1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP 8.199The sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of cenoscopy, in opposition to idioscopy, which discovers new phenomena.1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department [of heuretic science], called cenoscopy, does not attempt to discover new phenomena but only analyzes those truths that are known and acknowledged by everybody.1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The third department [of heuretic science], called idioscopy, embraces all those kinds of investigation which are occupied in bringing to light phenomena previously unknown and which having discovered these phenomena use the same observational methods to push the study of them further.
Edwina, List:You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing that. For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial. For my own clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally normative, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems ought to behave; or descriptive, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems actually do behave?Thanks,JonOn Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate: No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is 'judged' as 'unPeircean'.
As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of Peirce. Since, as you note:
Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).
Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No.
That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of thought - but - although the biological realm does not itself reflect on or study the nature of logic and metaphysics - it nevertheless operates within the rules of logic. Your view, as I understand it, that biosemiotics is a 'free interpretation of Peirce' is simply not - in my view, valid.
Biosemiotics is not a special use of Peirce. It does not go beyond Peircean framework but is thoroughly grounded in his theories.
Edwina
On Mon 22/01/18 12:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent:
Edwina, List:Your labeling of evaluations such as "unPeircean" and "more/less legitimate" as "Gatekeeper terminology" is likewise a judgmental assertion that expresses your personal opinion. If we were to forbid all such statements from the List, then there would be very little discussion at all going forward; it would thus "block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48; 1898). Please also note that I have not applied these or any similar descriptions to anything that you have (or anyone else has) said in the current thread; nor have I argued here or elsewhere that "Peircean semiosis is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics." I have simply suggested that we be clear about whether we are talking about those branches of philosophy (as I usually am) or about broader applications in the physical and biological sciences (as you usually are).That said, it is not the case, at least according to Peirce, that logic and metaphysics apply exclusively "within the human conceptual domain." "For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, ... logic [considers] those things whose end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903). "Logic regarded from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of deliberate thinking. To say that any thinking is deliberate is to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a purpose or ideal" (CP 1.573, EP 2:376; 1906). Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906). Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903). "Its business is to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP 2:375; 1906).By contrast, it seems to me that biosemiotics falls under the special sciences, rather than philosophy. "For those [special] sciences, experience is that which their special means of observation directly bring to light, and it is contrasted with the interpretations of those observations which are effected by connecting these experiences with what we otherwise know. But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538; undated). Do we at least agree on that much?Regards,JonOn Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:- Jon - my final comment on this is that to declare that another view is 'unPeircean' or is 'more/less legitimate' is Gatekeeper terminology for it inserts a non-individual judgment.
Yes, I read your full post - and don't agree that biosemiotics goes ''well beyond what Peirce explicitly stated'...After all, if it goes 'well beyond' the explicit, 'while still remaining within the scope of broadly Peircean views'...then, you have watered biosemiotics down to a peripheral and even diluted or 'free' Peircean semiosis. As you say - such a definition that you use implies a 'freedom' of interpretation. Those of us who refer to his many references to Mind as Matter disagree that Peircean semiosis is confined to the philosophies of logic or metaphysics - both of which are within the human conceptual domain. Instead, we consider that biosemiotics is fully grounded in basic Peircean semiotics. Not 'well beyond' but fully grounded'.
that's it.
Edwina
On Mon 22/01/18 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent:Edwina, List:A gatekeeper is someone who seeks to restrict what others say and do; I have simply expressed my personal opinion, exactly the same as you. Did you even read my whole post, or just stop and react after the second sentence? Please note what I said in the last sentence, in particular. In the past, I have not adequately recognized the difference between talking about biosemiotics and talking about semeiotic within logic and metaphysics, for which I hereby apologize.Thanks,JonOn Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:Jon, list - using the term 'more legitimate' is terminology used by a Gatekeeper. After all, to declare that 'some readings of Peirce are more legitimate' is exactly the wording used by a Gatekeeper - who declares that some 'readings/interpretations' are 'more legitimate'! Legitimate according to what non-individual authoritative scale?
As I said - all each one of us, who are each equal to each other and each as dumb/smart as each other can do - is to state that our individual interpretation agrees/disagrees with another - and that's all.
As Peirce himself said - to leave truth up to an individual is 'most pernicious' - and no individual has the right to say that a reading/interpretation is 'more legitimate/truthful than another. Again - all one can do is say: I personally disagree - and my own view is quite different and is such and such. Period. None of us has the right to declare that another view has a universal non-validity [i.e., is 'not legitimate']. ...You can't say it's 'unPeircean' or is 'not legitimate' because that inserts an external authoritative criterion. All you can do is say: I, personally, don't agree.....
Edwina
On Mon 22/01/18 9:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent:Edwina, List:I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or some kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings. What I have argued in the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of Peirce (or any other author) are more legitimate than others. Instead, I respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating. There are at least three that seem to come up regularly.
- The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
- The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
- The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.
This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his lifetime. As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within the scope of broadly Peircean views.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'. My response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce. All one can say is: 'I disagree with your view'.....and outline your own view. That's it.
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