Gary R, Jon AS, and Edwina,
JFS: My only point is that if any of those definitions are precise, then
they cannot be the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define.
If so, Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's
term -- they should choose a different word or phrase of their own..
GR: The "hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define" might yet be
clarified in the very terms he created and used. That clarification
affects the 'haziness', not necessarily the concepts as such, nor
the terminology being considered. What Jon seems to be doing, at
least in part, is to bring these concepts together into a well
organized structure for our contemplation.
There are two kinds of clarifications: (1) Take a vague term and
define a precise special case for use in science or engineering;
(2) Define a completely new concept that is only indirectly related
to the cloud of meanings of the previously "hazy" term.
For non-controversial examples of (1), I'll mention some words
that Galileo, Kepler, and Newton redefined: position, velocity,
acceleration, gravity, mass, force, momentum, energy...
For the first four words (position to gravity), they made them more
precise. For example, Newton defined velocity as the first derivative
of position with respect to time, and acceleration as the second
derivative. That made the computation more precise, but it didn't
change the concepts.
For gravity, Galileo defined a precise formula for relating gravity
to speed and acceleration. He used experimental data that did not
change the concept. But Newton generalized the earthbound concept
to one that explained Kepler's observations about the universe.
But that generalization included the old concept as a special case.
The other four words were and are used in an open-ended variety
of informal ways. For science, they had been debated and defined
in many ways, but there was no accepted theory for relating them --
until Newton created precise definitions and theories for them.
For those examples, Peirce (and everybody else) would approve
of using those words with the definitions by Newton (and by
later scientists who extended and corrected Newton).
But note that Galileo, Kepler, and Newton invented experimental
and theoretical methods that were very different from earlier
versions. In Peirce's terms, they started with completely
new *abductions* before they did their inductions, deductions,
and testing.
JAS
These are the ten trichotomies (CP 8.344-374, EP 2:482-490; 1908)
that serve as the basis for identifying 66 classes of Signs, once
they are arranged into the proper "order of determination" (EP 2:481;
1908)--a task that Peirce himself never completed, which is probably
why I find it so fascinating to explore.
I agree that it's fascinating and worth exploring.
But I suspect that there are reasons whey Peirce never completed them.
The short answer is continuity. As he said, symbols evolve from icons
and other symbols. A pointing finger is an index. A pronoun like 'it'
serves as an index, but as a word, 'it' is also a symbol. Pronouns
like 'he' or 'she' also convey the same information as the purely
symbolic words 'male' and 'female'. And what about the proposals for
new pronouns by the LGBT community?
The problem of fitting those intermediate cases into the ten classes
is nontrivial. Even worse, how would they fit into 66 classes?
JAS
What are the practical implications of all this? I have no idea;
and since, as Gary R. noted, this is (so far) a strictly theoretical
inquiry, it really does not matter.
I don't believe that Peirce would say that theoretical inquiry does
not matter. As he said, every concept must "show its passport" at
the gates of perception and action.
ET
I am more interested in the operation of the semiosic process as
complex; I'm interested in how, for example, a plant can gather
information about its changing environment and develop new habits
of its formation, such that the next generation of that same plant
is adaptive and evolving.
Those are important practical issues that have important practical
consequences. But I don't see any reason why Edwina's applications
should conflict with Jon's theoretical interests. Both of their
interests would fall into case (2): "Define a completely new
concept that is only indirectly related to the cloud of meanings
of the previously hazy term."
As a suggestion, I would say that both Jon and Edwina are pursuing
directions that were inspired by, but different from Peirce's.
They could cite Peirce as the starting point for their research,
but use different words from those that Peirce admitted were hazy.
At the end of their research, they might or might not find some
convergence or divergences to or from Peirce or each other.
Meanwhile, I doubt that arguing over terminology is a fruitful
direction for them or for the rest of us.
John
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