List: Based on Peirce's writings about the concept of a *logical* Quasi-mind, I proposed defining it as an *individual* Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs, which are connected such that they are susceptible to determination by *another *Sign to a *single *Interpretant. In the post below--which may have gotten lost in the shuffle over the last few days, hence this new thread--I further posited that an *embodied metaphysical* Quasi-mind is an individual substance possessing Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation from determinations by *previous* Signs, as well as the capacity for Habit-change from determinations by *subsequent* Signs.
Building on this, I would now like to suggest that a *Person* is an embodied metaphysical Quasi-mind who additionally has a *center of consciousness*, which provides a *unity of feeling* to coordinate the corresponding continuity of reactions and bundle of habits (cf. CP 6.228-229; 1898). This is what makes it possible to recognize the *Inner World* and distinguish it from the *Outer World*. CSP: The ensemble of all habits about ideas of feeling constitutes one great habit which is a World, and the ensemble of all habits about acts of reaction constitutes a second great habit, which is another World. The former is the Inner World, the world of Plato's forms. The other is the Outer World, or universe of existence. (CP 4.157; c. 1897) Peirce went on in that passage to identify clusters of ideas of feelings with qualities, and clusters of reactions with Things. He further noted that human languages accordingly require two different kinds of words--one to "denominate things" (proper names), and the other to "signify, or mean, qualities" (verbs, adjectives, common nouns, etc.). These obviously correspond to Matter and Form, respectively, as Peirce defined them in EP 2:304 and NEM 4:292-300 (both 1904). Unlike a "mere" Quasi-mind, a Person can *intentionally* strive to *bring about* Entelechy--the unity of Matter and Form, Truth as the conformity of a Sign and its Interpretant to its Object--in one of two ways, depending on the *purpose* in view. CSP: Of the two great tasks of humanity, *Theory *and *Practice*, the former sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is *acquainted*, passing from this, as its *matter*, to successive interpretants embodying more and more fully its *form*, wishing ultimately to reach a direct *perception *of the entelechy; while the latter, setting out from a sign signifying a character of which it *has an idea*, passes from this, as its *form*, to successive interpretants realizing more and more precisely its *matter*, hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct *effort*, producing the entelechy. (EP 2:304; 1904) The feature of consciousness that makes this possible is *self-control*; cf. CP 5.440-442, EP 2:347-348 (1905) and EP 2:418-419 (1907). Theory is *deliberate* semiosis proceeding from the Outer World to the Inner World, in accordance with the normative science of *logic*. Practice is *deliberate *semiosis proceeding from the Inner World to the Outer World, in accordance with the normative science of *ethics*. Both are *deliberate* pursuits of the *summum bonum*, the growth of concrete reasonableness, in accordance with the normative science of *esthetics*. Notice that Jeff Downard's example yesterday--in which the retroductive inference that opium (Matter) has a dormative virtue (Form) prompts further inquiry into the nature of that character (wishing to perceive Entelechy)--fits nicely into Peirce's description of Theory here. Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > As promised/warned, I have more to say about Peirce's semeiotic and > metaphysics in accordance with his 1904 employment of Aristotelian terms > for the Categories--Form (1ns), Matter (2ns), and Entelechy (3ns). My > understanding--aided by my recent reading of Vincent Colapietro's book, > *Peirce's > Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*--is > that every *individual substance* consists of both a *continuity of > reactions* (CP 3.613; 1911) and a *bundle of habits* (CP 1.414, EP 1:279; > 1887-8). A Thing is an aggregate of Matter whose Form is *determinate*, > such that it receives only *brute* reactions and behaves in strict > accordance with *inveterate *habits. > > > > CSP: … there are two sorts of connection which do not involve anything > but Matter and Form; namely, the determination of Matter by Form, and the > blind reaction of Matter with Matter. (NEM 4:297; 1904) > > > > At first, it might seem that "the determination of Matter by Form" is > precisely what Signs do; but Peirce said otherwise at the very end of the > same manuscript. > > > > CSP: It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the *power* to > bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an *act* of > bringing it about. There are several good arguments to show that this is > the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the circumstance > that there is no such act. For an act has a Matter as its subject. It is > the union of Matter and Form. But a sign is not Matter. An act is > individual. The sign only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904) > > > > This passage parallels Peirce's later description of the three Universes > of Experience in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (CP 6.455, > EP 2:435; 1908). The Being of a Sign--a constituent of the third > Universe--"consists in active power to establish connections … between > objects in different Universes"; namely, Things in the second Universe > (Matter) and Ideas in the first Universe (Form). This does not apply to > "the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such," but to "the > Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary > between its Object and a [Quasi-]Mind." > > > > Consequently, there can be no *act* of determining a Matter to a Form, > because an act is individual and has a Matter as its subject; but a Sign in > itself is not Matter, since it only *exists* in Replicas. In this sense, > there is no *Sign*-action at all, only *Replica*-action. What Peirce > wrote specifically about a Qualisign pertains to *every* Sign--"It cannot > actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing > to do with its character as a sign" (CP 2.244, EP 2:291; 1903). > > > > Furthermore, since every Quasi-mind is both an individual Sign and a > complex of connected Signs, it likewise cannot actually act as a Quasi-mind > until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its > character as a Quasi-mind. The Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic Sheet) of > Existential Graphs is an embodiment of a *logical* Quasi-mind, while a > biological organism is an embodiment of a *metaphysical* Quasi-mind. > > > Note that the latter is similar to a Thing in that it is an individual > substance. However, it is different in that it is *determinable*--it > possesses Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation as the > accumulated Immediate Objects and Final Interpretants, respectively, of the > *previous* Signs that have *already* determined it; and it has the > capacity for Habit-change when *subsequent* Signs produce *new *Final > Interpretants. In other words, it is "an intelligence capable of > learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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