John,
If you wish to maintain your claim that “The word polyversity implies that there exists a discrete set of meanings,” or that your claim is consistent with my definition of the word in Chapter 2 of Turning Signs, I won’t argue the point, as it’s a matter of opinion too specific to be of much interest to the list. So I’ll confine myself here to the issue of what constitutes a definition. As I said in my first post under this subject line, definitions of terms to be used in formal languages are different from definitions of terms to be used in an essay addressed to non-specialists, and my definition of “polyversity” falls toward the latter end of the spectrum. Here, lifted out of its context in my book, is what I have been referring to as the definition of the term I coined: [[ So a word can have many meanings (polysemy); a meaning can have many words (polylogy). There are many ways to express a single idea, though some are better than others in any given situation. There are also many right ways to read a single expression (along with an infinite number of wrong ways). We have to know these multiplexities intimately in order to fully engage both principles, of charity and of relevance. Perhaps it would help to have one word for polysemy and polylogy. How about polyversity? Since this word has very little history of usage, we can in good conscience do a Humpty Dumpty on it, and dictate what it means without fear of interference from established meanings. Besides, it combines a Greek prefix with a Latin root, something no expert coiner of words would ever do. Let's face it, if you want to be sure that a word means exactly one thing and nothing else, you have to use one that's never been used before – and the uglier the better, as Peirce remarked about one of his many coinages (EP2:335). However, just because we have a new word with a single meaning doesn't mean that we have a new concept. Other versions of the same idea may have appeared elsewhere. Maybe what i call polyversity is the same as what's called conceptual alternativity in cognitive semantics (Talmy <file:///C:/Users/Gary%20Furman/Documents/gnoxic/sitemirror/meanlist.htm#lingua> 2000, I.258). An equivalent principle is also recognized in biology, as we will see later on. But that's the whole point of polyversity: what appears at first to be a new concept, or a false one, can always turn out to be an old truth in a new (dis)guise, while the most familiar phrase can sometimes turn into a revelation. That's because language does have a life of its own, as do you, and thus it can cross your path at many different angles. And that's why it helps to approach dialog with ‘beginner's mind <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ngb.htm#bgnmnd> .’ ] http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm#polyv ] Now, after I posted the link to this part of my book, I assumed that you had read this definition, and some part of its context, because you wrote “I just read your article.” But it’s evident now that your sense of the word “definition” was different from mine. The search method you describe below would work better for a more formal definition, and indicates that you were looking for the kind of definition you could use for operations in formal logic. You were evidently looking for a one-sentence definition which includes the definitum. So you didn’t recognize the above as a definition. In his later years, Peirce wrote quite a lot about what constitutes a definition. For instance, in MS 318 he wrote “Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one frames a scientific definition” (EP2:403). Lowell 3.13, which I posted yesterday, is a pertinent example of two kinds of definition; I’ll say more about that in the Lowell thread. My point here is that there are different kinds of definitions, and the kind I gave for polyversity is the kind that is supposed to introduce a new term that will be used later in the book to make observations about languages and other symbol systems. The definition above uses several terms and phrases that were introduced earlier in the chapter or in the previous chapter. I judged this to be the best way to introduce important terms in a book written for a broad, non-specialist (but philosophically minded) audience. And that’s what I was referring to as the “purpose” of my definition. The bottom line here is: if you find my definition “incomplete,” and not suitable for the purposes of formal logic or NLP, don’t blame me! Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 13-Jan-18 13:54 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology On 1/13/2018 11:37 AM, <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] wrote: > I introduced the term “polyversity” and defined it in Chapter 2 of > /Turning Signs/, Before I sent that note, I had searched that web page for every occurrence of 'polyversity': <http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm That web page has seven occurrences of the word polyversity. Two occur in headings, and five occur in sentences: 1. "a meaning can have many words (polylogy)... Perhaps it would help to have one word for polysemy and polylogy. How about polyversity?" 2. "Maybe what i call polyversity is the same as what's called conceptual alternativity... (Talmy 2000, I.258)." 3. "But that's the whole point of polyversity: what appears at first to be a new concept, or a false one, can always turn out to be an old truth in a new (dis)guise" 4. "if my description of the world differs from yours, i can chalk it up to polyversity and not to your personal perversity." 5. "All humans, regardless of culture, and barring special disabilities, are equipped to learn some form of symbolic language – in all its glorious polyversity." The first one is the closest to a definition. I did not quote it because the one I quoted from your earlier note is clearer: >> I dealt with polysemy... by coining the word “polyversity” to include >> not only polysemy (the tendency of a word to have various meanings) >> but also the tendency of a meaning to be expressible in various >> linguistic signs. > > GF: That is not a definition, it’s a statement of my intention in > coining the word; and I told you in that post where to find the > definition. And as I showed in previous messages, your use was not > consistent with it. In my earlier note, I used the word polyversity according to that definition. You complained that I ignored your purpose for defining it. But no occurrence in that web page indicates that some purpose outside the definition constrains how the word may be used. > In Peirce’s terminological practice, he was quite careful to use terms > coined by others (such as Jeremy Bentham’s “cenoscopy”) only for the > concept they were coined to name. Clearly his ethics of terminology > obligated people in this way, and the last sentence of Rule #6 clearly > implies that obligation. I believe that I conformed to that obligation. I took the only definition I could find and followed it as precisely as I could. If I made a mistake, please quote whichever passage you claim is in error. Then show why you believe it's incorrect. John
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