Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].
And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.
I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW object....via its own knowledge base....then, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.
Edwina
On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Gary, List,I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.Best, Helmut----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .John, you wrote,
[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]
What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :
[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ]
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: John F Sowa [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
Edwina
> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex
> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.
Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria: “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”
lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.”
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html
Gary R
> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the
> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on
> this.
Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic process philosophy" in 1999: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
Stephen
> Here's
> somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei
> rce/
Thanks for that reference. I googled "peirce whitehead" and found many other references. Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola from 2008: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html
Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference. But the 2008 paper is more detailed. In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe:
> Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly
> noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first question
> of
> metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among
> the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks truth, but
> a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440).
But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point. In his 1903 classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special sciences"
depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics would be more general than the special sciences.
Gary F
> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”
> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures
> may represent his first clear move in that direction.
This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why.
John
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