Mary, list, Mary, if you're a clodhopper than I'm a bumpkin. But, of course, quite the opposite is the case, so I'm spared for yokeldom!
More and more I hope that this forum can find ways, as you wrote, to help "newcomers to Peirce to feel welcome," and I personally am devising strategies to do more of that in the new year. For example, I am working with Laureano Battista (a NYC Semiotics Web member/organizer who is also a member of this forum), and bouncing off Joe Ransdell's original introduction on 'How the Forum Works' (which can be found on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM ) to develop a perhaps more "user friendly" introduction to the working of this forum. I am also planning a few 'pragmaticist' games for the new year (I won't say more on that topic yet, but I'll be soliciting help from you and others on this idea early in the year). But more to the present point, recently, in other threads, several forum members offered some very interesting questions which I thought were quite promising for further list discussion. I hope that some of those folks will start new threads with these questions, some of which I think ought appeal to "newcomers to Peirce" as well as to "the usual suspects." I point to this matter of creating new threads as it is possible for some very good ideas to get 'lost' in a thread introduced for some other purpose. So I hope those questions will yet be asked in threads with very specific Subject lines. You wrote: ML: What attracts me to Peirce is the awe I feel and the depth and breadth of his journey to understand and to believe in the movement of semiosis. It is makes so much sense. . . I agree that a kind of belief "in the movement of semiosis" does make much sense, and from my perspective, more sense than any other philosophical work since the 19th century (although there's *much* to admire elsewhere, including the work of Whitehead, Apel, some of the existentialists, Camus, Wittgenstein, as well as much contemporary work.) This is why I think some of the questions recently asked (but not answered) might provoke us to deeper reflections on how this profound and original philosophy of pragmaticism (and including all the cenoscopic sciences: phenomenology, theoretical esthetics/ethics/semiotic, as well as scientific metaphysics) might contribute something of substance to what Peirce refers to as meliorism, which is nothing more nor less than the belief that the world we live in can be made better by our very human, albeit, often sadly, "all too human" (Nietzsche), efforts. Pragmatism ought to have some very important to contribute to meliorism, and this was Peirce's belief. I see a commonality in your work relating Peircean perspectives to literature to Gene Halton's, and I think literature, as well as art, and music, etc., are all potentially fruitful directions for semiotics and pragmatism to be moving into (Gene is also, and perhaps primarily, a sociologist, and I recommend his books to everyone on this list, as pragmatism has a great deal to offer that field as well). We have artists and art theorists, architects, and practitioners and students of many disciplines on this list, and I hope to find ways of encouraging more of them to participate actively on the list in 2018. But, again, *lurkers are prized!* Meanwhile, the extraordinary work that Gary f has been doing in presenting the whole of the 1903 Lowell Lectures and, in my view, very useful commentary (even if one doesn't necessarily agree with all of it) presently remains my primary focus. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 4:29 PM, Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> wrote: > I think vector analysis of Gary R and knowledge soup of John S are exactly > what I needed to be reminded of when I felt the need to focus on the 3 > pronged spoke rather than the triangle. This kind of help allows newcomers > to Peirce to feel welcome. What attracts me to Peirce is the awe I feel and > the depth and breadth of his journey to understand and to believe in the > movement of semiosis. It is makes so much sense even, as he says, “in the > mind of a clodhopper” like me. > > On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 4:01 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> >> Heh - but I'm not a fan of Hegel or indeed, of any utopian >> idealism...which 'absolute truth' seems to me, to hover around. >> >> I think that one can't get away from the realities of Firstness and >> Secondness [entropy and diversity]... >> >> Edwina >> >> >> On Tue 12/12/17 3:38 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Hi Edwina, list: >> >> >> >> You said, >> >> “Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. “ >> >> >> >> J >> >> >> >> "it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute truth?" >> >> >> >> In this way Hegel advances until he reaches the 'Absolute Idea', which, >> according to him, has no incompleteness, no opposite, and no need of >> further development. The Absolute Idea, therefore, is adequate to describe >> Absolute Reality. >> >> >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 2:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. Not only is such >>> closure unscientific but we are not a large or diverse enough group to >>> substantiate a scientifically valid consensus. >>> >>> I'm not against the triangle as such - as in, for example, that Lady >>> Welby classification triangle of the signs to which you refer. As you say, >>> this is a static image and not meant to imagize the process of the >>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant triad. My focus on the 'spoke' is >>> only to imagize the semiosic O-R-I process as am open and networking >>> interaction. >>> >>> By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the >>> possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility of a >>> evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).". Wouldn't you say that before >>> the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be incidents in a mode of >>> Secondness..which might vanish or might exist long enough to interact with >>> each other and form those habits? >>> >>> I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .." >>> there would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then by >>> the principle of habit there would have been a second flash...."...But >>> Secondness is of two types. consequently besides flashes genuinely second >>> to others, so as to come after them, there will be pairs of flashes, or, >>> since time is now supposed to have developed, we had better say pairs of >>> states, which are reciprocally second, each member of the pair to the >>> other. This is the first germ of spatial extension. These states will >>> undergo changes; and habits will be formed of passing from certain states >>> to certain others, and of not passing from certain states to certain >>> others"... >>> >>> My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?] operates >>> within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the matter that is >>> formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness since this matter is >>> both temporally and spatially existent. Then, these 'states'/bits of matter >>> will develop their own habits..and so on. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue 12/12/17 2:42 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: >>> >>> Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list, >>> >>> I can't say that I experience the horror that Edwina does with the use >>> of the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself >>> uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the >>> classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an >>> analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the >>> point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and >>> semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any >>> particular semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful. >>> >>> But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering >>> movement through the categories (which paths of movement I've called >>> categorial vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible >>> vectors is in play. >>> >>> [image: Blocked image] >>> >>> (I have renamed the vector of analysis that of involution, although >>> both terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic"). >>> >>> For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in >>> the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves >>> what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns), >>> after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose >>> of devising an experimental testing of the hypothesis (3ns), followed by >>> the inductive testing itself (2ns). This 'movement through the categories' >>> is, in my opinion, best illustrated by a bent arrow either within or >>> outside of a triangle. That the process doesn't end there is well >>> illustrated by John Sowa's 'Knowledge Soup' diagram. >>> >>> As I've noted here before, this process vector is the very same one >>> Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance 'sporting' >>> (1ns), then, the possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the >>> possibility of a evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns). Again, if you >>> see the process as triadic, it most certainly doesn't *end* with that >>> evolutionary adaptation. Yet, for me being able to see the direction of the >>> several vectors, comparing (as I just did with inquiry and biological >>> evolution), or contrasting them (for example, contrasting both inquiry and >>> evolution with the semiotic path (the vector of determination) whereas >>> the object (2ns) determines the representamen (1ns) which determines the >>> interpretant 3ns) can potentially reveal interesting new relations. >>> >>> So, I agree with Gary F: >>> >>> Yes, it’s a long-running debate whether we should use a triangle or a >>> three-spoke diagram. . . Personally I don’t think it matters much which one >>> you use, as long as you recognize that relation as triadic. >>> >>> >>> And yet (1) it is especially important in, for example, considering the >>> -> representamen -> interpretant path that "you recognize that relation as >>> triadic" and, in the sense of infinite semiosis, neither linear nor >>> arriving at an end point) and (2) for many purposes the three spoked >>> diagram is indeed. preferable. But for some, especially certain analytical >>> purposes, the triangle proves quite helpful. >>> >>> This is one of those areas where I think the decision as to which (the >>> triangle or the spoke) manner of diagramming a triadic relation is most >>> useful for her purposes ought be left up to the individual inquirer, that >>> we ought not insist on what is right or wrong (seek consensus) for others >>> in this matter. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Blocked image] >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 12:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Mary, list - I fully agree with you. I have always been horrified - and >>>> I mean the word - by the use of the triangle to portray the semiosic triad. >>>> It is, in my view, so completely wrong, for it sets up a closed linear >>>> path. >>>> >>>> The' node connecting three lines of identity' [1.347] is, in my view, >>>> the correct image, for as Peirce points out - it clearly shows how such a >>>> node and its relations is networked almost to infinity with other such >>>> formats. As you say - it shows the 'openness inherent in triadic >>>> relations'. >>>> >>>> Edwina - >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue 12/12/17 3:32 PM , Mary Libertin mary.liber...@gmail.com sent: >>>> >>>> Gary, list, >>>> >>>> I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine triadic >>>> relation”—“a node with three lines of identity” instead of a triangle. >>>> Ogden popularized the Peircean concept of triangle in an appendix in his >>>> book “The Meaning of Meaning”, and that triangle has been repeated over and >>>> over. I believe the node with three lines of identity makes immediate, >>>> diagrammatic sense and I believe shows forth the openness inherent in >>>> triadic relations. I’d like to investigate this—its historical context, >>>> literature on it, etc. Do you think I’m making sense, and /or can you point >>>> me in the right direction? Thanks. >>>> >>>> Mary Libertin >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 7:01 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3, >>>>> >>>>> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce- >>>>> manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd- >>>>> draught/display/13884 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to those >>>>> of Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is >>>>> that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is >>>>> obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is >>>>> inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion >>>>> may be required to convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that >>>>> every triadic relation involves meaning. There will be two lines of >>>>> inquiry. First, all physical forces appear to subsist between pairs of >>>>> particles. This was assumed by Helmholtz in his original paper on the >>>>> Conservation of Forces. Take any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by >>>>> which I mean a fact which can only be defined by simultaneous reference to >>>>> three things, and you will find there is ample evidence that it never was >>>>> produced by the action of forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, your >>>>> right hand is that hand which is toward the east, when you face the >>>>> north with your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and >>>>> up, are required to define the difference between right and left. >>>>> Consequently chemists find that those substances which rotate the plane of >>>>> polarization to the right or left can only be produced from such active >>>>> substances. They are all of such complex constitution that they cannot >>>>> have >>>>> existed when the earth was very hot, and how the first one was produced is >>>>> a puzzle. It cannot have been by the action of brute forces. For the >>>>> second >>>>> branch of the inquiry, you must train yourself to the analysis of >>>>> relations, beginning with such as are very markedly triadic, gradually >>>>> going on to others. In that way, you will convince yourself thoroughly >>>>> that >>>>> every genuine triadic relation involves thought or meaning. Take, for >>>>> example, the relation of giving. A gives B to C. This does not >>>>> consist in A's throwing B away and its accidentally hitting C, like the >>>>> date-stone, which hit the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would >>>>> not >>>>> be a genuine triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by >>>>> another. There need be no motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer >>>>> of the right of property. Now right is a matter of law, and law is a >>>>> matter >>>>> of thought and meaning. I there leave the matter to your own reflection, >>>>> merely adding that, though I have inserted the word “genuine,” yet I do >>>>> not >>>>> really think that necessary. I think even degenerate triadic relations >>>>> involve something like thought. >>>>> >>>>> The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can >>>>> never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown. In >>>>> Existential Graphs, a spot with one tail —X represents a quality, a spot >>>>> with two tails —R— a dyadic relation. Joining the ends of two tails is >>>>> also >>>>> a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph with >>>>> three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of identity >>>>> [image: >>>>> Blocked image] is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it >>>>> is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, “Why, >>>>> that is the very man I saw on Monday.” We may say, with sufficient >>>>> accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a >>>>> man and I say, “That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is >>>>> the same I saw on Monday.” There is a recognition of triadic identity; but >>>>> it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is >>>>> itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such >>>>> direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can >>>>> only >>>>> identify them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two >>>>> different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of >>>>> manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, >>>>> which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C. >>>>> >>>>> 347 . It is interesting to remark that while a graph with three tails >>>>> cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations >>>>> of >>>>> graphs of three tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher >>>>> number of tails. >>>>> >>>>> [image: Blocked image] >>>>> >>>>> And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, >>>>> pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a >>>>> compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that >>>>> beyond these three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there >>>>> is nothing else to be found in the phenomenon. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> null >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- > null >
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