Jon, one question re your statement: “… he had defined the Intentional 
Interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer" (SS 196, EP 
2:478).  Apparently he realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an 
Interpretant of the Sign that the utterer is currently uttering …”

Why not?

Gary f.

} We read the world wrong and say that it deceives us. [Tagore] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
Sent: 20-Mar-18 13:13
To: [email protected]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

 

List:

 

In a draft letter to Victoria Lady Welby, Peirce asserted that "every sign … 
must be a determination of a quasi-mind," which "is itself a sign, a 
determinable sign" (SS 195; all citations 1906 unless noted otherwise).  He 
then defined a Sign as "any medium for the communication or extension of a 
Form" (SS 196, EP 2:477), and went on to describe an instance of semiosis as 
follows.

 

CSP:  There is the Intentional lnterpretant, which is a determination of the 
mind of the utterer; the Effectual lnterpretant, which is a determination of 
the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational lnterpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. (SS 196-197, EP 2:478)

 

The Effectual Interpretant is almost certainly the Dynamic Interpretant as the 
feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign actually determines the 
interpreting Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.536).  In the secondary literature, there 
seems to be a general consensus that the Intentional and Communicational 
Interpretants are the Immediate and Final Interpretants, respectively.  For 
example, the EP editors imply this in a note on the quoted passage.

 

PEP:  In the Logic Notebook (MS 339:531, 533, 541-44), the Intentional 
Interpretant is also called the Intended, Impressional, or Initial 
Interpretant; the Effectual Interpretant is also called the Factual, Middle, or 
Dynamic Interpretant; and the Communicational Interpretant is also called the 
Normal, Habitual, or Eventual Interpretant. (EP 2:555n2)

 

However, Peirce did not actually mention the Intentional, Effectual, or 
Communicational Interpretants at all in that particular manuscript (with pages 
numbered per the microfilm images [and by Peirce himself], R 339:412[275r], 
414[276r], 422-425[283r-286r]).  Fortunately, he did make some relevant remarks 
right after briefly defining the Normal, Dynamic, and Immediate Interpretants.

 

CSP:  I have thus omitted the intended interpretant.  So far as the intention 
is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant.  So far as 
it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in 
no sense the interpretant of that sign. (R 339:414[276r])

 

Peirce thus explained why he switched from Intended on one page (275r, dated 
March 31) to Immediate on the next (276r, dated April 2).  Only a few weeks 
previously (March 9), he had defined the Intentional Interpretant as "a 
determination of the mind of the utterer" (SS 196, EP 2:478).  Apparently he 
realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an Interpretant of the Sign that 
the utterer is currently uttering; instead, it must be an Interpretant of a 
previous Sign determined by the same Dynamic Object.  Hence it is a Final 
Interpretant in the sense of being the last outcome of semiosis prior to the 
instance being analyzed; i.e., the Intentional Interpretant is the antecedent 
Sign whose own Dynamic Interpretant is the Sign now being uttered.

 

Moreover, a few months later (August 27), Peirce characterized two of the ten 
divisions of Signs as being "according to the Purpose of the Eventual 
Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the Sign is 
intended to exert" (R 339:424[285r]; emphases added).  The latter is the 
familiar trichotomy for the Relation of the Sign to its Final Interpretant as 
Rheme/Dicisign/Argument, here crossed out and replaced with Seme/Pheme/Delome.

 

As for the Communicational Interpretant, it is important to pay careful 
attention to how Peirce described the mind of which it is a determination.

 

CSP:  This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and must 
be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order 
that the sign in question should fulfill its function … Thus the Form conveyed 
is always a determination of the dynamical object of the commind. (SS 197, EP 
2:478)

 

The essential ingredient of the utterer is the Dynamic Object, which determines 
the Sign; that of the interpreter is the Dynamic Interpretant, which the Sign 
determines; and that of the Commens is the Sign itself, which welds the utterer 
and interpreter into one Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.551).  The Sign serves as a 
medium for the communication of a Form from the Dynamic Object to the Dynamic 
Interpretant, both of which are external to the Sign (cf. EP 2:389-391 & EP 
2:544n22).

 

However, any determination of the Commens must be something that is internal to 
the Sign.  Therefore, the Communicational Interpretant is the Immediate 
Interpretant, rather than the Final Interpretant.  It is "the interpretant as 
it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily 
called the meaning of the sign" (CP 4.536); i.e., "that which it conveys" (CP 
1.339; no date), which is a Form.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

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