Dear gary, list,
If what Gary adds of John about Putnam is true, “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle: "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also become clearer." I would make that same comment about Peirce.” Then is it obvious to you that Peirce and Aristotle (among others) are talking about one great big thing that has relation to several similar things? it seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate aim is. .. it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain our proper object, like archers having a target to aim at? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the sciences or faculties it is the object. That is, if nothing is complete which has no end and only one thing is the ultimate aim, then why do I find it so bizarre to justify our actions with: *because* Peirce.. *because* Aristotle.. *because* ultimate aim? I would greatly appreciate someone explaining this joke to me so that I may *redirect my attention to the subject*, recognize that it is clear it has a reality, in *some* mode of being, which is independent of what anyone thinks about it, “become clearer” and lead to a modification of those habits 3. *Aristotle*. Have read and thought more about Aristotle than about any other man. Best, Jerry R On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 6:47 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > John Sowa wrote, > > “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle: > "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also > become clearer." > > I would make that same comment about Peirce.” > > > > Amen to that! And if I may clarify more minutely: > > > > Becoming clearer about a *subject* begins with assuming — provisionally > at least — that it has a reality, in *some* mode of being, which is > independent of what anyone thinks about it. This reality involves the > *possibility* of perceiving the real difference between true and false > thoughts about it. > > > > Finding that Peirce has become clearer *about that subject* means > perceiving the *real relations* between its reality and Peirce’s actual > words about it. The reality *of those relations* consists in the fact > that they are what they are independently of what anyone thinks about them. > But the increase in clarity which I find in Peirce is a result of *my > thoughts* about the real subject coming into greater conformity with *Peirce’s > actual words* about it. > > > > This clarity may turn out (upon further study of both the subject and > Peirce’s words) to be an illusion. But in any case, it results from > Peirce’s actual words *redirecting my attention to the subject*, to some > extent. Only in this way can my thoughts about the subject (or about > Peirce’s thoughts) gain a measure of independence from my own previous > habits of language usage (or of reading Peirce). To me, “becoming clearer” > refers to a modification of those habits. > > > > I know, it’s like explaining a joke, which takes all the fun out of it. > But what could be more Peircean? > > > > Gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 3-Jan-18 03:04 > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic > > > > On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > > > I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of the > > > opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions after they pop > > > up only on the basis that they are written by him. > > > > I agree. But Peirce would also insist that readers should make a clear > distinction between his exact words and anybody else's interpretation. > Note how strongly he objected to the version of pragmatism by William > James. He even replaced the word 'pragmatism' with 'pragmaticism' to avoid > any confusion. > > > > As I said in my note about ways of studying Peirce, the first is trying to > determine exactly what he said. But there may be 5, 7, or indefinitely > (infinitely?) many ways of interpreting, building on, using, and extending > his work. > > > > > Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers a > > > chance to check our understanding at some future time, as well of the > > > text as of the object the text tries to understand. > > > > Yes, of course. There has been a century of developments that Peirce > could not have known. Even for those subjects he knew very well, he did > not provide an exhaustive analysis of every detail. We must fill in those > gaps, but we also have to be clear about the sources. > > > > And by the way, I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about > Aristotle: "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that > Aristotle has also become clearer." > > > > I would make that same comment about Peirce. > > > > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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