List: Following Gary R.'s example, before offering any further remarks of my own, I would like to add a few more Peirce quotes about Quasi-minds to the mix. The first three are from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906); #2 directly precedes Gary's first selection, and #3 comes shortly after it. The other four are from "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" (1906) and related manuscript drafts; #7 includes, and provides the context for, Gary's second selection.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 1. I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536) 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical, Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one word, "Mind." In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical Interpretants are dynamically connected. In our Diagram the same thing which represents The Truth must be regarded as in another way representing the Mind, and indeed, as being the Quasi-mind of all the Signs represented on the Diagram. For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a *Quasi-mind*. (CP 4.550) 3. The matter which the Graph-instances are to determine, and which thereby becomes the *Quasi-mind* in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one, being a Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality, and at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion, shall be a sheet, called the *Phemic Sheet*, upon which signs can be scribed and from which any that are already scribed in any manner (even though they be incised) *can *be erased. (CP 4.553) 4. Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389) 5. A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. Thus, after an ordinary conversation, a wonderfully perfect kind of sign-functioning, one knows what information or suggestion has been conveyed, but will be utterly unable to say in what words it was conveyed, and often will think it was conveyed in words, when in fact it was only conveyed in tones or in facial expressions. It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the sign. So, then, it is a determination that really acts upon that of which it is a determination, although *genuine* action is of one thing on another. This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid. This liquid is of complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition. It also has so strong a cohesion and consequent surface-tension that the contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. Accident may cause one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bottle producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a tube to another bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the contents of the first bottle which will thus act upon the contents of the second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by decomposition may then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule produced by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a determination of the contents that actively operates upon that of which it is a determination, including another determination of the same subject. (EP 2:391-392) 6. For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds*, meaning things capable of varied determination as to forms of the kind communicated. As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form. It is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the Object and afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a being of the predicate. The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22) 7. Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes ... Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite. On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs ... This quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to determination. Moreover, the determinations come as events each one once for all and never again. Furthermore, it must have its rules or laws, the more special ones variable, others invariable. (EP 2:545n25) On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Jon S., list, > > OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on > Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime > next week. > > Best, > > Gary R > 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551 > > Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work > of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can > no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, > etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that > unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic > nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but > it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances > embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give > “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within > our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it > may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs > require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a > *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one > mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign > they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of > human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of > thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I > admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It > might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this > fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume - > and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is > only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of > diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it > be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our > system may not represent every variety of non-human thought. > 1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant] > > … quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined, > must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of > susceptibility to determination. > 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195 > > I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will > try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this > in the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what > they are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or > true. But a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a > Sign. A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a > sort of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better > considered self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every > thinking requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must > be a determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a > determinable sign. > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
