List,
In a separate discussion, Gary F has suggested that the concept of the immediate object "was born in 1904 when Peirce was motivated to distinguish between two kinds of objects. For me, understanding what motivated that distinction, in the context of a taxonomy of signs, and what motivated further refinements of the notion (especially in 1907 in the context of pragmatism), is the very essence of understanding what the term means. It’s a matter of fact that Peirce wrote some things about it in 1904 and other things in 1907. I have no motivation to devise a definition of the term that will subordinate those facts to a monolithic overview of “Peircean semiotic” that will present it as a finished product. To me, it never was and never will be a finished product — in this respect it resembles Peirce’s “perfect sign” (and not incidentally, my own Turning Signs)." In response, I don't think the concept was born at that time. Rather, Peirce framed a way of using a set of distinctions between immediate and dynamical objects, and between three sorts of interpretants some time around 1904 for the sake of supplying a more refined classification of signs based on the character of each and the relations that obtain between them. In doing, so, he continued to refine the terminology he was employing for the different classes of signs based on these distinctions and to develop some new hypotheses about their character, but it goes too far to say the concept of the immediate object was born at this time. Instead, I believe that Peirce used that concept in central arguments from early on--as is clear from his published work in "Questions" and "Consequences." Here is what he says in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man": 5.241. In the first place, then, the difference between what is imagined or dreamed and what is actually experienced, is no argument in favor of the existence of such a faculty. For it is not questioned that there are distinctions in what is present to the mind, but the question is, whether independently of any such distinctions in the immediate objects of consciousness, we have any immediate power of distinguishing different modes of consciousness. Now, the very fact of the immense difference in the immediate objects of sense and imagination, sufficiently accounts for our distinguishing those faculties; and instead of being an argument in favor of the existence of an intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective elements of consciousness, it is a powerful reply to any such argument, so far as the distinction of sense and imagination is concerned. And in Consequences, he draws out some of the implications: 5.286. (3) The thought-sign stands for its object in the respect which is thought; that is to say, this respect is the immediate object of consciousness in the thought, or, in other words, it is the thought itself, or at least what the thought is thought to be in the subsequent thought to which it is a sign. This looks to me like the concept of an immediate object that is entirely continuous with the conception in his later writings. While I admit that he is refining his account of this conception and exploring various ways of understanding and using it, I think it is pretty much the same concept as before. Note that in "Consequences", he is not simply talking about an immediate object of consciousness. Rather, he is drawing out the consequences of his earlier hypotheses and characterize an immediate object that is part of sign--and it is represented in that sign in relation to a further interpretant. As such, I think that a natural reading of this passage is that the immediate object of a sign is (1) a part of a sign of the real object that determined the sign and (2) it is part of that sign in relation to a further interpretant that interprets it to be part of the sign and to stand in a relation to the real object. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, March 16, 2018 7:14:36 AM To: 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Gary Richmond' Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard; 'Terry Moore' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] R1467 Jon et al., I don’t have any useful feedback to offer on your definitions, Jon, and I’ll try to explain why, although the more personal reasons will mostly elude my explanation. First, regarding the Bellucci book (which I’ve now read except for the last chapter): both Jeff and Jon see a lack of logical order in it, which for them is a defect. For me, on the other hand, it’s an advantage. Or at least the chronological order of the book, combined with its thoroughness, is its greatest virtue, for me. Bellucci simply starts with Peirce’s remarks about signs in 1865, considered in their logical (and mostly Kantian) background, and follows the development of Peirce’s speculative grammar right up to the end of his life, following all the innovations and twists and turns and modifications and refinements and sometimes reversals that it went through. For me this is ideal because it enables me to follow Peirce’s argument as it developed, one text at a time. And I’ve always felt that I learn more from following Peirce’s thought process than I have from trying to summarize it or select key points and rearrange them into a neatly logical package — although I certainly did try to do that, until quite recently. For instance, take the case of the immediate object. This concept was born in 1904 when Peirce was motivated to distinguish between two kinds of objects. For me, understanding what motivated that distinction, in the context of a taxonomy of signs, and what motivated further refinements of the notion (especially in 1907 in the context of pragmatism), is the very essence of understanding what the term means. It’s a matter of fact that Peirce wrote some things about it in 1904 and other things in 1907. I have no motivation to devise a definition of the term that will subordinate those facts to a monolithic overview of “Peircean semiotic” that will present it as a finished product. To me, it never was and never will be a finished product — in this respect it resembles Peirce’s “perfect sign” (and not incidentally, my own Turning Signs). Jon, when you posted a collection of direct (and dated) quotes from Peirce about the “perfect sign,” or about “quasi-mind”, I appreciated that. But the more you added in the way of explanation and/or summary, the more I felt that the concepts were being obscured or distorted rather than clarified. So I raised some objections on the list, to which you responded quite cogently. But now I don’t even feel motivated to post either objections or agreements as they occur to me. All I want to do is follow what Peirce said with a better understanding of why he said it when he said it. I think of him as an inquiring mind who picked up the phenomenon of semiosis, observed it from various angles and recorded his observations, and that is the process I want to participate in — with my full attention not on Peirce but on the phenomenon he was examining at the time. I’ve found Bellucci’s book perfectly suited to that process. I don’t mean to suggest that there’s anything wrong with the project you’re engaged in, Jon (or Gary’s or Jeff’s). It’s a project that you are well motivated to carry forward and I’m not, that’s all — partly because I lack the energy and partly for personal reasons irrelevant to this discussion. I have every confidence that you will carry it forward to results that will continue to be beneficial to Peirce scholarship. By the way, I’ve been extremely annoyed by the posters to peirce-l who seem to be proud of their lack of interest in your project, while they blather on ad nauseam about their own bleary-eyed impressions of Peirce. (The number of subscribers whose posts I delete unread has risen lately to 6 or 7, and even your responses to them I skim pretty fast, so I may be missing some of your good ideas because of that. My patience seems to be in short supply these days, at least with email.) Anyway, rather than blather on myself, I should get back to my transcription work, to finishing the last chapter of Bellucci’s book, and to a couple of projects that I haven’t mentioned here. In the meantime I’ll be perusing any mail I get from any of you, but don’t be discouraged if I don’t respond. Sometimes I just have nothing worth saying. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 15-Mar-18 22:02 To: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]>; Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]>; Terry Moore <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] R1467 All: I wonder if the new (and still tentative) definitions that I have been considering for the semiotic Correlates, formulated in accordance with what I have recently been calling the metaphysics of semiosis, might offer some food for thought in this context. In any case, I would welcome your feedback on them, since I have not yet posted them on the List. * The Dynamic Object is the Matter that the Sign denotes. * The Immediate Object is the Form that the Sign signifies. * The Immediate Interpretant is the Form that the Sign communicates. * The Dynamic Interpretant is the Matter that the Sign determines. * The Final Interpretant is the Entelechy that the Sign intends, which is the unity of Matter (DI) and Form (II). Ripples in a lake and shadows on the ground result from "the determination of Matter by Form, and the blind reaction of Matter with Matter" (NEM 4:297; 1904); i.e., dyadic dynamical action among Things. However, such behaviors are governed by the Real (and inveterate) habits of the Matter that render it intelligible, such that the Form--at least to some partial extent--is capable of being apprehended by an interpreting Quasi-mind. It is only when this occurs in a concrete instance that the Matter becomes a Dynamic Object, the Form becomes an Immediate Object, and the ripples or shadows become a (natural) Sign--or more accurately, a Replica of a Sign. After all, "a sign has its being in the power to bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an act of bringing it about ... [because] there is no such act" (NEM 4:300; 1904); and a Sign "cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign" (EP 2:291; 1903). In this respect, there is no sharp distinction between thought-Signs (and other Symbols), material Indices, and Icons--all Signs are "of such a nature as to exist [only] in replicas" (EP 2:303; 1904). Hence we must be careful not to conflate the embodiment of a Sign, whether natural or genuine, with the Sign itself. Every Sign has a Dynamic Object, an Immediate Object, and the capacity to produce Interpretants; these are jointly constitutive of what it means to be a Sign at all. Regards, Jon S.
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