Stephen, list,
'Logic' has many meanings for Peirce as for all of us. In the *Commens*
dictionary of Peirce's terms there are about 25 entries having 'logic' or
'logical' in them, many--but not all--concerned with formal logic. The
distinction between two of these terms is of the greatest importance, I
think, in responding to your doubt as to whether or not logic is a science
(it is, and a very large percentage of Peirce's writings deal with it) or a
"dynamic force" (I might not express it in those terms, but I think I see
what you mean).
So, Peirce distinguishes between *Logica Utens*, the logic all reflective
people use and, for the most part, use quite effectively, thank you),
and *Logica
Docens*, the scientific study of logic. And, it's important to keep in
mind, "
The *logica docens* is nothing but the perfectionment of [the] *logica
utens*." 1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R]
1147
*Logica Utens*
1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Section II. Why Study Logic? | CP 2.186
Now a person cannot perform the least reasoning without some general ideal
of good reasoning; for reasoning involves deliberate approval of one’s
reasoning; and approval cannot be deliberate unless it is based upon the
comparison of the thing approved with some idea of how such a thing ought
to appear. Every reasoner, then, has some general idea of what good
reasoning is. This constitutes a theory of logic: the scholastics called it
the reasoner’s *logica utens*. Every reasoner whose attention has been
considerably drawn to his inner life must soon become aware of this.
*Logica Docens*
902 | Logic | DPP 2:21; CP 2.204-205
. . . the result of the scientific study. . . is called *logica docens*. [—]
That part of logic. . . *logica docens*, which, setting out with such
assumptions as that every assertion is either true or false, and not both,
and that some propositions may be recognized to be true, studies the
constituent parts of arguments and produces a classification of arguments
such as is above described, is often considered to embrace the whole of
logic; but a more correct designation is Critic (Greek {kritiké}.
And as earlier noted, as Peirce developed it logic is a very much broader
field than critical logic (as central as he always maintains that* that*
critical branch of formal logic is). Still, logic as semeiotic (that
is, *logica
docens*) has three branches, theoretical (speculative) grammar, critic
(just mentioned in the quotation above), and theoretical rhetoric. As
Peirce suggests, many equate critical logic (critic) with the whole of
logic, while for Peirce, theoretical rhetoric (methodeutic, esp. in its
including a pragmatistic theory of inquiry) is the final branch for which
the other two prepare.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 5:08 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Progress. Anyway I have been radically influenced by Roberto Assagioli who
> was a contemporary of Jung and Freud. Indeed Triadic Philosophy advocates
> what emerged from his work -- psychosynthesis -- which is as close as
> anything I know to a triadic form of psychology since it includes as
> fundamental a higher self which is what I take a triadic thinker to be in
> touch with. We all hit bumps in life that require skilled others to help
> iron out. Psychosynthesis spawns practitioners who know how to help and how
> to back off in the face of things too serious to deal with. I am reflecting
> on a lifetime of involvement which began when I worked at Riggs in
> Stockbridge when Erik Erikson and David Rappaport were both there. I think
> Pierce is right to reject psychologism as a basis for logic but I am
> inclined to think logic is a term that should be used more and shorn of its
> seemingly specialized provenance. It seems to me Peirce really did have a
> sense that what he was talking about had a universal heft. If anything is
> true these days it is that universal means everyone. Actually, I am not
> sure logic is a science.Isn't it more a dynamic force? Or even a basis of
> whatever rules are needed to keep reality moving along.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 3:47 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen, list,
>>
>> Stephen wrote: "I would say that when psychology functions triadically
>> it has made strides in the direction of logic."
>>
>> I would instead say that the *explication* of the essential triadic
>> nature of logic in the *theoretical* science of *logic as semeiotic* has
>> the potential of being a stimulant towards the development of fresh
>> approaches to research in psychology, at least for those who have studied
>> it and so can see its possible value. Unfortunately, I would imagine that
>> there are few such researchers. Michael Shapiro has noted this paucity of
>> students of Peircean semiotic in a number of fields, for example in his own
>> field, linguistics, although he personally keeps trying to "spread the
>> word" that semeiotics could play a significant role in its further
>> development.
>>
>> But it is important to understand that while logic as semeiotic *is *a
>> cenoscopic (philosophic) science in Discovery Science, psychology is not.
>> Rather, it's a science further down in his classification, an idioscopic
>> (special) science but, for Peirce, still a *discovery* (theoretical,
>> pure research) science.
>>
>> However, I think that what you're actually suggesting in your note refers
>> to a science* not *in discovery science, namely, psychology as a *practical,
>> or* *applied* science (which Peirce only rarely, if ever, mentions).
>> While I've taken a few graduate level courses in personality theory, etc.,
>> I must admit that I don't know much about that discipline as it's practiced
>> today. Still, I would guess that there are even fewer practitioners in
>> practical psychology who apply Peirce's triadic logic to it than there are
>> in idioscopic psychology or linguistics.
>>
>> As you've noted in the past, your own "triadic philosophy" is not
>> essentially Peircean (and I agree that for the most part that it is
>> not--while I hasten to add that I have found some philosophical gems among
>> your aphorisms), such that, for example, your remark quoted at the top of
>> this message has it backwards from a Peircean standpoint. For Peirce,
>> discoveries in pure theoretical logic as semeiotic would certainly have
>> direct applications to idioscopic (special) psychology and practical logic;
>> and so, it would seem to follow that applications of *those* discoveries
>> and developments in special psychology and practical logic might well help
>> improve the practice of applied psychology (but probably not vice versa).
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I find the issue remote from what I sense. Sorry. It seems almost a
>>> supposition which is my term for something different than what can be
>>> proved. To speak of logic seems t me to speak of what tends to good. Did
>>> Peirce believe this? I think he did. I think his explanation about
>>> inkstands reverts to abstract discussions which are remote. At least to me.
>>> Bear in mind I have gaps in my apparatus more portentous than Peirce's
>>> lefthandedness.I would say that when psychology functions triadically it
>>> has made strides in the direction of logic.
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:22 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Stephen, here’s a Peirce quote that illustrates the point Peter is
>>>> making:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [[ A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me
>>>> alienum puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says,
>>>> “You see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it
>>>> was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to
>>>> continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts
>>>> would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in
>>>> my inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two
>>>> places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and
>>>> physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient
>>>> causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the
>>>> same general relation to the functions of the mind. ] CP 7.366, 1902]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What I referred to as his “anti-psychologism” is his frequent
>>>> insistence that the science of logic has nothing to learn from the science
>>>> of psychology (which was generally understood at the time to be about how
>>>> *human* minds work (although it did include some experiments on other
>>>> animals). Frederik Stjernfelt takes a close look at the anti-psychologism
>>>> of Peirce and other logicians in his book *Natural Propositions*.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Gary f.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Peter Skagestad [mailto:skagest...@gmail.com]
>>>> *Sent:* 21-Jan-18 16:15
>>>> *To:* Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>; Gary Fuhrman <
>>>> g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Stephen, list,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Two comments. First, I think this is a big deal and have written
>>>> extensively about it, most recently in the Peirce Quote Book, but also in
>>>> earlier writings found on the Arisbe website.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Second, I see no actual contradiction between what you are saying and
>>>> what Gary said. Peirce nowhere puts down the brain or denies that it is the
>>>> locus of conscious activity; he simply does not restrict *reasoning*
>>>> to this conscious activity in the brain, but includes activities that
>>>> involve arms, hands, pencils, and paper, most famously the activity of
>>>> creating and manipulating diagrams. So yes, in Peirce’s view as I
>>>> understand it, brains are indeed wonderful, but so are pencils and paper,
>>>> which vastly augment the reasoning power of the brain.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Peter
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for
>>>> Windows 10
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From: *Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
>>>> *Sent: *Sunday, January 21, 2018 3:52 PM
>>>> *To: *Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List
>>>> <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Subject: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as a source
>>>> of conscious thinking? I thought he was simply flagging the limits of
>>>> psychology as a basis for explaining things. Not a big deal but I do think
>>>> the brain or whatever we take to be our inner thinking mechanism is quite a
>>>> precious piece of work and that we can combat psychologist just the same.
>>>> We can question Cartesianism without throwing out thinking.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------
>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----------------------------
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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