BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - even a Dicent Indexical Sinsign functions in a triad - that infamous weathervane...which is an interaction between two subjects.
And for dyadic actions to take place, the two agents in brute interaction are, in themselves, triads [the wind, the wooden vane] So- I can do nothing about your confusion. Edwina On Sun 11/02/18 10:18 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I continue to be confused by your latest comments. From a purely logical standpoint, "no Signs are things" entails "no things are Signs," unless there is some sort of equivocation on the meaning of "Signs" and/or "things." You said that you agree with me that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303), but subsequently said that "a 'thing' must also be a Sign." Which is it? You also seem to be saying now that every interaction of one "thing" with another "thing" is "always semiosic," and even that "all interactions are semiosic." I do not believe that this was Peirce's view; in fact, he explicitly denied it in "Pragmatism," which I just finished rereading. CSP: All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place between two subjects,--whether they react equally upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,--or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. (EP 2:411; 1907) Besides semiosic (triadic) action, which is not "resolvable into actions between pairs," there is also brute dynamical (dyadic) action, which is "resolvable into actions between pairs." Do you deny the existence of the latter? On the contrary, Peirce seems to have considered it to be the defining characteristic of existence. CSP: A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. (CP 6.343; 1907) From a cosmological standpoint, my guess is that this is what Peirce meant when he described matter as "mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them" (CP 1.601; 1902). I wonder if this is precisely the difference between a "thing" and a "Quasi-mind"; the latter must still have at least some capability for Habit-change, as all human minds obviously do. Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 6:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - I am saying that a 'thing' cannot exist unless it is in interaction with another 'thing'. This interaction is always semiosic. Therefore, an insect does not exist 'per se' but only in interaction with...the air, other insects, the sun..etc etc.. And all interactions are semiosic. Therefore, yes, a 'thing' must also be a Sign [again, remembering that I mean: DO-[IO-R-II]) . .... Edwina On Sun 11/02/18 6:38 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent: Edwina, List: I am having trouble following you here. Since you agree that a Sign is not a thing, what does it mean to say that things must also be Signs? Are you suggesting that all things must also be Signs, or that all Dynamic Objects must also be Signs, or something else entirely? In this context, since a thing cannot be a genuine Sign, by "Signs" do you mean "ordinary" Sinsigns or Replicas of genuine Signs? Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 2:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon AS - I agree with your outline of the 'sign is not a real thing'. With regard to the necessity of the Dynamic Object, I'd suggest that this Dynamic Object, as a thing also requires that it be related, so to speak, with a Mind that is interacting with it. That is, things must also be Signs. Edwina On Sun 11/02/18 3:15 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Helmut, Gary F., List: I suspect that we are misplacing the emphasis if we read Peirce as saying that "a sign is not a real thing"; I take him to be saying instead that "a sign is not a real thing." In other words, genuine Signs are constituents of the third Universe of Experience, rather than the second that corresponds to "the Brute Actuality of things and facts" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908). That is why he added that a Sign "is of such a nature as to exist in replicas"; existence, in his terminology, pertains only to whatever belongs to the second Universe. Peirce's definition of "Real" is "having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453, EP 2:434; 1908). Hence it is clearly not a matter of more or less, and "degenerate" is not a pejorative meaning "less real." In fact, Peirce explained elsewhere that it is borrowed from geometry, where it describes the conic section formed by two coplanar lines (EP 2:306; 1904); it is simply the antonym of "genuine." So I agree with Gary F. that "The sign proper is a Type , its replicas are Tokens , and it is only the tokens that exist as 'things' ... a sinsign is not a genuine sign." And yet Sinsigns are the only "Signs" that exist; both Legisigns (Types) and Qualisigns (Tones) must be embodied in Sinsigns (Tokens) serving as Replicas in order to exist. Another way of stating this is what Peirce said specifically about a Qualisign--"It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign" (CP 2.244, EP 2:291; 1903, emphasis added). Yet I do not see degenerate Signs as somehow "less real" than genuine Signs. The distinction of two different kinds of Sinsigns is interesting. I wonder now if it has any connection with the issue of whether a particular Sign has an utterer, and whether this in turn has bearing on Peirce's notion of a Quasi-mind. Peirce's lengthy discussion in "Pragmatism" about the Object begins by identifying it as "an ingredient of the utterer" that "will function as a sort of substitute for an utterer, in case there be no utterer, or at any rate fulfills nearly the same, but a more essential, function" (EP 2:404; 1907). That is why every Sign, genuine or degenerate, has a Dynamic Object; but does every Replica of a genuine Sign perhaps require a Quasi-mind to serve as its utterer? Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 12:10 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Gary, List, I think it is not easy to decide (I don´t have a child) whether a baby´s scream is a token of "scream gets mother´s attention" (learned) or "I have a problem, and thus scream by instinct" (instinctively). About the term "real thing" I wonder if there is a definition. About the term "degenerate" I wonder, whether this is just a technical term concerning the categorial assignment, or a pejorative term, meaning "less real". I tend to the former. Is reality and thingness a continuum, or binary? I mean, are there things more or less real (e.g. tokens less real than types), or are things either completely real or completely unreal? I vaguely remember, that John Deely (so sad he is dead) has said or written, that relations are ontological. I guess that means that they are real things. Best, Helmut 11. Februar 2018 um 17:17 Uhr g...@gnusystems.ca Jon, list, Gary R is the one to thank for noticing the timeliness of the example — on my blog it started out as just the two translations of the Dogen text, and the semiotic commentary was an afterthought. I recall that years ago, when we were discussing Peirce’s “New Elements” on the list, there was some consternation caused by his statement that “a sign is not a real thing.” On the one hand, this seemed to cast doubt on the reality of signs, which Peirce often affirms elsewhere. On the other, it would seem to assert that an existing thing (a sinsign) is not really a sign at all. The clarification that “It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas” was insufficient for many of us. But now I think the same idea could be stated this way: The sign proper is a Type, its replicas are Tokens, and it is only the tokens that exist as “things.” You’ll recall that in “New Elements” (EP2:300-324) Peirce focusses on the Symbol as the “genuine” sign and refers to the Icon and Index as “degenerate.” If we apply those terms to the qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy which Peirce introduced in the 1903 “Syllabus” (but does not mention in “New Elements”), we could quite reasonably say that the legisign is genuine while the sinsign is degenerate (and the qualisign even more so). Then we could reasonably translate “a sign is not a real thing” as follows: a sinsign is not a genuine sign. On the other hand, in his classification of sign types in the Syllabus Peirce does not use the terminology of “genuine” vs. “degenerate.” The icon, index, qualisign, sinsign etc. are all referred to as “signs.” But the whole classification of signs in the Syllabus is arrived at by analysis of the most genuine, or paradigmatic Sign type, which is legisign, symbol or argument depending on the trichotomy in question. Peirce presents his classification as if these genuine signs are ‘built up’ from simpler types, and in a sense they are, because (for instance) the symbol can only convey information by involving an index involving an icon. But in another sense these ‘simpler’ types are not genuine signs; they are defined by analysis of more genuine signs into their functional parts. In 1906 Peirce wrote that “an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it” (MS 295). Likewise the essence of the most genuinely triadic sign relations is not to be ‘built up’ of simpler ones, but analyzed into those simpler relations; and the most genuinely triadic relations are those by which arguments, legisigns and symbols are related to their respective objects and interpretants. This ‘top-down’ view of the classification of signs is not incompatible with, but is easily overlooked in, the presentation on “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations.” Take for example the Legisign (CP 2.264, EP2:291): [[ A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. ... It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word “the” will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so.]] What I’m suggesting is that, in the language of “New Elements,” a legisign is a more “genuine” sign than a sinsign or replica; and when Peirce said in “New Elements” that “a sign is not a real thing,” he meant the same thing that he meant in saying that “ It is not a single object, but a general type.” And we must notice here that Peirce defines two kinds of sinsigns: “ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant”; and the sinsigns that are the replicas required by legisigns. The difference is that the ordinary sinsign is regarded, but not intended, as significant. So in Gary’s R’s example, the burnt child’s scream is an ordinary sinsign for the mother, because she reads it as an index of the child’s distress, not because it is a replica of any legisign. There is a psychological sense in which that scream is more real than a replica of a legisign would be, because it elicits a more dynamic reaction from the mother. But that reaction, being more dyadic and less intentional, is the interpretant in a relation to the sign which is less genuuinely triadic (from a logical point of view) than the relation would be if the sign were a replica of a legisign. We’ve all seen children who seem to crave such reactions from adults and therefore pretend to be in greater distress than they really are. When they scream intending to get that reaction, the scream is a replica of a legisign, which may be verbalized as the law “scream gets mother’s attention.” The element of intention makes that sinsign, as a replica of a legisign, a more genuine sign from the logical point of view, precisely because it is a fake, a pretense, from a psychological point of view. So which sign is more real, the “ordinary sinsign” (like the burnt child’s scream) or the sinsign which is a replica of a legisign (like the scream of a child who just wants attention)? It depends on whether you are doing a top-down analysis of semiosis as Peirce (the logician) generally did, or trying to build up a concept of semiosis from its simplest examples. I think this line of thought is closely related to the fact that it takes a symbol to say anything true about a real object, but symbol use also makes it possible to lie. This explains why symbols are ‘particularly remote from the Truth itself’ (EP2:307), even though they are more “genuine” signs than icons or indices, as Peirce also says in “New Elements”. Gary f. } To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves. [Virginia Woolf] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [3] }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 10-Feb-18 21:44 To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] one and the same representamen Gary F., List: Thank you for posting such a timely example. GF: In Peircean texts like this one, ‘representamen’ and ‘sign’ are two words for the same thing – which is obviously not an existing physical “thing,” since it can be embodied many times in many ways. This is why I confessed last night that my own usage of "Representamen" to date is not strictly consistent with Peirce's--he basically treated it as synonymous with "Sign," although at least a couple of times he defined a Sign as a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. It is also a good reminder that whether we call it a Replica or a Token or a Sign-vehicle, the physical embodiment of a Sign is not the Sign itself. CSP: In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in replicas. Look down a printed page, and every the you see is the same word, every e the same letter. A real thing does not so exist in replica. The being of a sign is merely being represented. Now really being and being represented are very different. (EP 2:303; 1904) CSP: Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is something that exists in replicas. Whether the sign "it is raining," or "all pairs of particles of matter have component accelerations toward one another inversely proportional to the square of the distance," happens to have a replica in writing, in oral speech, or in silent thought, is a distinction of the very minutest interest in logic, which is a study, not of replicas, but of signs. (EP 2:311; 1904) CSP: It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign. (EP 2:391; 1906) That last quote expresses why, in Gary R.'s thought experiment, although certainly a Dynamic Interpretant for the child, I analyze the girl's scream as a Sign for the mother--or rather, correcting myself now, a Replica of a Sign. I acknowledge that, as a physical sound, it can be analyzed instead as a Dynamic Object for the mother; but this seems to treat it "as an object in itself," thus breaking the continuity with its own Dynamic Object, which is the hot burner. More to ponder ... Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5] Links: ------ [1] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [3] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [4] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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