List: In starting this new thread, Jeff included my off-List message below, which could use some additional context to explain why I specifically mentioned ripples in a lake and shadows on the ground. I was responding to the following statements that he and Gary R. had made.
JBD: Roughly put, I tend to think of the immediate object of a thought-sign as a technical way of talking in the context of a normative theory of semiotics about the "object as we are conscious of it" or "the object as it is represented in a thought-sign" or the "intentional object" of a belief. The initial question is not, "how can thoughts have such objects of consciousness?", but rather, "what are the grounds for saying that some representations are correct and others are in error in terms of the relation that holds between the object of our thought and the dynamical object as it really is?" As such, it might make sense to say that only thought-signs have immediate objects, but that material indices (e.g., the ripples a lake indicating the direction the wind is blowing) and icons (e.g., a shadow as a yet unseen image of an object's shape) do not. If we restrict ourselves to thought-signs, and we accept that all thoughts-signs are parts of inferential processes, then the question is more a matter of what we should say about the parts of thought signs. That is, the question becomes: do all iconic and indexical rhemes, or do all indexical dicisigns, considered as parts of larger propositional and inferential signs, have immediate objects? GR: But *if* the "material index" (e.g., the ripples a lake indicating the direction the wind is blowing) or ​material icon (e.g., a shadow as a yet unseen image of an object's shape) *function* *as* signs and are not just analytical abstractions, then there will be some human (or other animal, perhaps even a plant) which grasps in its consciousness (if not necessarily its 'thought') the 'indicating' (it would already has collateral knowledge of 'direction' in your example), or the 'iconicity' which might suggest or hint at some object. GR: I'm not sure how biosemioticians might see this, but certainly we all see animals responding to signs in nature, and I can certainly imagine them having an Immediate Object which becomes a Representamen determining the Interpretant which would result in their fleeing because of signs of a forest fire, say, or a hare responding to the shadow of a paper kite which it misinterprets as a falcon on the hunt. So, I find your *first* "restriction" to (human) thought signs perhaps premature. But you have at least made me see this as an unsettled point. GR: Those interesting questions suggest to me restrictions upon the restriction noted above. So you seem to me to be assuming that Bellucci is right in writing that only thought-signs have immediate objects and that Peirce is wrong in saying that all signs (in sign-action, mind you, not as isolated abstractions) have immediate objects. Obviously my new (and still tentative) definitions for the Correlates are an outcome of my ongoing exploration of concrete semiosis using the metaphysical terms of Form, Matter, and Entelechy as Peirce employed them. I have also been experimenting with Sign classification in accordance with them. Each *internal* (formal) Correlate, including the Sign itself, is divided according to its *phaneroscopic* nature; i.e., its Mode of Apprehension or Presentation. Each *external* (material) Correlate is divided according to its *ontological* nature; i.e., its Mode of Being. The *telic* (final) Correlate is divided according to its *normative* nature; i.e., its Purpose. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 12:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 15-Mar-18 22:02 > *To:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]>; Gary Fuhrman < > [email protected]>; Terry Moore <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] R1467 > > > > All: > > I wonder if the new (and still tentative) definitions that I have been > considering for the semiotic Correlates, formulated in accordance with what > I have recently been calling the metaphysics of semiosis, might offer some > food for thought in this context. In any case, I would welcome your > feedback on them, since I have not yet posted them on the List. > > - The Dynamic Object is the Matter that the Sign *denotes*. > - The Immediate Object is the Form that the Sign *signifies*. > - The Immediate Interpretant is the Form that the Sign *communicates*. > - The Dynamic Interpretant is the Matter that the Sign *determines*. > - The Final Interpretant is the Entelechy that the Sign *intends*, > which is the unity of Matter (DI) and Form (II). > > Ripples in a lake and shadows on the ground result from "the determination > of Matter by Form, and the blind reaction of Matter with Matter" (NEM > 4:297; 1904); i.e., dyadic dynamical action among Things. However, such > behaviors are *governed *by the Real (and inveterate) habits of the > Matter that render it intelligible, such that the Form--at least to some > partial extent--is capable of being apprehended by an interpreting > Quasi-mind. > > > > It is only when this occurs in a concrete instance that the Matter becomes > a Dynamic Object, the Form becomes an Immediate Object, and the ripples or > shadows become a (natural) Sign--or more accurately, a Replica of a Sign. > After all, "a sign has its being in the *power *to bring about a > determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an *act *of bringing it about > ... [because] there is no such act" (NEM 4:300; 1904); and a Sign "cannot > actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing > to do with its character as a sign" (EP 2:291; 1903). > > > > In this respect, there is no sharp distinction between thought-Signs (and > other Symbols), material Indices, and Icons--*all *Signs are "of such a > nature as to exist [only] in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; 1904). Hence we must > be careful not to conflate the *embodiment *of a Sign, whether natural or > genuine, with the Sign *itself*. Every Sign has a Dynamic Object, an > Immediate Object, and the capacity to produce Interpretants; these are > jointly constitutive of what it means to *be *a Sign at all. > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon S. >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
