Gary f, list, You quoted Peirce:
The answers to these questions do not come of themselves. They require the most laborious study, the most careful and exact examination. The system of questions does not save that trouble in the least degree. It enormously increases it by multiplying the questions that are suggested. But it forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor. Then asked: Gf: Why should we take the trouble to engage in the “most laborious study” required to answer these endless questions? Because, according to Peirce, “it forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.” Is that really a *hard fact*? Or is it merely Peirce’s opinion that the conceptions attained in this way are so much clearer than any attained before? Can it be a *hard fact* — the epitome of Secondness, as described by Peirce earlier — that one conception is clearer than another? If so, what does that tell us about the nature of “hard facts”? Perhaps I am reading this passage somewhat differently from you. It seems to me that the *hard fact *to which Peirce is referring may be his own sense that, having made this minute analysis, engaged in this "most laborious study," that he has *himself* been able to achieve "much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic than have ever been attained before." In my opinion, this is in fact (in "hard fact"?) his achievement, perhaps especially in logic (although in my opinion his achievement in phenomenology hasn't yet even begun to be fully comprehended let alone developed). So, my question: Is Peirce here reflecting on his own phenomenological and logical achievements as he himself sees them? If so, the "hard fact" is just a manner of speaking and hasn't necessarily much to do with phenomenological 2ns at all. Similarly is he informally using the "singular us" (e.g. "Can you give us [i.e., 'me'] a hand fellows?") in writing "it forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions. . ." to refer to his own disciplined efforts over nearly a lifetime? Who else would have (could have! and even to this day) made the minute, in depth, expansive phenomenological and logical inquiries Peirce made? Peirce frequently invites his reader (or listener in lectures) to herself do what he himself has done, a kind of replicating the experiment (or experience). But who would be willing to engage in such extraordinarily minute logical investigations today? And who else could have attained the extraordinary achievements in logic which he did through these minute methods, for prime example, more or less single-handedly inventing modern triadic semeiotic (or, as I like to think of it, trichotomic semeiotic, as involving the categories at almost every stage of his semeiotic analysis)? But, this is just a quick guess; and there may be more to these passages than I've suggested here involving, as you've suggested, phenomenological 2ns. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 5:53 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > > > A word or two about the second part of Lowell 3.14, CP 1.543 … > > > > Whatever “subject of inquiry” we are talking about, it must be something > “before the mind” in some way, to use the language Peirce uses to introduce > Phenomenology earlier in Lowell 3. That makes it a Phenomenon; hence it > “involves > three kinds of elements.” > > > > The “principle of our procedure” in this Phenomenological inquiry seems > to apply *recursively*, even to the “kinds of elements” themselves. “And > so we have endless questions, of which I have only given you small scraps.” > > > > Why should we take the trouble to engage in the “most laborious study” > required to answer these endless questions? Because, according to Peirce, “it > forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of > logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has > yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.” > > > > Is that really a *hard fact*? Or is it merely Peirce’s opinion that the > conceptions attained in this way are so much clearer than any attained > before? Can it be a *hard fact* — the epitome of Secondness, as described > by Peirce earlier — that one conception is clearer than another? If so, > what does that tell us about the nature of “hard facts”? > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] > *Sent:* 20-Jan-18 18:50 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14 > > > > Continuing from Lowell 3.13, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce- > manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13940: > > > > A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a Second, called > its *Object*, *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*, this triadic > relation being such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for some > Interpretant. > > [CP 1.542] It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any > actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be > another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of its > own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an endless > series of events which could have actually occurred, which is absurd. For > the same reason the interpretant cannot be a *definite* individual > object. The relation must therefore consist in a *power* of the > representamen to determine *some* interpretant to being a representamen > of the same object. > > [543] Here we make a new distinction. You see the principle of our > procedure. We begin by asking what is the mode of being of the subject of > inquiry, that is, what is its absolute and most universal Firstness? The > answer comes, that it is either the Firstness of Firstness, the Firstness > of Secondness, or the Firstness of Thirdness. > > We then ask what is the Universal Secondness, and what the Universal > Thirdness, of the subject [in hand?]. > > Next we say that Firstness of Firstness, that Firstness of Secondness and > that Firstness of Thirdness that have been described have been the > Firstness of the Firstness in each case. But what is the Secondness that is > involved in it and what is the Thirdness? > > So the Secondnesses as they have been first given are the Firstnesses of > those Secondnesses. We ask what Secondness they involve and what Thirdness. > And so we have endless questions, of which I have only given you small > scraps. > > The answers to these questions do not come of themselves. They require the > most laborious study, the most careful and exact examination. The system of > questions does not save that trouble in the least degree. It enormously > increases it by multiplying the questions that are suggested. But it forces > us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic > than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has yielded > such fruit is the principal argument in its favor. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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