Helmut, list, I have to run off to a very busy late afternoon/evening soon, but wanted to quickly respond to your post. You wrote:
HR: I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to the word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it up, and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special". Well, I'm glad that *that* at least is cleared up. Continuing, you quoted me: GR: " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.)" Then commented: HR: I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on biology. To say as I did that biology (and the other idioscopic sciences) can offer examples is not for a moment to suggest that that is their principal work. Hardly! Indeed, it isn't *their* work at all--they can, if they wish more or less ignore the cenoscopic sciences (although I don't think it's best practice and rarely happens since both logic and methodology are taken up in cenoscopy). Rather *it is the work of those working in the idioscopic* sciences to employ biological and other physical and psychical examples from the work in those sciences. As for all the sciences, both ceno-and idioscopic, employing mathematics, well, of course. And the various sciences do employing the findings of other sciences in their own work when applicable--no argument there! Continuing, you wrote: HR: But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of the boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with the question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both due to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I first did not want to quibble on, but now I think that the answer to this question(s), resp. the belief about the answer would have an influence on the classification. I do not have a clear opinion about which is due to which, I only do not believe in the isolation answer possibility. Some of your questions indeed seem related to classifications of the sciences, others to logic (perhaps especially theoretical rhetoric and methodeutic) or to metaphysics. I haven't any quick answers except to say each of the cenoscopic sciences have their own work to do while possibly employing principles from sciences 'higher' in the classification of sciences of discover, all of them from math, logic as semeiotic employing principles from phenomenology, etc.. It seems to me that idioscopic practitioners may *hope *the work they do, say in logic, may be of value to the idioscopic/special sciences, while the idioscopic sciences have their own *special* works, develop their own methodologies, etc. They most certainly need not be in conflict. Indeed, one would hope that they would mutually fecundate, even fructify each other. There is also the real possibility and practice of inter- and transdisciplinarity. Best, Gary R xx [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 12:33 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Gary, List, > I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to the > word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it up, > and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special". Still, > by the way you put it: > > " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic > sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic > sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental > experiments', etc.)" > > I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer > examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn > contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And > biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics > is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I > thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on > biology. > But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of the > boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with the > question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both due > to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I first > did not want to quibble on, but now I think that the answer to this > question(s), resp. the belief about the answer would have an influence on > the classification. I do not have a clear opinion about which is due to > which, I only do not believe in the isolation answer possibility. > Best, > Helmut > > 24. Januar 2018 um 12:48 Uhr > *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > Helmut, list, > > You wrote: "Maybe I have had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I > thought that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to > cenoscopy such as semiotics/logic." > > I think you have the "observing phenomena" part of idioscopy right but, as > I understand it, not the "without connecting them to cenoscopy" part. > Peirce writes (re: the 1903 Classification): > > > This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities > of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor > with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present > condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its > idea from Comte's classification; namely, the idea that one science depends > upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such > principles to that other. It turns out that in most cases the divisions are > trichotomic. > > > Compte's idea, which Peirce embraces, is that sciences higher in the > outline classification offer principles to those lower in it; while > sciences lower in the classification can offer examples for those higher in > the classification. So, mathematics can offer principles to all the other > sciences as being 'first science' in the Classification. Similarly, > cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in > turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to > exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.) > > So, to return to the point at hand, the cenoscopic > sciences--phenomenology, normative science (esthetics, ethics, logic as > semeiotic) metaphysics--offer principles to the idioscopic sciences, both > physical and psychical, while these *may* provide examples for the > cenoscopic sciences--'material' to exemplify the principles discovered. > > As I see it, of the three branches of Discovery Science: Mathematics, > Cenoscopy, and Idioscopy, the first and the last will forever need > "updating." I suggested in an earlier post how the advances in the > Idioscopic sciences would necessarily much modify that part of the > Classification, and would now add that much the same is undoubtedly so for > First Science, Mathematics, in our day. > > Yet as I see it, Peirce's Cenoscopic philosophy holds its own today while, > iin my opinion, it has not begun to be sufficiently explored nor developed > (with the possible exception of the third branch of the normative sciences, > namely, logic as semiotic). > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 5:40 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >> Gary List, >> Maybe I have had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it >> was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as >> semiotics/logic. >> Best, Helmut >> >> 22. Januar 2018 um 23:24 Uhr >> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> >> Helmut, list, >> >> You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, >> just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that >> the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, >> of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and >> semiobiology is idioscopic. >> >> First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field, >> maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic >> analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the >> schema of which is clear enough. >> >> The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches: >> theoretical grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical >> rhetoric). The subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with >> biology except 1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans, >> and 2. what is discovered in the biological sciences may serve as* >> examples* in logic as semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics >> is its own special science. >> >> iii. Logic >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Philosophy:_logic,_or_semiotic> >> (*or* Semiotic *or*Formal Semiotic). *(Study of true and false.)* >> >> *(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory >> and his fallibilism.)* >> 1. Speculative Grammar >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Classes_of_signs> >> (*or* Philosophical *or* Universal Grammar) >> (*or* Stechiology) >> *(Includes the classification of signs).* >> 2. Critic >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Modes_of_inference> >> (*or* Logical Critic, Critical Logic, *or* Logic Proper). >> *(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and >> deduction).* >> 3. Methodeutic >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Pragmatism> >> (*or* Speculative Rhetoric, >> *or* Universal *or* Philosophical Rhetoric). >> *(Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Pragmatism>, and >> includes study of scientific method).* >> >> >> As I understand it, biosemiotics takes the principles of logic as >> semeiotics and uses them in its own, new inquiries leading to fresh >> discoveries. This is the kind of thing one would expect a special >> (idioscopic) science to do. In my view, biosemiotics has expanded the >> subject matter of biology exactly on semeiotic principles. >> >> I would recommend that you study the chart of the Classification of the >> Sciences of Discovery near the bottom of this article on Peirce's >> classification. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification >> _of_the_sciences_(Peirce) >> >> Biology--as have all the physical and psychic sciences--has come a very >> long way since Peirce's day and a new outline of idioscopy would no doubt >> look very different from Peirce's. But one would expect to find >> biosemiotics among the special sciences and most certainly not as a >> sub-division of the *normative science* of logic as semeiotic. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >> wrote: >>> >>> Gary, List, >>> If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just >>> following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the >>> first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of >>> the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and >>> semiobiology is idioscopic. >>> Best, Helmut >>> >>> 22. Januar 2018 um 22:15 Uhr >>> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> >>> Jon S, Edwina, list, >>> >>> Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does >>> not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes >>> that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought >>> (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial." >>> >>> I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special >>> (idioscopic) science. This is the *kind* of distinction I just pointed >>> to in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I >>> too see this as obvious and non-controversial. >>> >>> It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important >>> than the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and >>> metaphysics. Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, >>> "invited" to use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially >>> the findings of logic as semeiotic. >>> >>> And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special >>> sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the >>> *Commens* dictionary.) >>> >>> 1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology >>> | CP 8.199The sort of science that is founded upon the common >>> experience of all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of >>> *cenoscopy*, in opposition to *idioscopy*, which discovers >>> new phenomena. >>> 1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department >>> [of heuretic science], called *cenoscopy*, does not attempt to discover >>> new phenomena but only analyzes those truths that are known and >>> acknowledged by everybody. >>> 1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The third department [of >>> heuretic science], called *idioscopy*, embraces all those kinds of >>> investigation which are occupied in bringing to light phenomena previously >>> unknown and which having discovered these phenomena use the same >>> observational methods to push the study of them further. >>> >>> >>> Again, why is any of this controversial? >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop >>>> doing that. For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special >>>> sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply >>>> recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I >>>> thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial. For my own >>>> clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally >>>> *normative*, such that it primarily investigates how biological >>>> systems *ought *to behave; or *descriptive*, such that it primarily >>>> investigates how biological systems *actually do* behave? >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant >>>>> that you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that >>>>> forbidding such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would >>>>> block 'the way of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks >>>>> inquiry since it sets up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other >>>>> person in the debate: No- I won't consider your view as having any >>>>> validity >>>>> because it is 'judged' as 'unPeircean'. >>>>> >>>>> As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization >>>>> of Peirce. Since, as you note: >>>>> >>>>> Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how >>>>> "every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) >>>>> ought >>>>> to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to >>>>> its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). Likewise, "Metaphysics ... >>>>> endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its >>>>> business is to study the most general features of reality and real >>>>> objects" >>>>> (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906). >>>>> >>>>> Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn >>>>> from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a >>>>> 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to >>>>> consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No. >>>>> >>>>> That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics >>>>> certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider >>>>> that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and >>>>> certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of >>>>> thought - but - although the biological realm does not itself reflect on >>>>> or study the nature of logic and metaphysics - it nevertheless operates >>>>> within the rules of logic. Your view, as I understand it, that >>>>> biosemiotics >>>>> is a 'free interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid. >>>>> >>>>> Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond >>>>> Peircean framework but is thoroughly grounded in his theories. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 22/01/18 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>> sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less >>>>> legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental assertion >>>>> that expresses your personal opinion. If we were to forbid all such >>>>> statements from the List, then there would be very little discussion at >>>>> all >>>>> going forward; it would thus "block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP >>>>> 2:48; >>>>> 1898). Please also note that I have not applied these or any similar >>>>> descriptions to anything that you have (or anyone else has) said in the >>>>> current thread; nor have I argued here or elsewhere that "Peircean >>>>> semiosis >>>>> is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics." I have simply >>>>> suggested that we be clear about whether we are talking about those >>>>> branches of philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in >>>>> the physical and biological sciences (as you usually are). >>>>> >>>>> That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that >>>>> logic and metaphysics apply exclusively "within the human conceptual >>>>> domain." "For normative science in general being the science of the laws >>>>> of conformity of things to ends, ... logic [considers] those things whose >>>>> end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903). "Logic >>>>> regarded >>>>> from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the >>>>> theory of deliberate thinking. To say that any thinking is deliberate is >>>>> to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a >>>>> purpose or ideal" (CP 1.573, EP 2:376; 1906). Hence the normative science >>>>> of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn >>>>> from >>>>> experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to go about pursuing truth as "the >>>>> conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). >>>>> Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of >>>>> Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its business is to study the most general >>>>> features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906). >>>>> >>>>> By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the special >>>>> sciences, rather than philosophy. "For those [special] sciences, >>>>> experience is that which their special means of observation directly bring >>>>> to light, and it is contrasted with the interpretations of those >>>>> observations which are effected by connecting these experiences with what >>>>> we otherwise know. But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in >>>>> order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, >>>>> experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and >>>>> includes >>>>> interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538; >>>>> undated). Do we at least agree on that much? >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Jon - my final comment on this is that to declare that another view >>>>>> is 'unPeircean' or is 'more/less legitimate' is Gatekeeper terminology >>>>>> for >>>>>> it inserts a non-individual judgment. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I read your full post - and don't agree that biosemiotics goes >>>>>> ''well beyond what Peirce explicitly stated'...After all, if it goes >>>>>> 'well >>>>>> beyond' the explicit, 'while still remaining within the scope of broadly >>>>>> Peircean views'...then, you have watered biosemiotics down to a >>>>>> peripheral >>>>>> and even diluted or 'free' Peircean semiosis. As you say - such a >>>>>> definition that you use implies a 'freedom' of interpretation. Those of >>>>>> us >>>>>> who refer to his many references to Mind as Matter disagree that Peircean >>>>>> semiosis is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics - both >>>>>> of >>>>>> which are within the human conceptual domain. Instead, we consider >>>>>> that biosemiotics is fully grounded in basic Peircean semiotics. Not >>>>>> 'well >>>>>> beyond' but fully grounded'. >>>>>> >>>>>> that's it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 22/01/18 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>>> sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and do; >>>>>> I have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as you. >>>>>> Did >>>>>> you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after the second >>>>>> sentence? Please note what I said in the last sentence, in particular. >>>>>> In >>>>>> the past, I have not adequately recognized the difference between talking >>>>>> about biosemiotics and talking about semeiotic within logic and >>>>>> metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by >>>>>>> a Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who declares >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'! Legitimate >>>>>>> according to what non-individual authoritative scale? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and >>>>>>> each as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our >>>>>>> individual >>>>>>> interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most >>>>>>> pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a >>>>>>> reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another. Again >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own view is >>>>>>> quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has the right >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> declare that another view has a universal non-validity [i.e., is 'not >>>>>>> legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is 'not legitimate' >>>>>>> because that inserts an external authoritative criterion. All you can >>>>>>> do is >>>>>>> say: I, personally, don't agree..... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon 22/01/18 9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>>>> sent: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce >>>>>>> or some kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings. What I have >>>>>>> argued in the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some >>>>>>> readings >>>>>>> of Peirce (or any other author) are more legitimate than others. >>>>>>> Instead, >>>>>>> I respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic >>>>>>> concepts and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of >>>>>>> Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are >>>>>>> operating. There are at least three that seem to come up regularly. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic. >>>>>>> 2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism. >>>>>>> 3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's >>>>>>> scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during >>>>>>> his >>>>>>> lifetime. As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in >>>>>>> biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the >>>>>>> philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well >>>>>>> beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining >>>>>>> within >>>>>>> the scope of broadly Peircean views. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky < >>>>>>> tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this >>>>>>>> list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set >>>>>>>> ourselves up >>>>>>>> as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are >>>>>>>> 'UnPeircean'. My >>>>>>>> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as >>>>>>>> dumb >>>>>>>> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us >>>>>>>> are the >>>>>>>> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce. All one can say is: 'I >>>>>>>> disagree with your view'.....and outline your own view. That's it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce > -l/peirce-l.htm . >
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