Stephen, list, Stephen wrote: "I would say that when psychology functions triadically it has made strides in the direction of logic."
I would instead say that the *explication* of the essential triadic nature of logic in the *theoretical* science of *logic as semeiotic* has the potential of being a stimulant towards the development of fresh approaches to research in psychology, at least for those who have studied it and so can see its possible value. Unfortunately, I would imagine that there are few such researchers. Michael Shapiro has noted this paucity of students of Peircean semiotic in a number of fields, for example in his own field, linguistics, although he personally keeps trying to "spread the word" that semeiotics could play a significant role in its further development. But it is important to understand that while logic as semeiotic *is *a cenoscopic (philosophic) science in Discovery Science, psychology is not. Rather, it's a science further down in his classification, an idioscopic (special) science but, for Peirce, still a *discovery* (theoretical, pure research) science. However, I think that what you're actually suggesting in your note refers to a science* not *in discovery science, namely, psychology as a *practical, or* *applied* science (which Peirce only rarely, if ever, mentions). While I've taken a few graduate level courses in personality theory, etc., I must admit that I don't know much about that discipline as it's practiced today. Still, I would guess that there are even fewer practitioners in practical psychology who apply Peirce's triadic logic to it than there are in idioscopic psychology or linguistics. As you've noted in the past, your own "triadic philosophy" is not essentially Peircean (and I agree that for the most part that it is not--while I hasten to add that I have found some philosophical gems among your aphorisms), such that, for example, your remark quoted at the top of this message has it backwards from a Peircean standpoint. For Peirce, discoveries in pure theoretical logic as semeiotic would certainly have direct applications to idioscopic (special) psychology and practical logic; and so, it would seem to follow that applications of *those* discoveries and developments in special psychology and practical logic might well help improve the practice of applied psychology (but probably not vice versa). Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > I find the issue remote from what I sense. Sorry. It seems almost a > supposition which is my term for something different than what can be > proved. To speak of logic seems t me to speak of what tends to good. Did > Peirce believe this? I think he did. I think his explanation about > inkstands reverts to abstract discussions which are remote. At least to me. > Bear in mind I have gaps in my apparatus more portentous than Peirce's > lefthandedness.I would say that when psychology functions triadically it > has made strides in the direction of logic. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:22 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Stephen, here’s a Peirce quote that illustrates the point Peter is making: >> >> >> >> [[ A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me alienum >> puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, “You see >> your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it was; and >> so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue >> my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not >> come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my >> inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two >> places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and >> physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient >> causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the >> same general relation to the functions of the mind. ] CP 7.366, 1902] >> >> >> >> What I referred to as his “anti-psychologism” is his frequent insistence >> that the science of logic has nothing to learn from the science of >> psychology (which was generally understood at the time to be about how >> *human* minds work (although it did include some experiments on other >> animals). Frederik Stjernfelt takes a close look at the anti-psychologism >> of Peirce and other logicians in his book *Natural Propositions*. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Peter Skagestad [mailto:skagest...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* 21-Jan-18 16:15 >> *To:* Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>; Gary Fuhrman < >> g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 >> >> >> >> Stephen, list, >> >> >> >> Two comments. First, I think this is a big deal and have written >> extensively about it, most recently in the Peirce Quote Book, but also in >> earlier writings found on the Arisbe website. >> >> >> >> Second, I see no actual contradiction between what you are saying and >> what Gary said. Peirce nowhere puts down the brain or denies that it is the >> locus of conscious activity; he simply does not restrict *reasoning* to >> this conscious activity in the brain, but includes activities that involve >> arms, hands, pencils, and paper, most famously the activity of creating and >> manipulating diagrams. So yes, in Peirce’s view as I understand it, brains >> are indeed wonderful, but so are pencils and paper, which vastly augment >> the reasoning power of the brain. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Peter >> >> >> >> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for >> Windows 10 >> >> >> >> *From: *Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> >> *Sent: *Sunday, January 21, 2018 3:52 PM >> *To: *Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List >> <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Subject: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 >> >> >> >> Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as a source >> of conscious thinking? I thought he was simply flagging the limits of >> psychology as a basis for explaining things. Not a big deal but I do think >> the brain or whatever we take to be our inner thinking mechanism is quite a >> precious piece of work and that we can combat psychologist just the same. >> We can question Cartesianism without throwing out thinking. >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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