Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, list,]
Lowell 3.13: "A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a Second, called its *Object*, *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*, this triadic relation being such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for some Interpretant." I know we've been here before, but I do not yet see how "*the Representamen determin[ing] its Interpretant to stand **in the same triadic relation** to **the same Object *(emphasis added)" can be seen as a function, defined as "a special relationship where each input has a single output." I don't see how this gels with the snippet of Peirce's above (quite a characteristic one, I believe). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a > function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the > sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s]. > > And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but > is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself > and other things too'. > > I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the > 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the > capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated > the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into > effectively a NEW object....via its own knowledge base....then, > this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. > The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base > [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant > Interpretant. > > Edwina > > > > On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Gary, List, > I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A > sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this > kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, > consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial > composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this > kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other > things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign > (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole > interpretant, not only the immediate ones. > 1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional > composition. > Best, Helmut > > 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr > Von: g...@gnusystems.ca > > > John, you wrote, > > [[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and > transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these > issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his > terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] > > What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief > quotations”? > > > > The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a > more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) > dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the > explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter > to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they > leave unexplained? Here it is again : > > [[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful > case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact > sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term > representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The > truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn > up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong > logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will > only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ] > > > > Gary f. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] > Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 > > > > Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F, > > > > Edwina > > > I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex > > > or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro > > > bacterium to the plant world to the animal world. > > > > Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career > to studying bacteria: “The growth, reproduction, and communication of > these moving, alliance-forming bacteria” > > lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our > sensitivities and stimulations.” > > https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html > > > > Gary R > > > Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the > > > thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on > > > this. > > > > Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic process > philosophy" in 1999: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf > > > > Stephen > > > Here's > > > somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei > > > rce/ > > > > Thanks for that reference. I googled "peirce whitehead" and found many > other references. Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola from 2008: > http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html > > > > Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference. But the 2008 paper is more > detailed. In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe: > > > Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly > > > noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first question > > > of > > > metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among > > > the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks truth, but > > > a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440). > > > > But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point. In his 1903 > classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special sciences" > > depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics would be > more general than the special sciences. > > > > Gary F > > > Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign” > > > which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures > > > may represent his first clear move in that direction. > > > > This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and > transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these > issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his > terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. > > > > John > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce > -l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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