I think there are myriad ways that things move from 1 to 2 to 3 -- each thought process is one of trillions. Sometimes the primal 1 wrestles with brutal 2 and the willed decision is a no -- all in seconds. Other times the process might emerge as a 1 topic and be amplified by 2 an index and then emerge as 3 a creative solution -- or at least as something to try. Triadic thinking insists that between 1 and 3 there is an index 2 of some sort, enabling a process of refinement, enlargement, or criticism.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 7:57 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > > > Peirce’s attempt to render the ‘Firstness of Secondness’ (i.e. pure > Secondness) comprehensible deals mostly with the difficulty of prescinding > it from the experience of willing, separating it from the Thirdness > involved in that experience. I think Peirce may be overstating the case > when he says that “he who wills is conscious of doing so, in the sense of > *representing* to himself that he does so”: when a cat is hunting a > mouse, for instance, I would attribute to the cat a *will* or even > *intention* to catch the mouse, but doubt that the cat is representing to > himself that he does so. But perhaps that’s a psychological point of view > which would not apply to a strictly *logical* view of the experience, > since logic is a matter of self-control, which indeed must imply some kind > of self-representation. > > > > Somewhat more difficult to follow is Peirce’s attempt to contrast > actuality (as Secondness) with *quality* (as Firstness). His remarks on > Hegel’s “neglect of Secondness” seem paradoxical, based as they are on the > premiss that “the word “existence” names, as if it were an abstract > possibility, that which is precisely the not having any being in abstract > possibility.” However, I think this does follow from Peirce’s earlier > statement (CP 1.527) that *matter* “has no being at all except the being > a subject of qualities. This relation of really having qualities > constitutes its *existence.*” Certainly it’s difficult to draw the line > here between logic and metaphysics. Anyway, this whole paragraph > demonstrates how hard it is to make “brute” Secondness intelligible. Maybe > that’s why Zen masters used to get it across to their students by shouting > at them or whacking them with a stick. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 30-Dec-17 10:35 > *To:* 'Peirce List' <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10 > > > > Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.9, https://fromthepage.com/ > jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd- > draught/display/13922 (cf CP 1.532): > > > > As to Secondness, I have said that our only direct knowledge of it is in > Willing and in the experience of a Perception. It is in Willing that the > Secondness comes out most strongly. But it is not pure Secondness. For, in > the first place, he who wills has a Purpose; and that idea of purpose makes > the act appear as a *Means* to an end. Now the word *Means* is almost an > exact synonym to the word *third.* It certainly involves Thirdness. > Moreover, he who wills is conscious of doing so, in the sense of > *representing* to himself that he does so. But representation is > precisely genuine Thirdness. You must conceive an instantaneous > Consciousness that is instantly and totally forgotten and an effort without > purpose. It is a hopeless undertaking to try to realize what > consciousness would be without the element of representation. It would be > like unexpectedly hearing a great explosion of nitroglycerine before one > had recovered oneself and merely had the sense of the breaking off of the > quiet. Perhaps it might not be far from what ordinary common sense > conceives to take place when one billiard ball caroms on another. One ball > “acts” on the other; that is, it makes an exertion *minus* the element of > representation. We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general > Firstness of all true Secondness is *Existence,* though this term more > particularly applies to Secondness in so far as it is an element of the > reacting First and Second. If we mean Secondness as it is an element of the > occurrence, the Firstness of it is *Actuality.* But actuality and > existence are words expressing the same idea in different applications. > Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and > has no other being; and therefore different Secondnesses, strictly > speaking, have in themselves no quality in common. Accordingly existence, > or the universal Firstness of all Secondness, is really not a quality at > all. An actual dollar to your credit in the bank does not differ in any > respect from a possible imaginary dollar. For if it did, the imaginary > dollar could be imagined to be changed in that respect, so as to agree with > the actual dollar. We thus see that actuality is not a *quality,* or mere > mode of feeling. Hence Hegel, whose neglect of Secondness was due chiefly > [to] his not recognizing any other mode of being than Existence,— and what > he calls *Existenz* is a special variety of it merely,— regarded Pure > Being as pretty much the same as Nothing. It is true that the word > “existence” names, as if it were an abstract possibility, that which is > precisely the not having any being in abstract possibility; and this > circumstance, when you look upon existence as the only being, seems to make > existence all but the same as nothing. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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