Gary f, list,
All of this is *very* interesting both from the standpoints of phenomenology and of semiotics (and, it would seem, how they necessarily involve each other). I don't know whether I have anything much to add to what you've already written, but first let me see if I fully grasp your meaning. You wrote: Gf: [H]ow is this specialized usage [of "Reference"] related to the ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”? For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,” a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it is definitely a*semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign. Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign, even a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light of Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans think on this issue. I certainly agree that seeing 'a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light of Peirce’s definition of the sign. . . as “First Correlate of a triadic relation" since from the standpoint of semiotics this is a case of degenerate 2ns because an actual cat is an Object and the word "cat" is but a sign. This seems clear enough, fairly obvious, I think. But getting closer to the heart of the matter, you quoted Peirce: [[ . . . I always left these references out of account, notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me any means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I discovered in the *verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a *reference* would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] (1906) In one sense the word "cat" is a mere possibility because there is a "universe of possibility" as regards how the Object, 'cat,' might be symbolized (e.g. by gatto, chat, Katze, etc.) as well as the name given to any actual cat, in this case, Spike. Indeed, some actual cats given one name by one owner are given another name by their next owner. And there are other 'possibilities' as well. Can we say that one loses the *genuine 2ns* of 'cat' unless one *experiences* (say, actually looks at, pets, feels the claws of a cat digging into his flesh, etc.) a real cat, say Spike? That "looking at" *grounds* ones cat-reference in actuality==genuine 2ns (not just facticity==degenerate 2ns). For example, one can imagine a person in a place where there are no cats and, so, has never seen an actual cat, but who has read extensively on cats, seen videos of cats, etc. This person would not really have a 'sense' of catness at all, I don't believe (I also just recalled those fanciful European visual depictions of Amerindians in the years just following the 'discovery' of the New World based on verbal descriptions of First Nation peoples). This seems in line with what you wrote in Chapter 7 of your book,*Turning Signs* http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention Gf: The reader of philosophy should be aware that ‘mere reference’ is only a ‘degenerate Secondness’ (CP 1.535, 1903). In order to fix her attention on a dynamic object within the sphere of experience, she must translate an ‘abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning’ – but since she can only do so by drawing upon her prior experience *with the terms translated*, her reading is at risk of getting trapped *inside* the bubble of language. ‘All degenerate seconds may be conveniently termed Internal, in contrast to External seconds, which are constituted by external fact, and are true actions of one thing upon another’ (EP1:254). Nor is it only abstractions and fantasies which are subject to this *degeneracy*: the representation of ‘facts’ in a ‘true’ story is equally degenerate, since it can only *refer* symbolically to the dynamic object of the story, the external facts. The difference between genuine and degenerate Secondness, or external fact and internal reference, is the difference between living through an event and imagining or recalling it. So, if I have grasped you meaning in your comments on the Lowell segment and your Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*, I would tend to strongly agree with your analysis of the distinction between genuine and degenerate 2ns. You closed that stimulating chapter of your book with this observation and question, one which I'd like to discuss at some point along the way (perhaps even in a separate thread). Gf: ‘Experience’ itself is only a word, like other words: how then do you reach the point where you can judge for yourself whether experience is your only teacher or not? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 5:58 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > > > Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax > with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the “slight > glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended > “merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of > thirdness which is the sole object of logical study.” > > > > But before we plunge into that, I’d like to point out a couple of > questions raised by Peirce’s reference here to the term “reference.” > Summarizing his previous remarks, he says that “genuine Secondness was > found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the > Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness, > or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full > Secondness.” He did not use the term “reference” earlier in this lecture, > but he did use it in the part of the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic > relations, CP 3.572: “The broadest division of dyadic relations is into > those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories > of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which > can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the > former kind may advantageously be termed a *reference;* a relation of the > latter kind, a *dyadic relation proper.*” > > > > This seems consistent with the identification of “Reference” as > “Degenerate Secondness” — but what is “advantageous” about using the term > “reference” in this way? And how is this specialized usage related to the > ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”? > For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is > curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and > word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give > him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a > Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,” > a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it > is definitely a *semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign. > Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into > here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I > approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*, > http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my > doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign, > even a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light > of Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First > Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans > think on this issue. > > > > There’s also a connection here with Peirce’s ‘epiphany’ about existential > graphs in 1906, when he said that: > > [[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably recognized, > as one great class of relations, the class of *references*, as I have > called them, where one correlate is an existent, and another is a mere > possibility; yet whenever I have undertaken to develop the logic of > relations, I have always left these references out of account, > notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or > other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me > any means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I > discovered in the *verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a > representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a > *reference* would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut, > thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control of > exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] > > > > But I think this message is long enough already, and I’ll leave commenting > on the rest of Lowell 3.11 for later. > > > > Gary f. > > > > > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] > *Sent:* 3-Jan-18 12:28 > > > > Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdo > wn1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-ii > i-3rd-draught/display/13928 : > > > > > > [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or > color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps, > as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. > > > > Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility, > Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three > categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity, > Tertiality. > > > > [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a > somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the > idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch > long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is > thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest. > > > > [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only > wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions > that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and > to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of > logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what > are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms > of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the > genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both > true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in > Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never > attaining full Secondness. > > > > [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a > First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative > Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing > without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that > First. A *Third* has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses > that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound > this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something > capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its > character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how > something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must > continue to be. > > > > [537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are > all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one > another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its > capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere *Mind* capable of thinking, > or a mere vague idea. The *Second* is Thought playing the rôle of a > Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the general nature of *Experience* > or *Information.* The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing > Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea > and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *Cognition.* But take away > the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine > Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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