Jeff, Gary f, List,
Jeff wrote: " Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena. Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves three kinds of elements CSP (Jeff's emphasis) JD: The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally, and this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are currently taking place on the Peirce-L. Jeff, your comment is problematic for me for two reasons. 1) In the Peirce quote, "Everything that you can *possibly* think" refers, in my understanding of phenomenology, to everything thing you may* actually* think. This is to say that for the phenomenologist the phenomenon must be before the mind, not *possibly* before the mind (i.e., Peirce is saying that all possible thought when thought will involve 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns). 2) It seems to me that your leaping to "the classification of signs generally" in you comment quoted just above, you are seemingly conflating logic as semiotics and phenomenology, a dangerous mixing in my opinion. and your following comments on descriptives, designatives, and copulatives clearly moves this notion of "possible" into the semiotic realm (that is, into a different cenoscopic science). You also wrote: " In addition to the public character of the phenomena . . . " But for the science of phenomenology, what is 'public' seems to me but the invitation of the individual phenomenologist to suggest to another person that she make the same (or similar) observation of the phenomena. But then that would be another individual having the phenomenological experience for herself. What is public is what together we can same about the phenomena we both experienced. This is quite different from the usual scientific experiment which, potentially--and, not infrequently, actually--many could experience at the same time. So to summarize my points above: 1) In the Peirce snippet above that " Everything that you can *possibly* think involves three kinds of elements " 'possibility' there points, in my opinion, to future actual phenomenological appearances for an individual. to some "is" a phenomenon rather than to some "could be" or "may be" phenomena. In short, for phenomenology itself the phenomenon *must *be before the mind. That one can later discuss it with others is dependent on their having themselves experienced the same or similar phenomena. And, 2) your argument, if I understand it, seemingly for some sort of *public* phenomenological experience, appears to me (in consideration of your examples) to conflate two different cenoscopic sciences, viz. phenomenology and semiotic. Semiotic will most certainly employ the discoveries of phenomenology, but that's an entirely different matter. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 11:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Gary F, Gary R, List, > > > Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on > the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those > "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena. > > > Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of > elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the > Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or > cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves > three kinds of elements (my emphasis). > > > The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think > there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term > "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally, and > this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are currently > taking place on the Peirce-L. For instance, it is not obvious to me how > "possible" applies to the classification of signs as descriptives, > designatives or copulatives based on the *presentation* of immediate > objects. Should we think of the modal operator as applying (1) before the > term "presentation" so that we're looking at possible presentations as well > as actual presentations, or (2) after it, so that we taking about > presentations of possible immediate objects as well as presentations of > actual immediate objects or (3) both? For my part, I've been exploring (3) > as an interpretative strategy and have been looking to see how that fits > with the texts. > > > Given the other things Peirce says about the character of the phenomena > that are the subject matter for phenomenology, I take the modal claim of > possibility to be implicit in the first sentence above and not just in the > second. > > > In addition to the public character of the phenomena, it is also > essential that we focus on those that are reproducible. For my part, I take > Peirce to be referring to the writings and the experience of, say, > Ladd-Franklin, Franklin, Mitchell and Shröder, as well as his own, when > talking about the hard-fact that greater clarity has been achieved. The > hardness of such facts comes in two forms: the passive form is what is > prevalent in what we perceive, the active form is prevalent in what we > do. What we do is at least as important as what we perceive in this > context. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > ------------------------------ > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 24, 2018 8:53:38 AM > > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14 > > > Gary R, Jeff, list, > > > > Gary, I think my reading of 3.14 is pretty much the same as yours — that > is, when Peirce speaks of “much clearer conceptions of the objects of > logic” and of the *hard fact* that the “system of questions” has yielded > such fruit, he is referring to *his own experience* of following that > method. In both the Harvard and the Lowell lectures of 1903, Peirce’s > emphasis in using the word “experience” is on the Secondness of it, the > element that makes a fact “hard.” But the main reason I make that > connection in this context is this passage from much earlier in Lowell 3 — > which also underlies my reference to “Phenomenon” as a Peircean term: > > > > [[ Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of > elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the > Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or > cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves > three kinds of elements. Whence it follows that you cannot possibly think > of any one of those elements in its purity. The most strenuous endeavors of > thinking will leave your ideas somewhat confused. But I think I can help > you to see that there *are* three kinds of elements, and to discern what > they are like. I begin with that one which the rough and tumble of life > renders most familiarly prominent. We are continually bumping up against > hard fact. We expected one thing, or passively took it for granted, and had > the image of it in our minds. But experience forces that idea into the > background, and compels us to think quite differently. ]] > > > > “That one” is, of course, Secondness, the dominant element we find in the > dyadic relation between expectation and “experience.” That element is > certainly prominent in Peirce’s experience of being “forced” to “much > clearer conceptions of the objects of logic than have ever been attained > before.” But the question I meant to ask was this: Can we really “bump up > against” *the clarity of a conception*? And if so, do we regard that > clarity as a “hard fact” in the public domain, i.e. observable *by others*? > Personally I don’t think so. > > > > The rest of my response will be inserted between the lines of Jeff’s post > below. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] > *Sent:* 23-Jan-18 18:55 > > Hi Gary F, List, > > > > First, a small point. I take a scientific phenomenon to be something > public that *could* be observed. It isn't necessary that it actually be > before the mind in order to be a phenomenon. Rather, the observation is > what is "in the mind" of the cognitive agent(s). > > > > GF: I take your point about a “scientific” phenomenon being “something > public,” but by Peirce’s definition, that is only one kind of Phenomenon, > one way of being “before the mind.” And further, an actual dinosaur bone > that has never been dug up is * not* a phenomenon, because it has never > *appeared* to anyone. When it does appear, we take it as an existing > thing that existed long before it was dug up — as that kind of phenomenon — > but a “phenomenon” which *does not appear* to any “mind” is a > contradiction in (Peircean) terms. On the other hand, an imaginary dinosaur > bone which nobody ever has or ever will actually dig up *is* a > phenomenon, because it *appears* to whoever imagined it. But would you > say it is observable to someone else? I wouldn’t. And for the same reason, > I do not consider a *concept* to be observable in that way. I can > certainly have a concept in mind (so the concept is a phenomenon), but you > can’t *observe* a concept in my mind, nor can I in yours. You can, > however, interpret my *representation* of it, if I put one into the > public domain. But that representation is *another* phenomenon, a > semiotic one, and the object of that sign is only * mediately* present to > the mind. > > Scientific communities do not make observations; only members of them do. > And those observations are themselves phenomena: we can think about them. > > > > Second, the results of Peirce's inquiries in logic are, like other > historical events, something that can be observed. > > > > GF: Peirce’s *experience of attaining *those results are not observable, > nor is your experience of that, or mine. How can I measure the clarity of > your concepts *to you*? If you represent them in a shared language, I can > judge the clarity of those representations *to me*, and I can likewise > judge the clarity of Peirce’s logical writings. But how can I say that the > superior clarity of Peirce’s concepts is a “hard fact” in the public > domain? That would be like saying that the validity of a given mathematical > proof of a given theorem is a “hard fact.” Maybe Peirce would say that, but > I wouldn’t. (But then, I’m not a mathematician.) > > > > Your question seems to be: is a claim that one written expression of a > logical conception is clearer than another really a hard fact? If so, what > does that suggest about the hardness of such facts? > > > > GF: The question was intended to be about the quality of clarity of the > conceptions themselves, not the clarity of a written expression of it. (Of > course there is no definite boundary between the one and the other, but > that doesn’t mean there’s no *difference* between a concept and its > expression. It’s a useful distinction, not an absolute one.) > > > > For my part, I don't think there is any significant difference between a > historical expression of, say, a law in a statute and the historical > expression of a logical conception in a philosophical theory. The fact that > a conception in the law is more clearly expressed than it was in the past > will show, as a hard fact, in the kinds of conduct that will follow from > the newly clarified statute. That is, there will actually be fewer > disagreements and conflicts in conduct among those who purport to be > regulated by their clearer conceptions of such laws. > > > > GF: Based on inductive reasoning from observations of such conduct, there > may be a communal consensus or majority opinion that the law has been > clarified. But that consensus or opinion is not a “hard fact” in the sense > that the actually observed conduct was. > > To sum up, I think that Peirce’s expression “*hard fact*” was a reference > to his personal experience of the results of following the method he > outlined in Lowell 3. To take it as a reference to *other people’s > experience* of those results is too much of a stretch for me. And to > regard the clarity of the results, even for people who have *not* > followed that method (such as most members of his Lowell Lecture audience), > as a “hard fact” is even more of a stretch. > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > ------------------------------ > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 23, 2018 3:53:20 PM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14 > > > > List, > > > > A word or two about the second part of Lowell 3.14, CP 1.543 … > > > > Whatever “subject of inquiry” we are talking about, it must be something > “before the mind” in some way, to use the language Peirce uses to introduce > Phenomenology earlier in Lowell 3. That makes it a Phenomenon; hence it > “involves > three kinds of elements.” > > > > The “principle of our procedure” in this Phenomenological inquiry seems > to apply *recursively*, even to the “kinds of elements” themselves. “And > so we have endless questions, of which I have only given you small scraps.” > > > > Why should we take the trouble to engage in the “most laborious study” > required to answer these endless questions? Because, according to Peirce, “it > forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of > logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has > yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.” > > > > Is that really a *hard fact*? Or is it merely Peirce’s opinion that the > conceptions attained in this way are so much clearer than any attained > before? Can it be a *hard fact* — the epitome of Secondness, as described > by Peirce earlier — that one conception is clearer than another? If so, > what does that tell us about the nature of “hard facts”? > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>] > > *Sent:* 20-Jan-18 18:50 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14 > > > > Continuing from Lowell 3.13, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdo > wn1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-ii > i-3rd-draught/display/13940: > > > > A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a Second, called > its *Object*, *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*, this triadic > relation being such that the Representamen determines its Interpretant to > stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for some > Interpretant. > > [CP 1.542] It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any > actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be > another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of its > own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an endless > series of events which could have actually occurred, which is absurd. For > the same reason the interpretant cannot be a *definite* individual > object. The relation must therefore consist in a *power* of the > representamen to determine *some* interpretant to being a representamen > of the same object. > > [543] Here we make a new distinction. You see the principle of our > procedure. We begin by asking what is the mode of being of the subject of > inquiry, that is, what is its absolute and most universal Firstness? The > answer comes, that it is either the Firstness of Firstness, the Firstness > of Secondness, or the Firstness of Thirdness. > > We then ask what is the Universal Secondness, and what the Universal > Thirdness, of the subject [in hand?]. > > Next we say that Firstness of Firstness, that Firstness of Secondness and > that Firstness of Thirdness that have been described have been the > Firstness of the Firstness in each case. But what is the Secondness that is > involved in it and what is the Thirdness? > > So the Secondnesses as they have been first given are the Firstnesses of > those Secondnesses. We ask what Secondness they involve and what Thirdness. > And so we have endless questions, of which I have only given you small > scraps. > > The answers to these questions do not come of themselves. They require the > most laborious study, the most careful and exact examination. The system of > questions does not save that trouble in the least degree. It enormously > increases it by multiplying the questions that are suggested. But it forces > us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic > than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has yielded > such fruit is the principal argument in its favor. > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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