process:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in
any one of the three modal categories.
Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking
is a basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion
of such by atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [
which is a modal category]. It is a relational or interactive
process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with another 'bit'
of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,
confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes
both spontaneity [Firstness] and also, Mind or Thirdness.
But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does
a crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical
contact or, are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and
organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical
triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]
in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the results of
contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.
Edwina
On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman [email protected]
sent:
Hi Gary f, List,
I am generally familiar with the general references for
laws and the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address
my question well. Are there passages from Peirce where he
specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other
than the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can
infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be
subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something
like that?
I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs
or semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear,
though suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP
5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like
the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of
Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong
as the evidence gets.
Thanks!
Mike
On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Mike,
There are plenty of passages in Peirce which
virtually identify semiosis with Representation and
thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being
general laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For
instance there is CP 5.105, EP 2:184):
[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym
for Representation, to which I prefer the less
colored term because its suggestions are not so
narrow and special as those of the word
Representation. Now it is proper to say that a
general principle that is operative in the real world
is of the essential nature of a Representation and of
a Symbol because its modus operandi is the same as
that by which words produce physical effects. ]]
Gary f.
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics" in the Routledge
Companion [1] and came across this quote:
"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or
semiosis (semeiosis), is human thought; but
semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there
is some reason to believe that even the laws of
nature are semiotic products." (emphasis added)
I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees
(CP 4.551), but do not recall seeing Peirce
references to signs in inanimate nature other than
crystals. Does anyone on the list know of others?
Thanks!
Mike
[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and
Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion to Semiotics,
P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010,
pp. 89–100.
--
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Collier web page [5]
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
[email protected] [6] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] [7] with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/ [8]peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Links:
------
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63
[5] http://web.ncf.ca/collier
[6]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[7]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[8] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
